TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE: From 1808 to 1816, Hegel served as professor of philosophy and headmaster of a gymnasium in Nuremberg. He lectured on a wide variety of subjects - from logic and ethics to phenomenology and metaphysics - and prepared a series of notebooks which he used as the basis of his lectures. Students made their individual transcriptions of his oral dictations, and Hegel would revise these, in a steady stream of redactive work over the years. In 1838, seven years after (...) Hegel’s death, the notebooks-cum-transcriptions were found by Karl Rosenkranz, who edited and put them together for publication as Hegel’s Philosophische Propaedeutik. This became Volume 18 of Hegel’s Werke. Rosenkranz wrote a lively foreword to the volume, discussing Hegel’s approach to teaching and his views on the role of philosophy in secondary-school education. To this, Rosenkranz added his own views on the function of philosophy in culture as a whole - and one cannot help feeling that the biting piquancy of his language on these issues carries echoes of numerous talks with Hegel. This translation of the Rosenkranz essay will be incorporated into the text of the first English translation of Hegel’s Philosophical Propaedeutic, now completed and under consideration by a university press. (shrink)

The first ever English translation of a key text in the history of art and aesthetics.

The series, founded in 1970, publishes works which either combine studies in the history of philosophy with a systematic approach or bring together systematic studies with reconstructions from the history of philosophy. Monographs are published in English as well as in German. The founding editors are Erhard Scheibe (editor until 1991), Günther Patzig (until 1999) and Wolfgang Wieland (until 2003). From 1990 to 2007, the series had been co-edited by Jürgen Mittelstraß.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), Günther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.

This paper discusses the contribution of Hegel’s first biographer to the overall understanding of his work through the elaboration and analysis of theses and remarks related to the earliest roots of Hegel’s speculation in his youth, i.e. pre-Jena period and certainly the most problematic and least known phase of his philosophical worldview and written expression. The aim of this contribution is, on the one hand, to point out the inestimable importance of the content presented in this biographical overview, as well (...) as the significance of the material consulted, on which the biography is based and which has survived only in a deficiently fragmented form. On the other hand, an important part of the research presented here consists of highlighting and correct historical and critical contextualization of certain inconsistencies and interpretive shortcomings, present in this first-ever written biography of Hegel, which had a significant impact on the subsequent understanding of the origin of the system and the dialectic in Hegel’s later and more mature speculation. (shrink)

Este artigo estuda alguns aspectos de uma das maiores transformações na história do pensamento estético, nomeadamente, a teorização estética do feio. A seguir a referências a concepções estéticas do feio em E. Lessing e F. Schlegel, é estudada a concepção dialética do feio segundo o Sistema da Estética (1830) de Ch. H. Weisse, da escola hegeliana. O feio é entendido então como a aparição não sublimada da contradição inerente ao finito. Esta concepção abre caminho à Estética do Feio, de K. (...) Rosenkranz, a única e certamente primeira estética do feio, completa, independente e sistemática. Através do estudo das suas teses principais e de alguns exemplos citados pelo autor, mostra-se como a estética do feio de Rosenkranz, apesar da sua pertença ainda em parte a cânones clássicos, abre o caminho para a autonomização do feio e à substituição de uma estética da beleza por outros valores, participando de um movimento de transformação da razão mais geral iniciado no final do séc. XVIII. (shrink)

This article explores the distinctive artistic form of caricature and the philosophical treatment it receives in the work of Karl Rosenkranz (1805–1879), who gives it a central role in the context of his remarkable book The Aesthetics of Ugliness (Die Ästhetik des Hässlichen). Rosenkranz’ legacy on this score is not much discussed (certainly in Anglo-American philosophical circles), but its importance for the development of post-eighteenth-century aesthetics—in particular, for an aesthetics that stretches beyond the conventional concerns with the (...) beautiful and the sublime—can hardly be overstated. After a presentation of Rosenkranz’ project on the aesthetics of ugliness, this article examines his take on caricature and its relation to philosophy (as well as philosophy’s relation to caricature), and then takes up some pressing contemporary questions that arise for caricature’s use of stereotypes. (shrink)

Functionalism about mental phenomena must account for their multiple realizability. According to standard doctrine, this can be achieved by allowing our folk theory's realization formula to be multiply satisfied by distinct physical properties. If at all, uniqueness can then be restored by suitable relativization to populations or worlds. Recent arguments suggest that this is a dead end. Here the attempt is made to devise a novel type of functionalism that accounts for multiple realizability but rejects the standard doctrine and thus (...) proves immune to those arguments. The distinctive feature of this novel type of functionalism is its use of plural quantification in ramsification, which allows it to retain uniqueness of satisfaction despite multiple realizability while respecting naturalness requirements on physical properties. (shrink)

On a wide range of measures and across cultures and societies, women tend to be more religious than men. Religious beliefs are associated with evolved social-cognitive mechanisms such as agency detection and theory-of-mind. Women perform better on most of these components of social cognition, suggesting an underlying psychological explanation for these sex differences. The Existential Orientation Scale was developed to extend the measurement of religion to include non-religious beliefs. Factor analysis extracted two dimensions: religious orientation and science acceptance. This new (...) scale was used to investigate the hypothesis that the dimensions of empathizing, a measure of social cognition, and systemizing can explain the sex differences in religious orientation. The sex differences in both religious orientation and science acceptance disappeared when empathizing and systemizing were entered. This indicates that underlying dimensions of individual differences can explain existential orientation better than being male or female. (shrink)

Dieses Buch ist die erfolgreichste Einführung in die Philosophie der Nachkriegszeit. Ein klassischer Text eines bedeutenden Philosophen dieses Jahrhunderts. Ausgehend von der Strittigkeit der Philosophie werden in 12 Vorträgen Grundlagen und Bedingungen des Philosophierens entfaltet. Im Anhang werden Lektürevorschläge zum eigenen philosophischen Studium gegeben. (Ec).

In this paper, we clarify what proponents of the Growing Block Theory (GBT) should and what they should not say, and what they consistently can say. Once all the central tenets of the view are on the table, we address both David Braddon-Mitchell’s and Trenton Merricks’ recent eulogies for GBT, based on what is representative of a certain type of argument meant to show that GBT is internally incoherent. We argue that this type of argument proceeds from a mistaken assumption (...) about GBT’s core, viz. that GBT works with an untensed notion of what, in the metaphysically most fundamental sense, there is. We conclude that this type of argument accordingly misfires and that for all we know, we might be living on the brink of reality. (shrink)

Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous, vindicating core internalist intuitions without construing justification as an internal condition knowable by reflection alone. Sven Rosenkranz conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing and of being in a position to know. His account contrasts with recent alternative views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. Instead, he develops a suitable (...) non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts. He also defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification and its varying degrees of strength that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states. (shrink)

Ernst Cassirers 1932 erschienene Darstellung der »Philosophie der Aufklärung« zählt zu den herausragenden Standardwerken zur Bestimmung der Leitgedanken der Epoche. »Die eigentliche ›Philosophie‹ der Aufklärung ist und bleibt«, so Cassirer, »etwas anderes als der Inbegriff dessen, was ihre führenden Denker [...] gedacht und gelehrt haben«. Entsprechend sah er das auszeichnende Merkmal seiner historischen Rekonstruktion der Epoche darin, »daß sie nicht die Geschichte der einzelnen Denker und ihrer Lehren, sondern eine reine Geschichte der Ideen der Aufklärungszeit zu geben suchte, und daß (...) sie diese Ideen selbst nicht nur in ihrer abstrakt-theoretischen Fassung darlegen, sondern in ihrer unmittelbaren Wirksamkeit aufzeigen und sichtbar machen wollte«. (shrink)

The paper explores a structural account of propositional justification in terms of the notion of being in a position to know and negation. Combined with a non-normal logic for being in a position to know, the account allows for the derivation of plausible principles of justification. The account is neutral on whether justification is grounded in internally individuated mental states, and likewise on whether it is grounded in facts that are already accessible by introspection or reflection alone. To this extent, (...) it is compatible both with internalism and with externalism about justification. Even so, the account allows for the proof of principles that are commonly conceived to depend on an internalist conception of justification. The account likewise coheres both with epistemic contextualism and with its rejection, and is compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and with its rejection. Despite its neutrality on these issues, the account makes propositional justification luminous and so is controversial. However, it proves quite resilient in the light of recent anti-luminosity arguments. (shrink)

We argue that sensitivity to the distinction between the tensed notion of being something and the tensed notion of being located at the present time serves as a good antidote to confusions in debates about time and existence, in particular in the debate about how to characterise presentism, and saves us the trouble of going through unnecessary epicycles. Both notions are frequently expressed using the tensed verb ‘to exist’, making it systematically ambiguous. It is a commendable strategy to avoid using (...) that verb altogether in these contexts and to use quantification and a location predicate instead. (shrink)

Realism about tense is the view that the contrast between what was, what is and what will be the case is real, and not merely a projection of our ways of thinking. Does this view entail realism about temporal passage, namely the view that time really passes, in the same sense of ‘real’? We argue that the answer is affirmative for many versions of tense realism, and indeed for all sensible versions. We thereby address an important conceptual issue regarding these (...) two forms of realism and rebut recent claims that tense realism is compatible with anti-realism about temporal passage. (shrink)