Contrastive Bayesianism

In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group (2013)
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Abstract

Bayesianism provides a rich theoretical framework, which lends itself rather naturally to the explication of various “contrastive” and “non-contrastive” concepts. In this (brief) discussion, I will focus on issues involving “contrastivism”, as they arise in some of the recent philosophy of science, epistemology, and cognitive science literature surrounding Bayesian confirmation theory

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

Citations of this work

Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Edited by Jeanne Peijnenburg.
Contrastive mental causation.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 3):861-883.
Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):666-672.

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References found in this work

Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison

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