Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-109 (2007)

Susan Brower-Toland
Saint Louis University
Introduction In this paper I examine William Ockham's theory of judgment — in particular, his account of the nature and ontological Status of its objects. ‘Judgment’ is the expression Ockham and other medieval thinkers use to refer to a certain subset of what philosophers nowadays call ‘propositional attitudes’. Judgments include all and only those mental states in which a subject not only entertains a given propositional content, but also takes some positive stance with respect to its truth. For Ockham, therefore, as for other medievals, a judgment is a type of mental State that includes attitudes such as belief, knowledge, opinion, doubt, faith, and so on.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI cjphil200737118
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,307
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Science, Perception, and Reality.Keith Lehrer - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (10):266-277.
Summary of "Elements of Mind" and Replies to Critics.Tim Crane - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.
The Intentionality All-Stars.John Haugeland - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:383-427.
Meinong's theory of objects and values.J. N. Findlay - 1971 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:497-497.
Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality.Victor Caston - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):249-298.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Ockham's Scientia Argument for Mental Language.Eric W. Hagedorn - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 3:145-168.
The Early Reception of Peter Auriol at Oxford.Rondo Keele - 2015 - Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 82:301-361.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Ockham on Concepts (Review). [REVIEW]Rondo Keele - 2007 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (4):659-660.
Hard Problems of Intentionality.Marc Rowlands - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):741-746.
A Contradiction in Ockham's Theory of Language.Donald Nute - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 25 (6):417 - 422.
The Intentionality of Formal Systems.Ard Van Moer - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (1-2):81-119.
Aristotle and Cognitive Intentionality.Gregory Thomas Smith - 2002 - Dissertation, The Florida State University
Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (4):317-336.


Added to PP index

Total views
1 ( #1,546,483 of 2,507,718 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,820 of 2,507,718 )

How can I increase my downloads?


Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes