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How to confirm the disconfirmed. On conjunction fallacies and robust confirmation
Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21 (2009)
Abstract
Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for nine different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
How the conjunction fallacy is tied to probabilistic confirmation: Some remarks on Schupbach (2009).Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):3-12.
A realist partner for Linda: confirming a theoretical hypothesis more than its observational sub-hypothesis.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):63-71.
Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered. [REVIEW]Stephan Hartmann & Wouter Meijs - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):73-87.
References found in this work
Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
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