Platonism is the most pervasive philosophy of mathematics. Indeed, it can be argued that an inarticulate, half-conscious Platonism is nearly universal among mathematicians. The basic idea is that mathematical entities exist outside space and time, outside thought and matter, in an abstract realm. In the more eloquent words of Edward Everett, a distinguished nineteenth-century American scholar, "in pure mathematics we contemplate absolute truths which existed in the divine mind before the morning stars sang together, and which will continue to exist (...) there when the last of their radiant host shall have fallen from heaven." In What is Mathematics, Really?, renowned mathematician Rueben Hersh takes these eloquent words and this pervasive philosophy to task, in a subversive attack on traditional philosophies of mathematics, most notably, Platonism and formalism. Virtually all philosophers of mathematics treat it as isolated, timeless, ahistorical, inhuman. Hersh argues the contrary, that mathematics must be understood as a human activity, a social phenomenon, part of human culture, historically evolved, and intelligible only in a social context. Mathematical objects are created by humans, not arbitrarily, but from activity with existing mathematical objects, and from the needs of science and daily life. Hersh pulls the screen back to reveal mathematics as seen by professionals, debunking many mathematical myths, and demonstrating how the "humanist" idea of the nature of mathematics more closely resembles how mathematicians actually work. At the heart of the book is a fascinating historical account of the mainstream of philosophy--ranging from Pythagoras, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, to Bertrand Russell, David Hilbert, Rudolph Carnap, and Willard V.O. Quine--followed by the mavericks who saw mathematics as a human artifact, including Aristotle, Locke, Hume, Mill, Peirce, Dewey, and Lakatos. In his epilogue, Hersh reveals that this is no mere armchair debate, of little consequence to the outside world. He contends that Platonism and elitism fit well together, that Platonism in fact is used to justify the claim that "some people just can't learn math." The humanist philosophy, on the other hand, links mathematics with geople, with society, and with history. It fits with liberal anti-elitism and its historical striving for universal literacy, universal higher education, and universal access to knowledge and culture. Thus Hersh's argument has educational and political ramifications. Written by the co-author of The Mathematical Experience, which won the American Book Award in 1983, this volume reflects an insider's view of mathematical life, based on twenty years of doing research on advanced mathematical problems, thirty-five years of teaching graduates and undergraduates, and many long hours of listening, talking to, and reading philosophers. A clearly written and highly iconoclastic book, it is sure to be hotly debated by anyone with a passionate interest in mathematics or the philosophy of science. (shrink)

It is explained that, in the sense of the sociologist Erving Goffman, mathematics has a front and a back. Four pervasive myths about mathematics are stated. Acceptance of these myths is related to whether one is located in the front or the back.

"This new collection of essays edited by Reuben Hersh contains frank facts and opinions from leading mathematicians, philosophers, sociologists, cognitive ...

There are two distinct meanings to ‘mathematical proof’. The connection between them is an unsolved problem. The first step in attacking it is noticing that it is an unsolved problem.

Among the universal attributes of homo sapiens, several have become established as special fields of study—language, art and music, religion, and political economy. But mathematics, another universal attribute of our species, is still modeled separately by logicians, historians, neuroscientists, and others. Could it be integrated into “mathematics studies,” a coherent, many-faceted branch of empirical science? Could philosophers facilitate such a unification? Some philosophers of mathematics identify themselves with “positions” on the nature of mathematics. Those “positions” could more productively serve as (...) models of mathematics. (shrink)

In my article on proof [Philosophia Mathematica (3) 5 (1997), 153—165], I suggested or intimated that computer proofs of mathematical theorems had been found only for relatively simple or trivial theorems. I am obligated to Martin Davis and R. S. Boyer for the information that this suggestion or intimation is incorrect. For instance, a machine proof of quadratic reciprocity was published by D. M. Russinoff in J. Automated Reasoning 8 (1992), 3–21. A machine proof of the unsolvability of the halting (...) problem has been published by R S. Boyer and J. S. Moore. This and many other examples are presented in Chapter 1 of their book, A Computational Logic Handbook, Academic Press, 1990. A second edition of this book is expected shortly. (shrink)

It is argued that there can only be a small-finite number of mathematical objects; that these objects range from the very concrete to the very abstract; and that mathematics is essentially not concerned with objects but with concepts. This viewpoint is described as "mentalist" and is upheld over Platonism, intuitionism, and formalism.