Semantic defectiveness and the liar

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.

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Author Profiles

Bradley Armour-Garb
State University of New York, Albany
James Woodbridge
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Citations of this work

Nothing Is True.Will Gamester - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):314-338.
Deflationism about Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb, Daniel Stoljar & James Woodbridge - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
From one to many: recent work on truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
Restricting the T‐schema to Solve the Liar.Jared Warren - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):238-258.
Something is true.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):687-705.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
When Truth Gives Out.Mark Richard - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Syntactic Structures.J. F. Staal - 1966 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (2):245-251.

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