This book proposes a reading of Dionysius the Areopagite's longest and most important treatise 'On the Divine Names' from a philosophical point of view, rather than from a theological point of view which dominates the secondary literature. At the same time, it can serve as an introduction to the entire philosophy of Dionysius.

This volume examines the theory of the passions through diverse strands of medieval philosophy and theology, from the Aristotelian scholastic tradition to the Platonic tradition, including the spiritual and monastic literature of the Middle Ages. The essays highlight the anthropological and moral philosophical relevance of previously overlooked and neglected texts.

To most interpreters, the case seems to be clear: Plotinus identifies matter and evil, as he bluntly states in Enn. 1.8[51] that 'last matter' is 'evil', and even 'evil itself'. In this paper, I challenge this view: how and why should Plotinus have thought of matter, the sense-making ἔσχατον of his derivational ontology from the One and Good, evil? A rational reconstruction of Plotinus's tenets should neither accept the paradox that evil comes from Good, nor shirk the arduous task of (...) interpreting Plotinus's texts on evil as a fitting part of his philosophy on the whole. Therefore, I suggest a reading of evil in Plotinus as the outcome of an incongruent interaction of matter and soul, maintaining simultaneously that neither soul nor matter are to be considered as bad or evil. When Plotinus calls matter evil, he does so metonymically denoting matter's totally passive potentiality as perceived by the toiling soul trying to act upon it as a form-bringer. As so often, Plotinus is speaking quoad nos here rather than referring to 'matter per se' (for Plotinus, somewhat of an oxymoron) which, as mere potentiality (and nothing else) is not nor can be evil. In short: matter is no more evil than the melancholy evening sky is melancholy -- not in itself (for it isn't), but as to its impression on us who contemplate it. As I buttress this view, it will also become clear that matter cannot tritely be considered to be the αὐτὸ κακόν as a prima facie-reading of Enn. 1.8[51] might powerfully suggest, but that the αὐτὸ κακόν, far from being a principle of its own, has to be interpreted within the dynamics of Plotinus's philosophical thinking as a unique, though numerously applicable flaw-pattern for all the single κακά (hence the Platonic αὐτό). To conclude, I shall offer a short outlook on the consistency of this interpretation with Plotinus's teaching on the soul and with the further Neoplatonic development of the doctrine of evil. (shrink)

The key to understanding Dionysius is the methodical acceptance of the literary fiction involved in reading an author who tries to recreate the immediateness of the first encounter of pagan wisdom and Christian doctrine. Dionysius’s method consists of the presentation of a Platonic ontology by way of biblical theonyms. These theonyms express whatever we can grasp of God by His self-communication toward us, yet they ultimately cannot reveal Him as He is. It is rewarding to compare biblical theonym and (...) author’s allonym at this point: the allonym “Dionysius Areopagita” expresses how the author wants to be read and received but not who he really is. Th us the Dionysian writings present themselves as if they were the communication of an early Christian author whose objective it is to proclaim the “unknown God” to philosophically educated Greeks, naming Him with the biblical theonyms and explaining them in a Platonic way. (shrink)

Desde hace más de un siglo, la filosofía de Dionisio el Areopagita ha sido menospreciada y subestimada como poco original debido a su obvia dependencia del pensamiento de Proclo. El presente artículo se propone corregir este punto de vista denigrante y re-evaluar el sistema neoplatónico presentado por Dionisio en el tratado De divinis nominibus. Al abstenerse metódicamente de leer a Dionisio como mero plagiado de Proclo, esta interpretación de los escritos dionisianos nos presenta su filosofía como la elaboración original y (...) profunda de una teo-ontología que -en las palabras del poeta Samuel T. Coleridge- "emprende la tarea de explicar la totalidad de las cosas estrictamente a través de un análisis de la autoconciencia, y a la vez construye en la mente un entero cosmos sirviéndose de nada más que de elementos proporcionados por la mente misma". (shrink)

Background:To date, most research on aggression in mental disorders focused on active-aggressive behavior and found self-directed and other-directed active aggression to be a symptom and risk-factor of psychopathology. On the other hand, passive-aggressive behavior has been investigated less frequently and only in research on psychodynamic defense mechanisms, personality disorders, and dysfunctional self-control processes. This small number of studies primarily reflects a lack of a reliable and valid clinical assessment of passive-aggressive behavior. To address this gap, we developed the Test of (...) Passive Aggression (TPA), a 24-item self-rating scale for the assessment of self-directed and other-directed passive-aggressive behavior.Method:Study 1 examined the internal consistency and factorial validity of the TPA in an inpatient sample (N= 307). Study 2 investigated the retest-reliability, internal consistency, and construct validity (active aggression, personality traits, impulsivity) of the TPA in a student sample (N= 180).Results:In line with our hypothesis, Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling revealed an acceptable to good fit of a bi-factorial structure of the TPA (Chi-square-df-ratio= 1.98;RMSR= 0.05, fit.off = 0.96). Both TPA scales showed good to excellent internal consistency (α= 0.83–0.90) and 4-week retest-reliability (rtt= 0.86). Correlations with well-established aggression scales, measures of personality, and impulsivity support discriminant and convergent validity of the TPA.Conclusions:The TPA is a reliable and valid instrument for the assessment of self-directed and other-directed passive-aggressive behavior. (shrink)

In this paper I shall argue that Proclus' criticism of Plotinus in De malorum subsistentia 31,5-21 is not entirely accurate, if we take into account Plotinus' theory of contraries as explained in Enn. I.8.6. For while Proclus thinks it impossible that anything could ever produce its contrary out of itself , Plotinus seems to propose that gradual ontological derivation from the first Principle will lessen the chain of being inevitably to the zero point of non-being . Non-being, however, is contrary (...) to the first Principle in a more radical way than the one Proclus thought of when he stated that absolute Good could never be the cause of Evil: according to Plotinus' interpretation, Good and Evil as well as being and non-being are contraries insofar they have no common substratum and do not share a common gšnoj. I shall try to plausibly explain this prima facie somewhat awkward notion of contrariety found in Plotinus by adducing analogies to numerical series, taking a recent paper by Dominic O'Meara as a starting point for the discussion. (shrink)

The authors undertake a thought experiment the purpose of which is to explore possibilities for understanding moral principles in analogy with cosmic order. The experiment is based on three proposals, which are described in detail: an ontological, a neurological, and a moral proposal. The ontological proposal accepts from the phenomena of quantum physics that there is a nonempirical domain of physical reality that consists not of material things but of what is philosophically conceptualized as a realm of nonmaterial forms. This (...) realm of forms is the realm of potentiality in physical reality that quantum physics posits as an indivisible Wholeness—the One. It is the ultimate reality because everything empirical is the actualization of its forms. The neurological proposal is the hypothesis that the brain is sensitive to the potentiality waves in the cosmic field, as ordinary measuring instruments in physics are sensitive to potentiality waves at the quantum level, so that the cosmic field can communicate with the human brain. The third proposal assumes that the communication with the cosmic field can translate into moral ideas and actions. Even though the three proposals underlying the thought experiment are highly speculative, they lead to definite implications that make sense in their own right and can be applied in a useful way. From the order of reality some simple rules of conduct follow that are identical with traditional moral rules but have the character of rules of well-ness, leading to new aspects of Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia and Kant's concept of the highest good. In analogy with the structure of physical reality, where all empirical phenomena are actualizations of nonempirical forms, it is suggested that the structure of morality, too, is that of a tacit, nonempirical form that actualizes in explicit principles and moral acts through our consciousness. The tacit form is thought to exist in the realm of cosmic potentiality, together with all the other forms that the empirical world actualizes. It can appear spontaneously in our consciousness when needed, offering its guidance to our judgment and free will. Because it does not appear in the form of commandments accompanied by threats, the actions of the tacit moral form define a higher level of morality, similar to that offered by some aspects of the Christian teaching, where one acts not out of fear but on the desire to do things right. (shrink)

The political mobilization of conservative Protestants in the United States since the 1970s is commonly viewed as having resulted from a “backlash” against the alleged iniquities of the 1960s, including the excess-es of the counterculture. In contrast, this article maintains that conservative Protestant efforts to infiltrate and absorb the counterculture contributed to the organizational strength, cultural attractiveness, and politi-cal efficacy of the New Christian Right. The essay advances three arguments: First, that evangelicals did not simply reject the countercultural ideas (...) of the 1960s, but absorbed and extended its key sentiments. Second, that conservative Protestantism’s appropriation of countercultural rhetoric and organizational styles played a significant role in the right-wing political mobilization of evangelicals. And third, that the merger of evan-gelical Christianity and countercultural styles, rather than their antagonism, ended up being one of the most enduring legacies of the sixties. In revisiting the relationship between the counterculture and evangelicalism, the essay also explores the larger implications for understanding the relationship between religion and poli-tics. The New Christian Right domesticated genuinely insurgent impulses within the evangelical resurgence. By the same token, it nurtured the conservative components of the counterculture. Conservative Protestant-ism thus constituted a political movement that channeled insurgencies into a cultural form that relegitimized the fundamental trajectories of liberal capitalism and consumerist society. (shrink)

Actual armed conflict develops to a large extent as »New Wars«. Meanwhile traditional peace ethics address either the global/regional or the local level, the dynamicss of New Wars and the according peace building strategies of »peace constituencies« create a new »glocal« field of action. The challenge for Christian peace ethics is now to find a third way between universalistic and communitarian approaches. In this essay the author proposes a »methodological communitarianism« that roots in Bourdieuian sociology and philosophical thinking of (...) Michael Walzer and Richard Rorty. It connects »thick« morals to »thin« principles in the peace constituenties’ task to build bridges between mutally excluding morals. Thus, it is suitable to model Christian peace ethics for this specific new challenge. (shrink)