Mind 111 (444):741-749 (2002)
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to show that Graham Priest's dialetheic account of semantic paradoxes and the paraconsistent logics employed cannot achieve semantic universality. Dialetheism therefore fails as a solution to semantic paradoxes for the same reason that consistent approaches did. It will be demonstrated that if dialetheism can express its own semantic principles, a strengthened liar paradox will result, which renders dialetheism trivial. In particular, the argument is not invalidated by relational valuations, which were brought into paraconsistent logic in order to avoid strengthened liar paradoxes.
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