This essay considers whether the just war tradition is compatible with Christian theologically grounded conceptions of mercy. After considering and rejecting positions that pit mercy and war against each other, the essay mines the work of Walter Kasper and James Keenan on Christian mercy to develop a position that reimagines mercy as compatible with traditional just war criteria. In particular, this analysis leads to the conclusion that Christians may endorse just war in the form of humanitarian intervention. By doing so, (...) they allow mercy to temper the aspects of warfare that diminish the humanity of others. (shrink)

ETHICISTS HAVE CRITICIZED THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S INvocation of "war" language as a response to the threat of terrorism in the post—September 11, 2001, world. Calling instead for a "police" model, these ethicists are found among both the pacifist and the just war traditions. This essay explores what a policing model might entail. First, it highlights some expressions of interest by just war ethicists in a police approach for tackling terrorism. Second, it critically surveys some representative examples of pacifist (...) appeals to such a paradigm. Third, it evaluates the call for a just-policing approach, showing how this model actually remains consonant with just war reasoning. Finally, the essay draws on the discipline of police ethics and examines what just cause, especially with respect to preemptive strikes, might look like in a just-policing approach to dealing with terrorism. (shrink)

Consensus among human rights groups and churches in recent years about cluster bombs has culminated in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. While there is apparent agreement that cluster bombs ought to be illegal, no substantive ethical treatment of this issue exists. In statements, references are typically made to the danger cluster munitions pose to civilians; it is alleged that these weapons are inherently immoral, and appeal is given only implicitly or in a cursory fashion to traditional just war reasoning. Taking (...) its cue from Jesuit moral theologian John C. Ford's influential article appearing in 1944 on `The Morality of Obliteration Bombing', and drawing on the more recent work of Oliver O'Donovan on `immoral weapons', this essay offers a critical moral assessment of cluster bombs and their use through attention to the principles of discrimination, proportionality, and the framework of double effect reasoning. (shrink)

In Fides et Ratio, Pope John Paul II commends the way in which the Church Fathers engaged philosophical schools, including those considered erroneous: “Faced with the various philosophies, the Fathers were not afraid to acknowledge those elements in them that were consonant with Revelation and those that were not. Recognition of the points of convergence did not blind them to the points of divergence”. Similarly, Kuipers seeks to provide a “serious, meaningful engagement with the positive elements and the constructive suggestions” (...) in—rather than simply to echo the standard criticisms of—Richard Rorty’s work. In the first half of the book, Kuipers identifies what he regards as the positive features of Rorty’s work. Focusing on Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he brings into relief the contours of his postmodern critique, respectively, of the Western philosophical tradition and of the traditional role of the philosopher. The book opens with a succinct account of Rorty’s critique of Western philosophy, an examination of Rorty’s variant of pragmatism, and an insightful discernment of “the emergence of an ethical concern for justice and human flourishing” in Rorty’s writing. Kuipers approves Rorty’s criticisms of philosophy-as-epistemology, with its emphasis on ontological, ahistorical foundationalism, and shares Rorty’s fear that the realist’s claim of correspondence to truth may lead to a substitution of coercion for conversation, which would thereby silence other voices. Because the human faculty for rationality is a limited tool, given our historical and linguistic contingencies, Rorty advocates instead an “edifying philosophy” with ad hoc, cultural criticism that inclusively seeks to find solutions for current social problems. This pragmatic shift from theory to practice, rather than leading to a loss of touch with the world, actually entails a sense of responsibility. Kuipers applauds how Rorty thus “gives us a heightened, ethical awareness of the responsibility involved in the intellectual task”. In contrast to fellow nonfoundationalist Joseph Margolis, who still affirms the role of the philosopher as someone possessing knowledge that others do not, Rorty holds that the responsibility for imaginatively and poetically redescribing ourselves belongs not only to the philosopher but to all members of society. (shrink)