Genuine confirmation and tacking by conjunction

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1):321-352 (2018)
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Abstract

Tacking by conjunction is a deep problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. It is based on the insight that to each hypothesis h that is confirmed by a piece of evidence e one can ‘tack’ an irrelevant hypothesis h′ so that h∧h′ is also confirmed by e. This seems counter-intuitive. Existing Bayesian solution proposals try to soften the negative impact of this result by showing that although h∧h′ is confirmed by e, it is so only to a lower degree. In this article we outline some problems of these proposals and develop an alternative solution based on a new concept of confirmation that we call genuine confirmation. After pointing out that genuine confirmation is a necessary condition for cumulative confirmation we apply this notion to the tacking by conjunction problem. We consider both the question of what happens when irrelevant hypotheses are added to a hypothesis h that is confirmed by e as well as the question of what happens when h is disconfirmed. The upshot of our discussion will be that genuine confirmation provides a robust solution for each of the different perspectives. _1_ Introduction _2_ Tacking by Conjunction: Existing Solution Proposals _3_ Genuine Confirmation _3.1_ Content elements and content parts _3.2_ Qualitative genuine confirmation _3.3_ Quantitative genuine confirmation _4_ Tacking by Conjunction: The Case of Confirmation _5_ Tacking by Conjunction: The Case of Disconfirmation _6_ Tacking by Conjunction: Adding Multiple Hypotheses _7_ Conclusion Appendix

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Author Profiles

Michael Schippers
University of Oldenburg
Gerhard Schurz
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

References found in this work

Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.

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