Grue‐Green and Some Mistakes in Confirmation Theory

Dialectica 28 (3‐4):197-210 (1974)
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Abstract

SummaryIt is argued, contrary to Nelson Goodman, that confirmability is not a semantical property possessed by some hypotheses. Instead, hypotheses are confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis of all relevant information, not just postivie or negative instances

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10.1111/j.1746-8361.1974.tb00636.x

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