Bas Van Fraassen is a nifty philosopher of science. He received his PhD in Pittsburgh in 1966, under the guidance of Adolf Grünbaum, he taught at Yale University, the university of Toronto, the University of Southern California, he has been McCosh Professor of Philosophy in Princeton, and eventually joined the department of philosophy at San Francisco State University, where he has the title of Distinguished Professor of Philosophy. He first gained attention with his book An Introduction to the Philosophy of (...) Time and Space where he tried to develop a formal theory of space and time based on the notion of causality. The book had an enormous legacy, with experts of the likes of John Earman and David Malament joining the debate. However, he achieved V.I.P. status with his classic The Scientific Image, where he defends a combination of empiricism and antirealism towards unobservable entities based on a re-definition of what the scientific enterprise is. His last achievement is the tome Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspectives, where he combines his scientific empiricism with the view that theories are best thought as models or structures, rather than sets of sentences. In this interview, we talk about his philosophical influences and the birth of The Scientific Image during a journey through North-Africa, Turkey and Eastern Europe, we talk about saving the phenomena and suspending judgement over the existence of unobservable entities, living in world full of mysteries and leaving unanswerable questions unanswered, rationality and irrationality, living in a simulation, the historical interplay between theorizing and experimenting, the meaning of particle detectors for an empiricist, the unity of science and physicalism, the condemnation of Galilei by the Church, and the distinction between Appearance and Reality…. (shrink)

The paper contains a comment on the criticism of the author's book Początek jest wszędzie (Prószynski i S-ka, 2002) by Marek Lagosz ("Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria, 14, 2005, 121-133). The comment focuses on the following issues: (1) the conception of philosophy of physics; (2) some methodological questions, especially the role of models in physics; (3) some explanations concerning the model proposed by the present author and his coworkers. A few "ideological remarks" are also made.

Zaproponowano, by Quine’a kryterium istnienia (teoria zakłada istnienie zmiennych związanych) rozszerzyć na matematyczne struktury. W duchu tego kryterium każdą matematyczną strukturę można uważać za oddzielny świat, w którym istnieją tylko te byty, bez zakładania których struktura straciłaby sens. Niektóre matematyczne światy są używane przez fizyków do modelowania rzeczywistego świata. W takiej sytuacji ontologia danej struktury matematycznej przenosi się na fizyczny świat. Mówiąc bardziej prozaicznie, niektóre matematyczne struktury interpretuje się jako struktury fizycznego świata. Cud rozumienia świata sprowadza się do cudu tej (...) interpretacji. (shrink)

Noncommutative geometry is quickly developing branch of mathematics finding important application in physics, especially in the domain of the search for the fundamental physical theory. It comes as a surprise that noncommutative generalizations of probabilistic measure and dynamics are unified into the same mathematical structure, i.e., noncommutative von Neumann algebra with a distinguished linear form on it. The so-called free probability calculus and the Tomita-Takesaki theorem, on which this unification is based, are briefly presented. It is argued that the unitary (...) evolution, known from quantum mechanics, could be a trace of noncommutativity on a deeper level. Philosophical significance of these results is also discussed. (shrink)