Visser's rules form a basis for the admissible rules of . Here we show that this result can be generalized to arbitrary intermediate logics: Visser's rules form a basis for the admissible rules of any intermediate logic for which they are admissible. This implies that if Visser's rules are derivable for then has no nonderivable admissible rules. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the admissibility of Visser's rules. We apply these results to some specific intermediate logics and (...) obtain that Visser's rules form a basis for the admissible rules of, for example, De Morgan logic, and that Dummett's logic and the propositional Gödel logics do not have nonderivable admissible rules. (shrink)

We present a basis for the admissible rules of intuitionistic propositional logic. Thereby a conjecture by de Jongh and Visser is proved. We also present a proof system for the admissible rules, and give semantic criteria for admissibility.

We present a basis for the admissible rules of intuitionistic propositional logic. Thereby a conjecture by de Jongh and Visser is proved. We also present a proof system for the admissible rules, and give semantic criteria for admissibility.

In recent years, the logic of questions and dependencies has been investigated in the closely related frameworks of inquisitive logic and dependence logic. These investigations have assumed classical logic as the background logic of statements, and added formulas expressing questions and dependencies to this classical core. In this paper, we broaden the scope of these investigations by studying questions and dependency in the context of intuitionistic logic. We propose an intuitionistic team semantics, where teams are embedded within intuitionistic Kripke models. (...) The associated logic is a conservative extension of intuitionistic logic with questions and dependence formulas. We establish a number of results about this logic, including a normal form result, a completeness result, and translations to classical inquisitive logic and modal dependence logic. (shrink)

This paper contains a detailed account of the notion of admissibility in the setting of consequence relations. It is proved that the two notions of admissibility used in the literature coincide, and it provides an extension to multi–conclusion consequence relations that is more general than the one usually encountered in the literature on admissibility. The notion of a rule scheme is introduced to capture rules with side conditions, and it is shown that what is generally understood under the extension of (...) a consequence relation by a rule can be extended naturally to rule schemes, and that such extensions capture the intuitive idea of extending a logic by a rule. (shrink)

In this paper we study the admissible rules of intermediate logics. We establish some general results on extensions of models and sets of formulas. These general results are then employed to provide a basis for the admissible rules of the Gabbay–de Jongh logics and to show that these logics have finitary unification type.

Admissible rules of a logic are those rules under which the set of theorems of the logic is closed. In this paper, a Gentzen-style framework is introduced for analytic proof systems that derive admissible rules of non-classical logics. While Gentzen systems for derivability treat sequents as basic objects, for admissibility, the basic objects are sequent rules. Proof systems are defined here for admissible rules of classes of modal logics, including K4, S4, and GL, and also Intuitionistic Logic IPC. With minor (...) restrictions, proof search in these systems terminates, giving decision procedures for admissibility in the logics. (shrink)

The language of the basic logic of proofs extends the usual propositional language by forming sentences of the sort x is a proof of F for any sentence F. In this paper a complete axiomatization for the basic logic of proofs in Heyting Arithmetic HA was found.

Axiom 1 of K is the same as Axiom 1 in L, thus we have nothing to prove. Axiom 2 of K is 2(φ → ψ) → (2φ → 2ψ). We give a derivation of this formula in L: (φ → ψ) ∧ φ → ψ 2((φ → ψ) ∧ φ) → 2ψ (the rule from L) 2(φ → ψ) ∧ 2φ → 2ψ (axiom 3 of L and propositional logic) 2(φ → ψ) → (2φ → 2ψ) (propositional logic) Remain (...) the rules of K. Modus ponens is a rule of both so there is nothing to prove. We show that L proves the Necessitation rule. That is, we have to show that if L φ, then L 2φ. The following derivation in L from assumption φ shows this: φ → φ (propositional logic) 2 → 2φ (the rule from L) 2φ (modus ponens using axiom 2 ) This completes the direction of the proof form left to right. (shrink)

This text contains some basic facts about modal logic. For motivation, intuition and examples the reader should consult one of the standard textbooks in the field.

We investigate the logical structure of intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory , and show that the first-order logic of is intuitionistic first-order logic IQC.

This paper contains a brief overview of the area of admissible rules with an emphasis on results about intermediate and modal propositional logics. No proofs are given but many references to the literature are provided.

This paper contains a proof-theoretic account of unification in transitive reflexive modal logics, which means that the reasoning is syntactic and uses as little semantics as possible. New proofs of theorems on unification types are presented and these results are extended to negationless fragments. In particular, a syntactic proof of Ghilardi’s result that $\mathsf {S4}$ has finitary unification is provided. In this approach the relation between classical valuations, projective unifiers, and admissible rules is clarified.

In this paper we prove that three of the main propositional logics of dependence, none of which is structural, are structurally complete with respect to a class of substitutions under which the logics are closed. We obtain an analogous result with respect to stable substitutions, for the negative variants of some well-known intermediate logics, which are intermediate theories that are closely related to inquisitive logic.

In Iemhoff we gave a countable basis for the admissible rules of . Here, we show that there is no proper superintuitionistic logic with the disjunction property for which all rules in are admissible. This shows that, relative to the disjunction property, is maximal with respect to its set of admissible rules. This characterization of is optimal in the sense that no finite subset of suffices. In fact, it is shown that for any finite subset X of , for (...) one of the proper superintuitionistic logics Dn constructed by De Jongh and Gabbay ), all the rules in X are admissible. Moreover, the logic Dn in question is even characterized by X: it is the maximal superintuitionistic logic containing Dn with the disjunction property for which all rules in X are admissible. Finally, the characterization of is proved to be effective by showing that it is effectively reducible to an effective characterization of in terms of the Kleene slash by De Jongh. (shrink)

If the Visser rules are admissible for an intermediate logic, they form a basis for the admissible rules of the logic. How to characterize the admissible rules of intermediate logics for which not all of the Visser rules are admissible is not known. In this paper we give a brief overview of results on admissible rules in the context of intermediate logics. We apply these results to some well-known intermediate logics. We provide natural examples of logics for which the Visser (...) rule are derivable, admissible but nonderivable, or not admissible. (shrink)

A method is presented that connects the existence of uniform interpolants to the existence of certain sequent calculi. This method is applied to several modal logics and is shown to cover known results from the literature, such as the existence of uniform interpolants for the modal logic \. New is the result that \ has uniform interpolation. The results imply that for modal logics \ and \, which are known not to have uniform interpolation, certain sequent calculi cannot exist.

Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made major contributions in a wide range of areas, including jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical reason; but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central themes in moral philosophy. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. Especially significant are his (...) explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value, which constitute a sustained and penetrating treatment of a set of issues at the very center of moral philosophy as it is practiced today. The contributors to the volume acknowledge the importance of Raz's contributions by engaging critically with his positions and offering independent perspectives on the topics that he has addressed. The volume aims both to honour Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and to contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the subject. (shrink)

In this paper we study the modal behavior of Σ-preservativity, an extension of provability which is equivalent to interpretability for classical superarithmetical theories. We explain the connection between the principles of this logic and some well-known properties of HA, like the disjunction property and its admissible rules. We show that the intuitionistic modal logic given by the preservativity principles of HA known so far, is complete with respect to a certain class of frames.

We study the modal properties of intuitionistic modal logics that belong to the provability logic or the preservativity logic of Heyting Arithmetic. We describe the □-fragment of some preservativity logics and we present fixed point theorems for the logics iL and iPL, and show that they imply the Beth property. These results imply that the fixed point theorem and the Beth property hold for both the provability and preservativity logic of Heyting Arithmetic. We present a frame correspondence result for the (...) preservativity principle Wp that is related to an extension of Löb's principle. (shrink)

In this paper we study the modal behavior of Σ‐preservativity, an extension of provability which is equivalent to interpretability for classical superarithmetical theories. We explain the connection between the principles of this logic and some well‐known properties of HA, like the disjunction property and its admissible rules. We show that the intuitionistic modal logic given by the preservativity principles of HA known so far, is complete with respect to a certain class of frames.

In this paper a method to construct Kripke models for subtheories of constructive set theory is introduced that uses constructions from classical model theory such as constructible sets and generic extensions. Under the main construction all axioms except the collection axioms can be shown to hold in the constructed Kripke model. It is shown that by carefully choosing the classical models various instances of the collection axioms, such as exponentiation, can be forced to hold as well. The paper does not (...) contain any deep results. It consists of first observations on the subject, and is meant to introduce some notions that could serve as a foundation for further research. (shrink)

We introduce Gentzen calculi for intuitionistic logic extended with an existence predicate. Such a logic was first introduced by Dana Scott, who provided a proof system for it in Hilbert style. We prove that the Gentzen calculus has cut elimination in so far that all cuts can be restricted to very simple ones. Applications of this logic to Skolemization, truth value logics and linear frames are also discussed.

This paper is a sequel to the papers Baaz and Iemhoff [4] and [6] in which an alternative skolemization method called eskolemization was introduced that, when restricted to strong existential quantifiers, is sound and complete for constructive theories. In this paper we extend the method to universal quantifiers and show that for theories satisfying the witness property it is sound and complete for all formulas. We obtain a Herbrand theorem from this, and apply the method to the intuitionistic theory (...) of equality and the intuitionistic theory of monadic predicates. (shrink)

In this paper, a proof-theoretic method to prove uniform Lyndon interpolation for non-normal modal logics is introduced and applied to show that the logics E\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {E}$$\end{document}, M\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {M}$$\end{document}, MC\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {MC}$$\end{document}, EN\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {EN}$$\end{document}, MN\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {MN}$$\end{document} have that (...) property. In particular, these logics have uniform interpolation. Although for some of them the latter is known, the fact that they have uniform Lyndon interpolation is new. Also, the proof-theoretic proofs of these facts are new, as well as the constructive way to explicitly compute the interpolants that they provide. It is also shown that the non-normal modal logics EC\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {EC}$$\end{document} and ECN\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {ECN}$$\end{document} do not have Craig interpolation, and whence no uniform interpolation. (shrink)

In this paper an alternative Skolemization method is introduced that, for a large class of formulas, is sound and complete with respect to intuitionistic logic. This class extends the class of formulas for which standard Skolemization is sound and complete and includes all formulas in which all strong quantifiers are existential. The method makes use of an existence predicate first introduced by Dana Scott.

This paper provides a method to obtain terminating analytic calculi for a large class of intuitionistic modal logics. For a given logic L with a cut-free calculus G that is an extension of G3ip the method produces a terminating analytic calculus that is an extension of G4ip and equivalent to G. G4ip was introduced by Roy Dyckhoff in 1992 as a terminating analogue of the calculus G3ip for intuitionistic propositional logic. Thus this paper can be viewed as an extension of (...) Dyckhoff’s work to intuitionistic modal logic. (shrink)

In this paper a method for the replacement, in formulas, of strong quantifiers by functions is introduced that can be considered as an alternative to Skolemization in the setting of constructive theories. A constructive extension of intuitionistic predicate logic that captures the notions of preorder and existence is introduced and the method, orderization, is shown to be sound and complete with respect to this logic. This implies an analogue of Herbrand's theorem for intuitionistic logic. The orderization method is applied to (...) the constructive theories of equality and groups. (shrink)

The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available — if the colors are primitive sui generis properties — this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable. The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light (...) of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind—body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-reductive physicalism are staples, realist primitivism is by and large a recent addition to the color literature. And it remains a minority position, although one that is perhaps gaining support. In this paper, we investigate whether it should be accepted, and conclude it should not be. (shrink)