Le Japon est le premier producteur mondial de jeux vidéo « à l’eau de rose ». Ces jeux de simulation amoureuse présentent une caractéristique curieuse : théoriquement, ils assignent la femme à la tache unique de séduire un personnage masculin, mais, dans les faits, ils favorisent la mise en place d’un réseau d’amitié entre femmes. C’est de ce réseau – tissé à la fois dans le jeu et dans la vraie vie – que dépend le succès en amour. M’appuyant sur (...) l’analyse de cette double dynamique, contradictoire en apparence, j’aimerais proposer l’hypothèse suivante : que les jeux permettent de « déjouer » les mécaniques sociales de l’injonction. Ces jeux nommés otome games s’inscrivent en effet, de façon significative, dans le contexte d’une panique nationale liée au déclin de la fécondité : ils visent le marché très porteur des nouvelles générations de femmes qui – vivant seules ou chez leur parents – sont tenues pour responsables de la faillite à venir du système. Elles ne fondent pas de foyer. Elles n’ont pas d’enfant. Comment parviennent-elles à conjurer l’exclusion? L’étude portera sur les stratégies collectivement mises au point pour faire des otome games un outil de construction identitaire, favorisant l’amitié entre joueuses comme moyen d’entrer en résistance. (shrink)

Le Japon est le premier producteur mondial de jeux vidéo « à l’eau de rose ». Ces jeux de simulation amoureuse présentent une caractéristique curieuse : théoriquement, ils assignent la femme à la tache unique de séduire un personnage masculin, mais, dans les faits, ils favorisent la mise en place d’un réseau d’amitié entre femmes. C’est de ce réseau – tissé à la fois dans le jeu et dans la vraie vie – que dépend le succès en amour. M’appuyant sur (...) l’analyse de cette double dynamique, contradictoire en apparence, j’aimerais proposer l’hypothèse suivante : que les jeux permettent de « déjouer » les mécaniques sociales de l’injonction. Ces jeux nommés otome games s’inscrivent en effet, de façon significative, dans le contexte d’une panique nationale liée au déclin de la fécondité : ils visent le marché très porteur des nouvelles générations de femmes qui – vivant seules ou chez leur parents – sont tenues pour responsables de la faillite à venir du système. Elles ne fondent pas de foyer. Elles n’ont pas d’enfant. Comment parviennent-elles à conjurer l’exclusion? L’étude portera sur les stratégies collectivement mises au point pour faire des otome games un outil de construction identitaire, favorisant l’amitié entre joueuses comme moyen d’entrer en résistance. (shrink)

Le Japon est le premier producteur de jeux vidéo à l’eau de rose. Appelés « jeux pour jeunes filles » (otome gēmu), ils proposent des gammes de « beaux gosses » formatés sur le modèle du prédateur, entraînant l’héroïne dans une histoire d’amour proche du rapt. Les scénarios reposent sur la mise en scène d’une perte de pouvoir, où la joueuse renonce à son libre arbitre. Les personnages les plus agressifs sont « irrésistibles », expliquent les fans qui désirent être (...) « prises au piège ». En étudiant ces jeux et les tensions qu’ils révèlent, j’espère éclairer les dynamiques sociales dont ils reproduisent, et déconstruisent, les logiques. Ils sont indissociables du contexte qui les a vu naître : celui d’une baisse record du nombre de mariages et de naissances, pour lesquelles les autorités désignent comme coupables les « personnes qui vivent seules » (o‑hitori‑sama). Pourquoi préfèrent-elles des partenaires fictifs aux hommes de chair et d’os? J’y vois l’expression d’une ambivalence à l’égard du mariage, désiré mais redouté. (shrink)

Japan is the world’s largest producer of love simulation games, revealing a curious feature: these games, in theory, assign female players to the unique task of seducing a male character, but, in reality, they promote the establishment of a network of friendship between women. Love cannot be achieved if this network is not carefully woven both in play and in real life. Based on the analysis of this double dynamics, outwardly contradictory, I would like to advance the following hypothesis: that (...) such games enable their users to ‘outsmart’ gender expectations. These games, called otome games, became popular in the context of a national panic related to the declining birthrate: they target the market of women who – living alone or with their parents – are held responsible for the future shortfall of the system. These new generations of women don’t start a family. They have no children. How do they manage to ward off exclusion and stigma? The study will focus on the strategies collectively devised to turn otome games into an identity-building tool, promoting friendship between players as a means of resistance against social norms. (shrink)

This essay tells the story of early French ethology—“the science dealing with the habits of living beings and their relations, both with each other and with the cosmic environment.” The driving force behind this “ethological movement” was the biologist Alfred Giard (1846–1908). The essay discusses how the ethological viewpoint of Giard and his pupils developed in a period in which the current disciplines of field biology were not yet crystallized. It also shows how concepts and research interests could (...) travel within Giard's network from one working context to another, even from one discipline to another. By studying this traveling process, the essay reveals that, unlike the modern ethology of Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, Giard's ethology was not a discipline at all but, rather, a scientific attitude. This scientific attitude triggered a reappraisal of fieldwork, but at the same time Giard's ethology was never limited to the field alone. It also found its way to the laboratory, the museum, and the zoo. -/- . (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay tells the story of early French ethology— “the science dealing with the habits of living beings and their relations, both with each other and with the cosmic environment.” The driving force behind this “ethological movement” was the biologist Alfred Giard (1846– 1908). The essay discusses how the ethological viewpoint of Giard and his pupils developed in a period in which the current disciplines of field biology were not yet crystallized. It also shows how concepts and (...) research interests could travel within Giard’s network from one working context to another, even from one discipline to another. By studying this traveling process, the essay reveals that, unlike the modern ethology of Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, Giard’s ethology was not a discipline at all but, rather, a scientific attitude. This scientific attitude triggered a reappraisal of fieldwork, but at the same time Giard’s ethology was never limited to the field alone. It also found its way to the laboratory, the museum, and the zoo. (shrink)

This essay attempts to describe the neo-Lamarckian atmosphere that was dominant in French biology for more than a century. Firstly, we demonstrate that there were not one but at least two French neo-Lamarckian traditions. This implies, therefore, that it is possible to propose a clear definition of a (neo) Lamarckian conception, and by using it, to distinguish these two traditions. We will see that these two conceptions were not dominant at the same time. The first French neo-Lamarckism (1879-1931) was structured (...) by a very mechanic view of natural processes. The main representatives of this first period were scientists such as Alfred Giard (1846-1908), Gaston Bonnier (1853-1922) and Félix Le Dantec (1869-1917). The second Lamarckism - much more vitalist in its inspiration - started to develop under the supervision of people such as Albert Vandel (1894-1980) and Pierre-Paul Grassé (1895-1985). Secondly, this essay suggests that the philosophical inclinations of these neo-Lamarckisms reactivated a very ancient and strong dichotomy of French thought. One part of this dichotomy is a material, physicalist tradition, which started with René Descartes but developed extensively during the 18th and 19th centuries. The other is a spiritual and vitalist reaction to the first one, which also had a very long history, though it is most closely associated with the work of Henri Bergson. Through Claude Bernard, the first neo-Lamarckians tried to construct a mechanical and determinist form of evolutionary theory which was, in effect, a Cartesian theory. The second wave of neo-Lamarckians wanted to reconsider the autonomy and reactivity of life forms, in contrast to purely physical systems. (shrink)

This essay attempts to describe the neo-Lamarckian atmosphere that was dominant in French biology for more than a century. Firstly, we demonstrate that there were not one but at least two French neo-Lamarckian traditions. This implies, therefore, that it is possible to propose a clear definition of a (neo)Lamarckian conception, and by using it, to distinguish these two traditions. We will see that these two conceptions were not dominant at the same time. The first French neo-Lamarckism (1879–1931) was structured by (...) a very mechanic view of natural processes. The main representatives of this first period were scientists such as Alfred Giard (1846–1908), Gaston Bonnier (1853–1922) and Félix Le Dantec (1869–1917). The second Lamarckism – much more vitalist in its inspiration – started to develop under the supervision of people such as Albert Vandel (1894–1980) and Pierre-Paul Grassé (1895–1985). Secondly, this essay suggests that the philosophical inclinations of these neo-Lamarckisms reactivated a very ancient and strong dichotomy of French thought. One part of this dichotomy is a material, physicalist tradition, which started with René Descartes but developed extensively during the 18th and 19th centuries. The other is a spiritual and vitalist reaction to the first one, which also had a very long history, though it is most closely associated with the work of Henri Bergson. Through Claude Bernard, the first neo-Lamarckians tried to construct a mechanical and determinist form of evolutionary theory which was, in effect, a Cartesian theory. The second wave of neo-Lamarckians wanted to reconsider the autonomy and reactivity of life forms, in contrast to purely physical systems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Questioning the Motives of Habituated Action:Burke and Bourdieu on PracticeDana AndersonThe British official's habit, in the Empire's remotest spots, of dressing for dinner is in effect the transporting of an idol, the vessel of a motive that has its sanctuary in the homeland.—Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 44In his recent Kenneth Burke and the Conversation after Philosophy, Timothy Crusius locates Burke in the context of "PostPhilosophical" thought by (...) describing Burke's expansive Dramatistic project as a praxis—as a program encompassing "any act whatsoever, including symbolic action (i.e., expression, whether artistic or discursive), in behalf of a better life." When praxis is conceived broadly as a dialectical perspective on human action—that agents and structures interact in mutually determining ways—the term becomes, in fact, an accurate summary of the entire Burkean corpus: "If we understand it as Burke does," Crusius continues, "all that he wrote is praxis" (1999, 198). This panoramic scope of Burke's dialectical inquiry is certainly one reason it remains rhetorical theory's perhaps most flexible and productive framework for considering human action; the Dramatistic pentad and its ratios for discussing the attribution of motive continue to invite theoretical "ways of placement" as multifaceted as human motives themselves.Speaking of Burke's work in terms of praxis, however, at least in the term's contemporary critical usage,1 raises a question regarding a cognate concept that the idea of praxis entails: in what sense is Burke's pentadic grammar of action equipped to consider the habituated actions characteristic of human practice?Practice, as a conceptual descendant of Marxian praxis, retains a connection with what Marx called "human sensuous activity" (1968, 28-30).2 In its most general sense, practice refers to the regular and repeated activities of agents that, in their quotidian enactment, dialectically [End Page 255] constitute an agent's sense of self and of reality in relation to external conditions of existence. While the activities of agents will tend to reify the dominant external conditions in which agents act, these external conditions are nonetheless open to change inasmuch as the evolving practices of individuals might come to challenge them. This perspective of the determined, yet determining nature of human practice is aptly summarized in The German Ideology, where Marx and Engels famously argue that "circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances" (2000, 189).3 As Michel de Certeau's seminal studies of practice have demonstrated (de Certeau 1984; de Certeau, Giard, and Mayol 1998), the power of this relationship of mutual constitution between individuals and their worlds of external circumstances owes directly to the banality of the actions through which such constitution is accomplished—actions ranging from the way bread is served in a given household, to the way cosmetics are purchased in department stores, to the general "ways of operating" in urban spaces, including simply walking in one's own neighborhood (de Certeau, Giard, and Mayol 1998; Mayol 1998, 7-13). As Judith Butler very poignantly summarizes, it is through precisely such "embodied rituals of everydayness," however "taken-for-granted" they may be, that "a given culture produces and sustains belief in its own 'obviousness' " (1999, 113-14).The constitutive dynamics of such practical actions should surely figure prominently into any conception of Burke's work as praxis. Indeed, this dynamic is already implicit in the fact that, for Burke, it is only through the possibility of mutually transforming both ourselves and our worlds through actions material and symbolic that we might begin to move toward a better life. But while Dramatism and practice rest on similar perspectives of the dialectically constitutive nature of human action, several aspects of the grammar through which Burke investigates motive might appear to limit, or even to preclude, the Dramatistic examination of practice as a kind of motivated action. More specifically, Burke's consistent "anti-Behaviorist" emphasis on the conscious or purposive nature of action questions the extent to which Dramatism can account for the dispositional and habituated actions characteristic of practice, actions for which agents would be least able to articulate conscious purposes. To cast the issue in the context of my epigraph above... (shrink)