This paper aims to investigate the equivalent of Epicurus’ πρόληψις, the second criterion of the Epicurean Canonic (DL X 31 = fr. 35 Usener), in Lucretius’ De rerum natura (DRN). Taking stock of the several occurrences of the Latin terms notitia and notities in the six books of the poem, I show that Lucretius’ view about preconception remains faithful to Epicurus’ πρόληψις, and that the poet does not endorse a less empiricist position than his Master because of some influence of (...) the Stoic ἔννοια. To this end, I will also briefly address an important case in which πρόληψις, albeit not clearly mentioned, plays an essential role, namely the prolepsis of the deity (DRN V 1169–1182). Finally, I explain how Lucretius can be of some help in grasping the controversial relationship between the criterion of πρόληψις and that of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας (animi inectus/iactus), showing in which way the poet seems to consider the latter as a criterion of truth in its own right. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to feelings (pathē) as criteria of truth and criteria of choice and avoidance in Epicureanism. The first section reviews two features of the other two Epicurean criteria of truth, perceptions and preconceptions: their non-rational and evident character. The second section extends the account to feelings, showing how, on the basis of their non-rational and evident character, feelings can be used to gain insights. The third section of the paper finally turns to feelings as criteria of choice (...) and avoidance. It examines some neglected textual evidence that shows that perceptions and feelings are closely connected to each other, that is, that Epicurean feelings are defined as perceptions and observances of themselves, shedding some new light on the joint role of feelings and perceptions in choices and avoidances. (shrink)

This paper discusses ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας, which later Epicureans are supposed to have elevated to a fourth criterion of truth to complement perceptions, preconceptions and feelings. By examining Epicurus’ extant writings, the paper distinguishes three different senses of the term: ‘thought in general’, ‘act of attention’ and ‘mental perception’. It is argued that only the sense ‘mental perception’ yields a plausible reading of ἐπιβολαί as a criterion of truth. The paper then turns to the textual evidence on ἐπιβολαί in later (...) authors. While the term ἐπιβολή is not used by Cicero, Lucretius and Philodemus in the sense of mental perception, it is argued that this still is the most plausible way of understanding ἐπιβολή as a criterion of truth. (shrink)

There is no single ancient Greek word in the surviving fragments and testimonies of Hellenistic philosophy that is directly translatable by the term ‘intuition’. But if we are in search of intuitions in the context of Hellenistic epistemology, it could be said that both the Stoics and the sceptics made use of them in their philosophical debates; for intuitions seem to be closely connected with the formation of conceptions, which were abundantly used by all Hellenistic philosophers. It is important to (...) understand, though, that the Stoics’ and the sceptics’ attitude towards the epistemic status of intuitions would greatly differ: The Stoics would explain intuitions by invoking a rational capacity of human beings, which based on experience would put them in touch with the reality of things, so that their intuitions could be thought of as somehow rationally admissible. The sceptics, on the other hand, would suggest that intuitions guide our everyday life merely on the basis of our previous experiences, and thus their intuitions could be regarded as empirically justified, although they would not guarantee any access to how things actually are. (shrink)