This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style skepticism about our knowledge of extra-mental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global skeptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are.

Defeasible reasoning is concerned with the logics of non-deductive argument. As is described in the literature, the study of this type of reasoning is considerably more involved than the study of deductive argument, even so that, in realistic applications, there is often a lack of resources to perform an exhaustive analysis. It follows that, in a theory of defeasible reasoning, the order and direction in which arguments are developed, i.e. theprocedure, is important. The aim of this article is to show (...) that debate is the most efficient procedure to argue in the presence of limited resources. To do so, there is first some general theory on defeasible argumentation, which is followed by an introduction to the problem of dialectical search. The problem of dialectical search is (or at least, should be) the essential issue in every theory on argumentation, and emerges at every occasion that involves adjudication on competing arguments. Starting with an example, it is explained that dialectical search can be best scheduled according to classical debating techniques, that work along well-tried methods. These methods (which include various forms of curtailment, interruption, and interpretation) have proven their value in keeping debating efforts within reasonable bounds. How they apply in a theory of formal argument, will be shown in this article. (shrink)

This paper critically explores Timothy Williamson’s view of evidence, and it does so in light of the problem of epistemic luck. Williamson’s view of evidence is, of course, a crucially important aspect of his novel and influential “knowledge-first” epistemological project. Notoriously, one crucial thesis of this project is that one’s evidence is equivalent to what one knows. This has come to be known as the E = K thesis. This paper specifically addresses Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology and the E = K (...) thesis in the context of anti-luck epistemology and the idea that knowledge is factive. Williamson’s views on these matters are worth investigating in some detail because he subscribes to a well-worked out anti-luck view of knowledge that incorporates what is perhaps the most common anti-luck condition. But this paper is also of more general importance because the critique of Williamson’s views on these matters reveals some important things about the nature of evidence and evidence is one of the most fundamental concepts in epistemology. (shrink)

This is an editorial introduction to a special issue of Acta Analytica on epistemic luck.

Pričujoči tekst analizira možnost utemeljitve epistemske teorije, ki bo zagotavljala upravičene in upravičljive kriterije za to, kdaj je določeno prepričanje znanje. Izhodišče nam predstavlja Goldmanovo teorijo reliabilnosti, kjer je določeno prepričanje epistemsko upravičeno le, če je dobljeno na osnovi procesov in mehanizmov, ki so zanesljivi. Problem tako zastavljene teorije upravičbe je dejstvo, daje zelo težko določiti, kateri so procesi, ki so zanesljivi. Pri tem je še posebej vprašljivo Goldmanovo zatrjevanje, da so zanesljivi lahko le tipi procesov, da pa posamezni primerki (...) procesov lahko proizvedejo le posamezna prepričanja, ki pa so ali resnična ali neresnična. Nejasnost je predvsem v tem, ker enostavno ne obstaja dovolj zanesljiv proces, mehanizem, ki bi nam vnaprej omogočil ocenjevanje posameznega prepričanja. V tej zvezi ne pomaga niti Goldmanovo razlikovanje med ohlapno in strogo upravičbo, ker, če sprejmemo ohlapno upravičbo kot utemeljeno, potem je dana možnost za sprejetje tudi nezanesljivih procesov in mehanizmov, kar pa pomeni, daje stroga upravičba zgolj nekaj ekstravagantnega. Možen izhod iz te zagate predstavlja ločevanje nivoja izvornih kognitivnih procesov in nivoja pridobljenih metod, postopkov..., vendar se izkaže, da tudi to ni rešitev. Zato predlagamo naslednjo opredelitev teorije upravičbe: Prepričanje p, ki ga ima oseba S v t, je upravičeno čče je i primerek tipa procesa, ki bi ga najboljša kognitivna znanost klasificirala kot zanesljivega. (shrink)