Resisting the tyranny of terminology: The general dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):643-643 (1998)
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Abstract

What van Gelder calls the dynamical hypothesis is only a special case of what we here dub the general dynamical hypothesis. His terminology makes it easy to overlook important alternative dynamical approaches in cognitive science. Connectionist models typically conform to the general dynamical hypothesis, but not to van Gelder's.

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Terry Horgan
University of Arizona

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