Results for 'Liar paradox'

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  1. The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages.Matti Eklund - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (...)
     
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  2. Buddhist Epistemology and the Liar Paradox.Szymon Bogacz - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what (...)
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  3. Liar Paradox.Bradley Dowden - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Liar Paradox is an argument that arrives at a contradiction by reasoning about a Liar Sentence. The classical Liar Sentence is the self-referential sentence “This sentence is false.”.
     
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  4. The Liar-Paradox in a Quantum Mechanical Perspective.Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert & Sonja Smets - 1999 - Foundations of Science 4 (2):115-132.
    In this paper we concentrate on the nature of the liar paradox asa cognitive entity; a consistently testable configuration of properties. We elaborate further on a quantum mechanical model (Aerts, Broekaert and Smets, 1999) that has been proposed to analyze the dynamics involved, and we focus on the interpretation and concomitant philosophical picture. Some conclusions we draw from our model favor an effective realistic interpretation of cognitive reality.
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  5. A Liar Paradox.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):36-40.
    The purpose of this note is to present a strong form of the liar paradox. It is strong because the logical resources needed to generate the paradox are weak, in each of two senses. First, few expressive resources required: conjunction, negation, and identity. In particular, this form of the liar does not need to make any use of the conditional. Second, few inferential resources are required. These are: (i) conjunction introduction; (ii) substitution of identicals; and (iii) (...)
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  6.  52
    A Liar Paradox of Material Implication.Tristan Haze - manuscript
    Here I present a new objection to the material or "hook" analysis of indicative conditionals - the thesis that an indicative conditional 'If A then C' has the truth-conditions of the so-called material conditional - based on Liar-like reasoning. This objection seems invulnerable to any Grice-Lewis-Jackson-inspired pragmatic rejoinder.
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  7.  18
    The Liar Paradox in Plato.Richard McDonough - 2015 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy (1):9-28.
    Although most scholars trace the Liar Paradox to Plato’s contemporary, Eubulides, the paper argues that Plato builds something very like the Liar Paradox into the very structure of his dialogues with significant consequences for understanding his views. After a preliminary exposition of the liar paradox it is argued that Plato builds this paradox into the formulation of many of his central doctrines, including the “Divided Line” and the “Allegory of the Cave” and the (...)
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  8.  23
    The Liar Paradox in the Predictive Mind.Christian Michel - 2020 - Pragmatics and Cognition 26 (2-3):239-266.
    Most discussions frame the Liar Paradox as a formal logical-linguistic puzzle. Attempts to resolve the paradox have focused very little so far on aspects of cognitive psychology and processing, because semantic and cognitive-psychological issues are generally assumed to be disjunct. I provide a motivation and carry out a cognitive-computational treatment of the liar paradox based on a cognitive-computational model of language and conceptual knowledge within the Predictive Processing framework. I suggest that the paradox arises (...)
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  9.  23
    The Liar Paradox in Fifteenth-Century Shiraz: The Exchange Between Ṣadr Al-Dīn Al-Dashtakī and Jalāl Al-Dīn Al-Dawānī.Khaled El-Rouayheb - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):251-275.
    ABSTRACTTwo rival scholars from Shiraz in Persia, Dawānī and Dashtakī engaged in a bitter and extended dispute over a range of metaphysical and logical issues. One of these was the liar paradox. Their debate on this point marked the most extensive scrutiny of the paradox in Arabic until that time. Dashtakī’s solution was to deny that the statement ‘What I say is false’ is true or false, on the ground that there is one statement and one application (...)
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  10. The Liar Paradox, Self-Understanding, and Nietzschean Perspectivalism.Andrew J. Hamilton - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
    The liar paradox in its simplest form is the following argument. Consider the sentence 'this sentence is false'; call that the "liar sentence". Suppose the liar sentence is true. Then, since it says it is false, the liar sentence is false. So our supposition that it is true was mistaken, and the liar sentence must be false. But that's precisely what the liar sentence says, so it is true after all. The liar (...)
     
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  11. The Liar Paradox.JC Beall & Michael Glanzberg - 2010 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. CSLI Publications.
    The first sentence in this essay is a lie. There is something odd about saying so, as has been known since ancient times. To see why, remember that all lies are untrue. Is the first sentence true? If it is, then it is a lie, and so it is not true. Conversely, suppose that it is not true. As we (viz., the authors) have said it, presumably with the intention of you believing it when it is not true, it is (...)
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  12.  1
    The Liar Paradox in the Predictive Mind.Christian Michel - 2019 - Pragmatics Cognition 26 (2-3):239-266.
    Most discussions frame the Liar Paradox as a formal logical-linguistic puzzle. Attempts to resolve the paradox have focused very little so far on aspects of cognitive psychology and processing, because semantic and cognitive-psychological issues are generally assumed to be disjunct. I provide a motivation and carry out a cognitive-computational treatment of the liar paradox based on a model of language and conceptual knowledge within the Predictive Processing framework. I suggest that the paradox arises as (...)
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  13.  7
    The Liar Paradox in the Predictive Mind.Christian Michel - 2019 - Pragmatics and Cognition 26 (2-3):239-266.
    Most discussions frame the Liar Paradox as a formal logical-linguistic puzzle. Attempts to resolve the paradox have focused very little so far on aspects of cognitive psychology and processing, because semantic and cognitive-psychological issues are generally assumed to be disjunct. I provide a motivation and carry out a cognitive-computational treatment of the liar paradox based on a model of language and conceptual knowledge within the Predictive Processing framework. I suggest that the paradox arises as (...)
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  14.  99
    The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema.Emil Badici - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):583 – 596.
    In Beyond the Limits of Thought [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema ). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to 'sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes', because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to (...)
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  15. Liar Paradox and Substitution Into Intensional Contexts.Dale Jacquette - 2010 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):119-147.
    John Barker, in two recent essays, raises a variety of intriguing criticisms to challenge my interpretation of the liar paradox and the type of solution I proposein ‘Denying the Liar’ and ‘Denying the Liar Reaffirmed.’ Barker continues to believe that I have misunderstood the logical structure of the liar sentence and itsexpression, and that as a result my solution misfires. I shall try to show that on the contrary my analysis is correct, and that Barker (...)
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  16. The Liar Paradox.Charles Parsons - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.
  17. The Liar Paradox and Fuzzy Logic.Petr Hajek, Jeff Paris & John Shepherdson - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):339-346.
    Can one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr saying "x is true" and satisfying the "dequotation schema" $\varphi \equiv \text{Tr}$ for all sentences $\varphi$? This problem is investigated in the frame of Lukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.
     
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  18. The Liar Paradox for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Michael Glanzberg - unknown
    The story goes that Epimenides, a Cretan, used to claim that all Cretans are always liars. Whether he knew it or not, this claim is odd. It is easy to see it is odd by asking if it is true or false. If it is true, then all Cretans, including Epimenides, are always liars, in which case what he said must be false. Thus, if what he says is true, it is false. Conversely, suppose what Epimenides said is false. Then (...)
     
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  19. The Liar Paradox in New Clothes.Jeff Snapper - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):319-322.
    Next SectionCharlie Pelling presents an impropriety paradox for the truth account of assertion. After solving his paradox I show that it is a version of the liar paradox. I then show that for any account of truth there is a strengthened liar-like paradox, and that for any solution to the strengthened liar paradox, there is a parallel solution to each of these “new” paradoxes.
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  20.  93
    The Liar Paradox and Fuzzy Logic.Petr Hájek, Jeff Paris & John Shepherdson - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):339-346.
    Can one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr(x) saying "x is true" and satisfying the "dequotation schema" $\varphi \equiv \text{Tr}(\bar{\varphi})$ for all sentences φ? This problem is investigated in the frame of Lukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.
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  21.  74
    The Liar Paradox: Tangles and Chains.Tyler Burge - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (3):353 - 366.
  22. The Liar Paradox From John Buridan Back to Thomas Bradwardine.Stephen Read - 2002 - Vivarium 40 (2):189-218.
  23. The Liar Paradox and the Stoics.Mario Mignucci - 1999 - In Katerina Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy. Clarendon Press.
     
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  24.  8
    The Liar Paradox: Between Evidence and Truth.Jonas Becker Arenhart & Ederson Safra Melo - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-23.
    Systems of paraconsistent logics violate the law of explosion: from contradictory premises not every formula follows. One of the philosophical options for interpreting the contradictions allowed as premises in these cases was put forward recently by Carnielli and Rodrigues, with their epistemic approach to paraconsistent logics. In a nutshell, the plan consists in interpreting the contradictions in epistemic terms, as indicating the presence of non-conclusive evidence for both a proposition and its negation. Truth, in this approach, is consistent and is (...)
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  25. The Liar Paradox and Metaphysics.Matti Eklund - 2006 - In Jurgis Skilters & Matti Eklund (eds.), The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication. University of Latvia Press.
     
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  26. Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox.Patrick Greenough - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):115 - 135.
    A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truth-status (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/not-true essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sequent-calculus. The lesson of the (...) is that not all assumptions are for free. One merit of this proposal is that it is free from the revenge problem. (shrink)
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  27.  44
    Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 339-354.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the (...)
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  28.  80
    Semantics and the Liar Paradox.Albert Visser - 1989 - Handbook of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):617--706.
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  29.  21
    The Liar Paradox and Methods for its Solution.A. I. Uemov - 1977 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 15 (4):92-106.
    There is no need to prove the significance to philosophy of the famous liar paradox. Attempts to solve it have not ceased over the course of many centuries, from hoary antiquity to our own day. The failure of attempts undertaken within the bounds of everyday, natural languages has led many philosophers, particularly of the positivist trend, to pessimistic conclusions with respect to the potentials of such languages. This is very clearly evident, for example, in the statement of A. (...)
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  30.  60
    Al-Taftāzānī on the Liar Paradox.David Sanson & Ahmed Alwishah - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 4 (1).
    Al-Taftāzānī introduces the Liar Paradox, in a commentary on al-Rāzī, in a short passage that is part of a polemic against the ethical rationalism of the Muʿtazila. In this essay, we consider his remarks and their place in the history of the Liar Paradox in Arabic Logic. In the passage, al-Taftāzānī introduces Liar Cycles into the tradition, gives the paradox a puzzling name—the fallacy of the “irrational root” —which became standard, and suggests a connection (...)
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  31. The Liar Paradox, Meaning and Truth.Jiri Raclavsky - 2009 - Filosoficky Casopis 57 (3):325-351.
     
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  32.  29
    Taylor Swift's Liar Paradox.Theresa Helke - 2021 - Philosophy Now 145:34-37.
    With the help of renowned logician Taylor Swift, Theresa Helke introduces four fundamental paradoxes: the Liar, Epimenides’, the Truth-Teller, and the No-No.
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  33.  7
    Liar Paradox and Metaparadox.Dale Jacquette - 2000 - SATS 1 (1):93-104.
  34. Analogues of the Liar Paradox in Systems of Epistemic Logic Representing Meta-Mathematical Reasoning and Strategic Rationality in Non-Cooperative Games.Robert Charles Koons - 1987 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    The ancient puzzle of the Liar was shown by Tarski to be a genuine paradox or antinomy. I show, analogously, that certain puzzles of contemporary game theory are genuinely paradoxical, i.e., certain very plausible principles of rationality, which are in fact presupposed by game theorists, are inconsistent as naively formulated. ;I use Godel theory to construct three versions of this new paradox, in which the role of 'true' in the Liar paradox is played, respectively, by (...)
     
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  35.  54
    The Information Liar Paradox: A Problem for Floridi’s RSDI Definition.Björn Lundgren - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):323-327.
    In this commentary, I discuss the effects of the liar paradox on Floridi’s definition on semantic information. In particular, I show that there is at least one sentence that creates a contradictory result for Floridi’s definition of semantic information that does not affect the standard definition.
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  36.  36
    The Liar Paradox and Many-Valued Logic.S. V. Bhave - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):465-479.
  37. Circularity, Truth, and the Liar Paradox.Andre Chapuis - 1993 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    This dissertation is a study of some recent theories of truth. The theories fall into three groups: The Revision Theories, the context-sensitive theories, and the "Chrysippian theories". ;The "Chrysippian theories" are based on the intuition that pathologicalities arising from the concept of truth can be recognized and acknowledged with the concept of truth itself. Thus, from the pathologicality of the Liar, for example, we can conclude that the Liar is not true. This leads to immediate difficulties since the (...)
     
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  38.  26
    The Liar Paradox.Kuang-Ming Wu - 2015 - Open Journal of Philosophy 5 (5):253-260.
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  39.  17
    The Liar Paradox is a Real Problem.Nik Weaver - 2017 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 25:89-100.
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  40.  15
    The Liar Paradox: An Extensional Alternative to the Situation Semantics Approach.Ulla Wessels & Georg Meggle - 1994 - In Ulla Wessels & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyōmen 1 =. De Gruyter. pp. 421-433.
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  41.  19
    The Liar Paradox.Eric Toms - 1956 - Philosophical Review 65 (4):542-547.
  42.  5
    The Meaning of the Liar Paradox in Randall Jarrell's "Eighth Air Force".Richard McDonough - 2022 - Philosophy and Literature 46 (1):195-207.
    Do logical paradoxes, like Eubulides’s Liar Paradox (the claim that the sentence “I am now lying” is true if and only if it is false), have any “existential” significance or are they mere brain puzzles for the mathematically minded? The paper argues that Randall Jarrell’s poem, “Eighth Air Force”, contains a poetic use of Eubulides’ Liar Paradox, spoken by Pontius Pilate’s wife in her statements about the “murder” of Jesus, in order to capture, symbolically, the inherent (...)
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  43. New Considerations on The 'Liar' Paradox.Wojciech Żełaniec - 2004 - Filozofia Nauki 2.
    In this article the author argues that the 'Liar' Paradox sentence: "This sentence is false" is neither true nor false because it does not express any proposition or "Satz" in the sense of Bernard Bolzano. The difficulty left open is that by a similar line of reasoning also the sentence "This sentence is true" would not express any proposition, yet it is sometimes taken to be true (on the strength of a theorem by Loewe).
     
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  44. Linguistics, Logic and the Liar Paradox. Comments on the Article by A. Gawroński ”The ’Liar Sentence’ as a Recurring Sentence Function (’the Polish Solution’)”.Jan Woleński - 2004 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 25:10-20.
    There are many versions of the Liar Paradox. J. Agassi names 13 of them. But the most important one is related to Tarski’s theorem that the truth predicate is non-definable for systems that are sufficient for the formalisation of elementary arithmetic of natural numbers. Let S be such a system. We assume that S is consistent and that the syntax of S has been arithmetized as understood by G¨odel. Let E be any sentence of S. E ∗ is (...)
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  45.  28
    Mathematical Perspectives on Liar Paradoxes.José-Luis Usó-Doménech, Josué-Antonio Nescolarde-Selva, Lorena Segura-Abad, Kristian Alonso-Stenberg & Hugh Gash - 2021 - Logica Universalis 15 (3):251-269.
    The liar paradox is a famous and ancient paradox related to logic and philosophy. It shows it is perfectly possible to construct sentences that are correct grammatically and semantically but that cannot be true or false in the traditional sense. In this paper the authors show four approaches to interpreting paradoxes that illustrate the influence of: the levels of language, their belonging to indeterminate compatible propositions or indeterminate propositions, being based on universal antinomy and the theory of (...)
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  46. Naive Semantics and the Liar Paradox.Hans G. Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):479-497.
  47. More on 'A Liar Paradox'.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.
    A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".
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  48.  25
    Gene Networks and Liar Paradoxes.Mark Isalan - 2009 - Bioessays 31 (10):1110-1115.
  49. Logic, Language, and the Liar Paradox.Martin Pleitz - 2018 - Münster: Mentis.
     
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  50. Assertion, Denial, and the Liar Paradox.Terence Parsons - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):137 - 152.
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