Emotion and Thought in Hume's Treatise

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (sup1):53-71 (1975)

Abstract

In this paper I examine Hume's theory of the emotions, as presented in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, paying particular attention to what he has to say about the relationships between emotion and thought. I begin by presenting, in some detail, Hume's views about the nature of the emotions, their causes, and their objects. I then consider the bearing of the private language argument on Hume's theory, and try to show that it is not sufficient to reveal the weaknesses in Hume's account of the connections between emotion and thought. Lastly, and most extensively, I attempt to show that Hume's account of these connectiosn is in fact unacceptable, and I argue that his basic mistake is that of construing emotions as sensations. Along the way I sketch in the outlines of what I take to be a more adequate theory of emotion and thought.

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Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. Anscombe & G. Granger - 1989 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 45 (2):293-294.

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