Potentials and burdens: a reply to Giubilini and Minerva

Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):341-344 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This article responds to Giubilini and Minerva’s article ‘After birth abortion: why should the baby live?’ published in the Journal of Medical Ethics. They argue for the permissibility of ‘after-birth abortion’, based on two conjoined considerations: (1) the fetus or newborn, though a ‘potential person’, is not an actual person, because it is not mature enough to appreciate its own interests, and (2) because we allow parents to terminate the life of a fetus when it is diagnosed with a deformity or fatal illness because of the burden it will place on the child, parent, family or society we should also allow parents to do the same to their newborn, since it is no more a person than the fetus. The author critiques this case by pointing out (a) the metaphysical ambiguity of potential personhood and (b) why the appeal to burdens is irrelevant or unnecessary



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):261-263.
Abortion, infanticide and moral context.Lindsey Porter - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):350-352.
Capacity, harm and experience in the life of persons as equals.John Finnis - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):281-283.
After-birth abortion: the intuition argument.Zohar Lederman - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):5-5.
Killing fetuses and killing newborns.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):19-20.
The moral significance of being born.Neil Levy - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):326-329.


Added to PP

57 (#256,407)

6 months
4 (#368,572)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Modal Properties, Moral Status, and Identity.David S. Oderberg - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):259-276.

Add more references