Lakatos and Hersh on Mathematical Proof

Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 9 (17):75-93 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The concept of Mathematical Proof has been controversial for the past few decades. Different philosophers have offered different theories about the nature of Mathematical Proof, among which theories presented by Lakatos and Hersh have had significant similarities and differences with each other. It seems that a comparison and critical review of these two theories will lead to a better understanding of the concept of mathematical proof and will be a big step towards solving many related problems. Lakatos and Hersh argue that, firstly, “mathematical proof” has two different meanings, formal and informal; and, secondly, informal proofs are affected by human factors, such as individual decisions and collective agreements. I call these two thesis, respectively, “proof dualism” and “humanism”. But on the other hand, their theories have significant dissimilarities and are by no means equivalent. Lakatos is committed to linear proof dualism and methodological humanism, while Hersh’s theory involves some sort of parallel proof dualism and sociological humanism. According to linear proof dualism, the two main types of proofs are provided in order to achieve a common goal: incarnation of mathematical concepts and methods and truth. However, according to the parallel proof dualism, two main types of proofs are provided in order to achieve two different types of purposes: production of a valid sequence of signs (the goal of the formal proof) and persuasion of the audience (the goal of the informal proof). Hersh’s humanism is informative and indicates pluralism; whereas, Lakatos’ version of humanism is normative and monistic.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,503

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mathematical Fit: A Case Study.Manya Raman-Sundström & Lars-Daniel Öhman - forthcoming - Philosophia Mathematica:nkw015.
Arguing Around Mathematical Proofs.Michel Dufour - 2013 - In Andrew Aberdein & Ian J. Dove (eds.), The Argument of Mathematics. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 61-76.
Mathematical reasoning: induction, deduction and beyond.David Sherry - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):489-504.
What is a Proof?Reinhard Kahle - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):79-91.
Syntax-directed discovery in mathematics.David S. Henley - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (2):241 - 259.
Mathematical proofs.Marco Panza - 2003 - Synthese 134 (1-2):119 - 158.
A Mathematical Bildungsroman.John Kadvany - 1989 - History and Theory 28 (1):25-42.
Proof-theoretical analysis of order relations.Sara Negri, Jan von Plato & Thierry Coquand - 2004 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 43 (3):297-309.
60% Proof Lakatos, Proof, and Paraconsistency.Graham Priest & Neil Thomason - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Logic 5:89-100.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-12-16

Downloads
16 (#899,259)

6 months
5 (#626,991)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The nature of mathematical knowledge.Philip Kitcher - 1983 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What is Mathematics, Really?Reuben Hersh - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Proofs and Refutations.Imre Lakatos - 1980 - Noûs 14 (3):474-478.
Proofs and Refutations. The Logic of Mathematical Discovery.I. Lakatos - 1977 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 39 (4):715-715.
Proofs and refutations (I).Imre Lakatos - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (53):1-25.

View all 12 references / Add more references