1. How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses

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Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21 (2009)
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Abstract

Could some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it might, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further, we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.

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10.1086/598164

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Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Edited by Jeanne Peijnenburg.
The whole truth about Linda: probability, verisimilitude and a paradox of conjunction.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2010 - In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. pp. 603--615.
Contrastive Bayesianism.Branden Fitelson - 2013 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

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