Epistemic circularity: Malignant and benign

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727 (2004)
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Abstract

* Editor’s Note: This paper won the Young Epistemologist Prize for the Rutgers Epistemology conference held in 2003.

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2007

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00318205

DOI

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00524.x

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Michael Bergmann
Purdue University

Citations of this work

Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin Goldman & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.
Political Realism and Epistemic Constraints.Ugur Aytac - 2022 - Social Theory and Practice 48 (1):1-27.

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.

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