# Mathematical rigor, proof gap and the validity of mathematical inference

Philosophia Scientiae 18 (1):7-26 (2014)

# Abstract

Mathematical rigor is commonly formulated by mathematicians and philosophers using the notion of proof gap: a mathematical proof is rig­orous when there is no gaps in the mathematical reasoning of the proof. Any philosophical approach to mathematical rigor along this line requires then an account of what a proof gap is. However, the notion of proof gap makes sense only relatively to a given conception of valid mathematical reasoning, i.e., to a given conception of the validity of mathematical inference. A proof gap can in particular be conceived as a failure in drawing a valid mathematical inference. The aim of this paper is to discuss two possible views of the validity of math­ematical inference with respect to their capacity to yield a plausible account of the intuitive notion(s) of proof gap present in mathematical practice. The first view is the one provided by the contemporary standards of mathematical rigor: a mathematical inference is valid if and only if its conclusion can be formally derived from its premises. We will argue that this conception does not lead to a plausible account of the intuitive notion(s) of proof gap. The second view is based on a new account of the validity of inference proposed by Prawitz: an inference is valid if and only if it consists in an operation that provides a ground for its conclusion given (previously obtained) grounds for its premises. We will first specify Prawitz's account to mathematical inference and we will then argue that the resulting ground-based account is able to capture various intuitive notions of proof gap as different types of failure in drawing valid mathematical inferences. We conclude that the ground-based account ap­pears of particular interest for the philosophy of mathematical practice, and we finally raise several challenges facing a full development of a ground-based account of the notions of mathematical rigor, proof gap and the validity of mathematical inference

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2014-07-23

77 (#226,734)

6 months
21 (#189,159)

Yacin Hamami
ETH Zurich

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