A system of environmental ethics recently developed by Lawrence Johnson may be used to analyze the moral implications of biological control. According to this system, entities are morally relevant when they possess well-being interests (i.e., functions or processes that can be better or worse in so far as the entity is concerned). In this formulation of ethical analysis, species and ecosystems are morally relevant because they are not simply aggregates of individuals, so their processes, properties, and well-being interests are not (...) reducible to the sum of their individual members. Following Johnson's thesis, species and ecosystems have morally relevant interests in surviving and maintaining themselves as integrated wholes with particular self-identities. This theoretical structure gives rise to a number of ethical criteria that are particularly relevant to biological control, which apply to the ecosystem (the extent to which it is large, native, unique, and integrated) and to the action being considered (the extent to which it is novel, omnipresent, monitored, reversible, and necessary). In these terms, it is evident that not all biological control efforts are ethically defensible. In general terms, natural biological control is most desirable, followed by augmentative strategies, classical approaches, and finally neoclassical biological control. Two specific cases (neoclassical biological control of rangeland grasshoppers and classical biological control of prickly pear cactus) illustrate the ethical concerns. Finally, it can be shown that formalized restrictions of biological control are necessary, given the unique properties of this technology. (shrink)

This essay explores a previously unexplored suggestion for combining consideration of aesthetics with considerations of vice and virtue to justify, not merely claims about nature’s beauty or its preservation, but landscape-transforming conservation projects. Its discussion is not univocal. On the one hand, it suggests that vices associated with humans assisting a creature’s journey to a new landscape make that organism’s presence on that landscape ugly. According to this suggestion, the creature may be regarded as trash, which would be virtuous to (...) remove. On the other hand, it worries that the argument ultimately traces this circle: It is wrong to fail to remove the creature because this failure would be blameworthy; and failure to remove would be blameworthy because wrong. (shrink)

Agriculture has been recently viewed as the primary destructive force of biodiversity, but the places that produce our food and fiber may also hold the key to saving the richness of life on earth. This argument is based on three fundamental positions. First, it is argued that to value and thereby preserve and restore biodiversity we must begin by employing anthropocentric ethics. While changing our understanding of intrinsic values (i.e., the unconditional values of biodiversity as a state and process in-and-of-itself, (...) without reference to human interests) is often advocated as the means by which our behavior will reflect the importance of biodiversity, a change in how we perceive and conditionally value biodiversity is proposed as a more effective and compelling approach. Second, I suggest that anthropocentric values can be linked to a sense of “Place,” with agriculture playing a vital role in this context. Agriculture forms a powerful basis for personal, experiential development of a profound meaning and connection to a setting or landscape. The agricultural setting has tremendous potential for arational (emotional, aesthetic, and spiritual) values that ultimately compel our actions. The constancy of relationship and mutuality of dependency between humans and agricultural lands, particularly extensive agroecosystems, fosters an intensity of association that transcends our recent affinity to wildlands. Third, a mature understanding of places and their biodiversity must include those organisms that account for many of the ecological processes and the majority of the species richness -- the insects. The importance of these insects in structuring the landscape and the effects of habitat destruction on these organisms both suggest a vital, intimate, and reciprocal link between insects and Places. Finally, it is argued that the most important avenue for future efforts to protect and restore biodiversity on the part of agricultural and other scientists is educational -- the presentation of our research to the public in terms that provoke emotional, aesthetic, and spiritual meaning which lies at the core of human values and actions. (shrink)

This overview and synthesis of the papers presented in this Special Issue suggests that there is a remarkably rich set of ethical issues having direct relevance to the development and practice of biological control for the management of agricultural pests. The perception and resolution of ethical issues appear to emerge from a set of factors that includes one's ethical viewpoint (anthropocentric or biocentric), agricultural system (industrial or sustainable), economic context (rich or poor), and power structure (expert or public). From this (...) set of parameters at least five major ethical questions can be formulated: (1) How should we regulate and apply biological control in the face of persistent ecological uncertainty regarding environmental impacts? (2) How ought we to balance the established and expected benefits of biological control to human and ecosystem well-being against the known and anticipated risks? (3) Who should be empowered to develop policies and make decisions regarding the study and practice of biological control? (4) How can we assure a more just distribution of benefits and costs associated with biological control technologies (e.g., sharing the costs of nonmarketable goods and services that benefit the public, and compensating people from whom biological control agents are acquired), and (5) Can biological control be justified as a resource substitution for pesticides or is its ethical application only possible as part of a reconceptualization of agricultural production? These central questions and possible answers are presented in a varied set of provocative analyses by some of the leading thinkers and authorities in their fields. (shrink)

Abstract The ‘species problem’ in the philosophy of biology concerns the nature of species. Various solutions have been proposed, including arguments that species are sets, classes, natural kinds, individuals, and homeostatic property clusters. These proposals parallel debates in ecology as to the ontology and metaphysics of populations, communities and ecosystems. A new solution—that species are processes—is proposed and defended, based on Robert Ulanowicz’s metaphysics of process ecology. As with ecological systems, species can be understood as emergent, autocatalytic systems with propensities (...) for centripetality and mutuality in the course of dynamically balancing ascendency (order and persistence) and overhead (randomness and change). The species-as-processes perspective accords with the Ulanowicz’s postulates of process ecology and it can be accommodated by existing theories of species—particularly in a reframing of Richard Boyd’s metaphysics such that species are homeostatic process clusters. Rather than contending that process-based metaphysics is the only, best or true account of species, a pluralist-realist approach is advocated based on the pragmatic principles that are reflected in modern view of species and ecology. If species are understood to be comprised of processes and to be emergent processes themselves, there are important implications for the life sciences, including: animal models in medical and environmental studies, conservation biology, extinction, biodiversity, restoration ecology, and evolutionary biology. Content Type Journal Article Category Invited Paper Pages 1-30 DOI 10.1007/s10516-011-9169-5 Authors Jeffrey A. Lockwood, Department of Philosophy, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071, USA Journal Axiomathes Online ISSN 1572-8390 Print ISSN 1122-1151. (shrink)

If the field of agricultural ethics is to realize its potential and if the agricultural and philosophical communities are to address the impending changes in world food production, there is a need for education in public, governmental, and academic arenas. The development of a symposium on agriculural ethics is an effective method for “raising awareness” of the imminent need for a consolidation of philosophical and agricultural expertise. Based on experience, a series of organizational guidelines and their associated philosophical issues are (...) presented. The initial step is a determination of the purposes of the symposium, which leads to the consideration of the choice of speakers and topics. The best series of speakers will ultimately prove to be ineffectual if the logistics of the symposium are not carefully planned. The scheduling, format, timing and location of the talks are critical. Related to these practical aspects is the organization of promotional efforts. Since one of the goals is, presumably, to enlighten a target audience, effective promotion should be a central concern. Underlying all of these considerations is the budget. How the agricultural ethics symposium at the University of Wyoming addressed these issues is presented, with a critical review of our efforts based on external evaluations. (shrink)