Abstract

In this paper I shall argue that Proclus' criticism of Plotinus in De malorum subsistentia 31,5-21 is not entirely accurate, if we take into account Plotinus' theory of contraries as explained in Enn. I.8.6. For while Proclus thinks it impossible that anything could ever produce its contrary out of itself , Plotinus seems to propose that gradual ontological derivation from the first Principle will lessen the chain of being inevitably to the zero point of non-being . Non-being, however, is contrary to the first Principle in a more radical way than the one Proclus thought of when he stated that absolute Good could never be the cause of Evil: according to Plotinus' interpretation, Good and Evil as well as being and non-being are contraries insofar they have no common substratum and do not share a common gšnoj. I shall try to plausibly explain this prima facie somewhat awkward notion of contrariety found in Plotinus by adducing analogies to numerical series, taking a recent paper by Dominic O'Meara as a starting point for the discussion