Why the dynamical hypothesis cannot qualify as a law of qualitative structure

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):630-631 (1998)
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Abstract

Van Gelder presents the dynamical hypothesis as a novel law of qualitative structure to compete with Newell and Simon's (1976) physical symbol systems hypothesis. Unlike Newell and Simon's hypothesis, the dynamical hypothesis fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for cognition. Furthermore, imprecision in the statement of the dynamical hypothesis renders it unfalsifiable.

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