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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1965)
Abstract
In his new foreword to this edition, Hilary Putnam forcefully rejects these nativist claims.Reprint years
1983
Call number
BC91.G66 1983
ISBN(s)
0674290712 9780674290716 0674290704 0672613476 9780672613470
DOI
10.2307/2103789
Links
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Citations of this work
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.
Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
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