R. A. Gorban. Personalistic Anthropology of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik. The article suggests the conception of Personalistic anthropology of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik, a modern Catholic philosopher and theologian, one of the founders of the Polish Personalist School. The author reveals that the Polish thinker clarifies the anthropologic theological model based on the principles of Personalism, in which the Person of Christ is the main hypostasis being an individual personality and a communal person, that is the Church. Stanislaw Bartnik (...) believed that anthropology must completely base on Christology, as humanization of a man has to fully actualize itself only in Christ. The theologian works out the definition of a communal personality, in which both an individual person and community gain the same considerable importance, as a human being finds the fullness of its personal dimensions only in a community, where it achieves its fullness. Accentuating mutual interdependence of personalities, he thinks society to be an anthropological environment that molds a personality, enabling it to realize its potential and reach the fullness of human existence, as it would be impossible without personal relations that are established within a community. In his works, written in different years, Stanislaw Bartnik generates the idea that a communal anthropology, which is complemented by a communal anthropology of salvation in the earthly dimension, is constituent of an individual anthropology. That is why it is important to build up a full-fledged anthropology based on Personalism and theology, as the theory and practice of Christian Perstonalist model help actualize the fullness of a man’s perfect personality in all its dimensions and manifestations. In conclusion, anthropology must become a universal science about a man as an individual and community. (shrink)

In this article by Richard Gorban «Personalistic Ecclesiology of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik» the author considers the concept of Personalistic Ecclesiology of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik, a modern Catholic philosopher and theologian, the follower of theological Personalism of Karol Wojtyla. The author found out that, according to Bartnik’s Ecclesiology, the Church consists primarily of prosopoistic constituents: the Personality of Christ, Christ, Holy Spirit, community of persons, the world of the personality and consequently becomes the Personality itself. In conformity with (...) the Polish thinker’s interpretation, the Church is a community of personalities, founded in a real way, by means of individual relations-bonds with the Personality of Christ as the one that performs His mission and perceives a special dimension of the subject’s existence in the process and prospects of salvation. The philosopher-personalist treats nature and peculiarities of the Church based on the idea that it is a product of religious commitment, the phenomenon of personal character. The structures of the Church and religious commitment are distinguished by prosopoistic relations, that is why the personality should be seen as not only the factor, which creates bonds with the Church, but is its fundamental structure. Based on human nature and common Christian community, the Church manifests itself as a religious-social Personality. From the point of view of realistic Universal Personalism of Stanislaw Bartnik, it takes form of a communal character, following the principles of other kinds of a community person. As long as, the Church becomes the community whole, it must realize and really fulfils its Personality, becomes truly its self, furthermore it serves and realizes not only its own existence as a personality, but the existence of a single human being in its aspirations to its own fullness. (shrink)

This article examines the topic of approaches to personal development that aim at achieving the highest possible level. Such approaches are considered here in the context of Kazimierz Dąbrowski “Theory of Positive Disintegration”. The shaping of the personality is accomplished by the dynamic integration and disintegration of the individual, and also by considering his/her five levels of development. The first level is called the stage of primary integration, whilst harmonious secondary integration refers to the highest level of development itself. The (...) discovery of the highest level of personal value in one’s progress is one of the most effective stages in protecting the individual from any unacceptable moral or ethical standards present in society. It is also effective in the resocialisation of cases involving social pathology. Each person has the task of promoting their personal values to the highest level of development. When the individual conclusively fulfils this task, he/she reaches an optimal stage of harmoniousness and peacefulness. (shrink)

This paper aims to present the main contours of Burns’s literary output which, interestingly enough, grows into a personal understanding of the collective mindset of -Troubles Northern Ireland. It is legitimate, I argue, to construe her fiction as a body of work shedding light on certain underlying mechanisms of sectarian violence. Notwithstanding the lapse of time between 1998 and 2020, the Troubles’ toxic legacy has indeed woven an unbroken thread in the social fabric of the region. My reading of the (...) novelist’s selected works intends to show how the local public have been fed by an unjustified—maybe even false—sense of security. Burns, in that regard, has positioned herself amongst the aggregate of writers who feel anxious rather than placated, hence their persistence in returning to the roots of Northern Irish societal divisions. Burns’s writing, in the above context, though immersed in the world of the Troubles, paradoxically communicates “an idiosyncratic spatiotemporality”, namely an experience beyond the self-imposing, historical time limits. As such, it gains the ability to provide insightful commentaries on conflict-prone relations, the patterns of which can be repeatedly observed in Northern Ireland’s socio-political milieu. Overall, the main idea here is to discuss and present the narrative realm proposed by Burns as determinate, liminal in terms of time and space, positioning readers between “then” and “now” of the region. (shrink)

Judaism was a mythical, strongly tribal religion with anthropomorphic God in which the leading element was the concept of a covenant between God and the exceptional “chosen people.” Such views produced a strong emphasis on tribal unity and attitude of election and moral superiority vis-à-vis the rest of humanity. Philo must have felt inadequacy of the ancient Judaism and its limitations to compete for the minds of Hellenes with their universalistic philosophical thought. Philo represented a trend in Jewish ideology which (...) attempted, in confrontation with the Greek culture, to assert itself as a valid cosmic view to support the existence of a community. He attempted to reevaluate Hebrew ideology found in the scriptures adopting Greek metaphysical, ethical, and religious doctrines to Judaism.The focus of this article is on Philo’s introduction of the Greek concept of Logos, in the modified version of Xenocrates into Judaism. Philo developed this concept further and transformed from a metaphysical entity into an extension of a divine and transcendental anthropomorphic being and mediator between God and men. Thus Philo produced a synthesis of both Hebrew and Greek traditions developing concepts that were used for future Hellenistic interpretation of messianic Hebrew thought by providing foundations for Christianity. (shrink)

The theory of descriptions occupies a very prominent place in Russell's system of logic and indeed in his system of philosophy. Since the publication of the now classical paper “On Denoting” in Mind for 1905 the theory had been incorporated into Principia Mathematica , the first volume of which appeared in 1910. In 1918 Russell discussed descriptions in his lectures on the Philosophy of Logical Atomism, which subsequently were published in The Monist for 1919. A very lucid exposition of the (...) main tenets of the doctrine is to be found in the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy dating from the same year. Epistemological aspects of the theory of descriptions are examined in “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description“, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1910–11, and also in Chapter V of The Problems of Philosophy, first published in 1912. (shrink)

In this article, the author represents the aspect of philosophical and religious doctrine of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik, a Polish personalist, which deals with the way the philosopher understands freedom as a structural component of a personality that enables a man to realize his inner and outer potential in both individual and social planes, in all dimensions of human existence: soul, body, intellect, will, actions, perception and creation of existence. Interrelation and interdependence between freedom and responsibility of a personality, as (...) well as between freedom and will of a person, are the issues of principle for a Catholic thinker. As interpreted by Bartnik, responsibility is a measure of freedom, because of direct relationship between them: the more freedom a person possesses, the greater responsibility it takes to implement and use it. The relationship between freedom and will explains the dialectic character of structure of a personality. Freedom of a man is manifested through auto- determination, which means the ability of will to make free choices, and ultimately the will determines itself, being evaluated by practical mind. Freedom in personal existence concerns personality as a whole, but not the will or actions taken separately. That is why, Bartnik believes, it is better to speak about personal freedom and free existence of a personality. Choice -making proves freedom of a man, but when choosing an option, a person chooses himself, thus creating his own spiritual image. Existence consists of possibilities to choose from and means the core and backbone structure of a personality in the dynamic process of self-realization. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell was one of those moralists who advocate a broad concept of ethics, including both social and individual ethics. This latter ethics is composed of prescriptions relating to the various ways of attaining happiness and perfection. Since however both happiness and perfection, i.e. the creative experience of one’s own existence can be attained by the same way, the requirement of self-realization may contribute to the harmonious coexistence of all people an effect that is desirable from social point of view. (...) Russell believed that if all people an effect that is desirable form social point of view. Russell believed that if all individuals are granted possibilities of unrestrained self-realization armed conflicts will cease. The requirement of self-realization will be fulfilled above all when the barriers that have up to now handicapped the free development of human possibilities are pulled down. The barriers to self-realization include the restrictions connected with the specific living conditions pertinent to the industrial civilization, the commonly accepted false picture of human nature, and traditional morality. (shrink)

Polish philosophers’ contribution to the philosophy of our times is not limited to logic. Neither was Polish philosophy mainly one more form of analitical school. The scope of this philosophy was broader, and its methods were much more diversified. This may be confirmed by many examples. One of these is Polish value theory as represented by Ingarden, Tatarkiewicz, Czezowski, and Ossowska.The differences in their methods are striking: we have Ingarden’s phenomenolgy as a tool of axiological inquires into the nature of (...) works of art, various analytical procedures presented by Tatarkiewicz, Czezowski and Elzenberg, the descriptive method of Ossowska. In spite of deep substantial differences these thinkers have much in common: subtlety in their philosophical work, faithfulness to the facts that are the point of departure in their axiological investigations, clearly objectivist tendency in solving the problems of value theory (except for Maria Ossowska). Another common feature: these thinkers tested their views with their lives opposing - when need arose - the outbursts of totalitarian barbarity. (shrink)

An attempt is made in the present essay to accommodate various senses of the notion of existence and ofthat of non-existence within the framework of logic. With this aim in view a system of Lesniewski's Ontology, referred to as System S, is outlined. Equipped with appropriate definitions and illustrated with a selection of theses it offers a logical theory of existence and non-existence. The usefulness of the theory is then tested by interpreting in its terms some of the principal notions (...) and assertions of Meinong's ontology. A few brief comments on the notion of 'possible object' and on 'semantics' of fiction conclude the essay. (shrink)

As the author sees it, Tadeusz Kotarbiński's reism is an ontology with semantical ramifications. Contrary to Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's view the reist is not commited to any particular categorially determined language; he has to use, and is at liberty to do so, the language of whoever happens to be his opponent always provide that it is a categorially determined language. Contrary to Ajdukiewicz's opinion, the positive ontological thesis of resim (i.e. the thesis that for all a and b, if a is (...) a b, then a is bulky and lasting) is not a tautology; it is a denial of the thesis held by unicategorial Platonism. Contrary to Ajdukiewicz's insistence, the negative ontological thesis of reism (i.e. the thesis that there are no properties, there are no relations, there are no events, etc.) consists of propositions which, in the light of multicategorial idealization of ordinary language, are meaningful and syntactically well constructed. They deny equally meaningful and syntactically well constructed assertions of multicategorial Platonism. (shrink)

The author starts with recalling, primarily in reliance on Du Contrat social the main clauses of the social contract. Then he advances arguments to show that the text of The Social Contract admits of two interpretations of Rousseau’s theory of the social contract. In the first interpretation, the state which is produced as a result of the contract is viewed as the environment in which man fulfils his moral calling; it is the state that by social actions people can discover (...) and pursue moral values while preserving their individual freedom and sovereignty. The other interpretation implies that Rousseau had little respect for the individual person’s freedom and moral sovereignty, because both the construction of the “political machine” and its first decisive motions are dependent on the law-maker, a factor independent of the contracting parties, who is expected to take care of the unenlightened masses to transform them into a society reminiscent of those of Republican Rome or Sparta. In conclusion, the author advances the conjecture that the tensions pervading the theory of the social contract bad their source In certain deeper beliefs by which Rousseau abode also e his literary and educational work. Those beliefs included his distaste of modern civilization, his belief in the unconditional supremacy of moral values, his admiration of freedom, moral sovereignty and integrity, his belief that freedom is a most fundamental value, and his commitment to the kind of social ties which he saw embodied first in Geneva and most perfectly in Sparta. (shrink)

An attempt is made in the present essay to accommodate various senses of the notion of existence and ofthat of non-existence within the framework of logic. With this aim in view a system of Lesniewski's Ontology, referred to as System S, is outlined. Equipped with appropriate definitions and illustrated with a selection of theses it offers a logical theory of existence and non-existence. The usefulness of the theory is then tested by interpreting in its terms some of the principal notions (...) and assertions of Meinong's ontology. A few brief comments on the notion of 'possible object' and on 'semantics' of fiction conclude the essay. (shrink)

An attempt is made in the present essay to accommodate various senses of the notion of existence and ofthat of non-existence within the framework of logic. With this aim in view a system of Lesniewski's Ontology, referred to as System S, is outlined. Equipped with appropriate definitions and illustrated with a selection of theses it offers a logical theory of existence and non-existence. The usefulness of the theory is then tested by interpreting in its terms some of the principal notions (...) and assertions of Meinong's ontology. A few brief comments on the notion of 'possible object' and on 'semantics' of fiction conclude the essay. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Los, zło, tajemnica: ku twórczym źródłom poezji Aleksandra Wata i Czesława Miłosza [Fate, Evil, Mystery: Toward the Creative Sources of Aleksander Wat's and Czesław Miłosz's Poetry], by Marek K. Siwiec.

The article reviews the book Los, zło, tajemnica: ku twórczym źródłom poezji Aleksandra Wata i Czesława Miłosza [Fate, Evil, Mystery: Toward the Creative Sources of Aleksander Wat's and Czesław Miłosz's Poetry], by Marek K. Siwiec.

ExcerptCzesław Miłosz issues from an age and place when making a distinction between the ethos of a poet, an essayist, or a philosopher seemed an unnecessary and imprudent indiscretion. His resplendent work on political philosophy, The Captive Mind, is along with Albert Camus' The Rebel one of the most insightful, historically accurate, and devastating critiques of Marxism and its entrenchment in twentieth-century thought to date. As such, The Captive Mind is unrivalled by other “theoretical” and abstract treatises in its sheer (...) ability to grasp the vital essence of political reality under totalitarian regimes. As a poet and an essayist, Miłosz's…. (shrink)

We classify two of Bertrand Russell's theories of events within the point-free ontology. The first of such approaches was presented informally by Russell in ‘The World of Physics and the World of Sense’ (Lecture IV in Our Knowledge of the External World of 1914). Based on this theory, Russell sketched ways to construct instants as collections of events. This paper formalizes Russell's approach from 1914. We will also show that in such a reconstructed theory, we obtain all axioms of Russell's (...) second theory from 1936 and all axioms of Thomason's theory of events from 1989. Russell's work certainly influenced the works of Stanisław Leśniewski, his student Alfred Tarski, and Czesław Lejewski – prominent members of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS). We see our work in the tradition of the research of Leśniewski and Tarski. Building on the technical tools developed in this environment and in the spirit of the traditional research of the LWS, we engage here, in particular, with two classic works by Russell on fundamental ontology. (shrink)

The following article begins with my recollection of the only academic conference on Zdziechowski that was organised still under the communist regime in the autumn of 1984 at the Jagiellonian University and ends with a description of the discussion on the genesis and power of evil, with the participation of Czesław Miłosz and Leszek Kołakowski, which was triggered in Poland immediately after the publication of the last edition of On Cruelty in 1993. On Cruelty was first published in 1928 (...) in the journal Przegla̧d Współczesny [Contemporary Review] in Krakow, a second time in 1938 in the volume of articles In the Face of the End, Krakow 1938, and a third – and so far last – time also in Krakow in 1993. On Cruelty, published three times but so far only in Polish, has never been thoroughly analysed or even discussed, which is why this article focuses on discussing it and related questions about the origins and nature of evil, mainly in Europe and Asia, from the earliest times to the present. Zdziechowski was particularly outraged when the cruelty he condemned was justified by religion, especially Christianity (Catholic and Protestant). From these condemnations, he described the activities of the Inquisition, the witch trials, cruelty to animals, and – in the introduction – the “psychology of cruelty.” At the same time, however, he meticulously listed the names of those political and spiritual leaders in Europe and Asia, theologians and thinkers, who, over many centuries, up to the present day, have resolutely spoken out against evil, including cruelty, within and outside the Church. A separate and important issue is Zdziechowski’s attitude to Tsarist Russia and Bolshevism, as outlined in his work On Cruelty. On the one hand, he pointed out that at least two rulers of Russia before 1917 – Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great – had made major contributions to the history of cruelty in Europe and Asia. But Bolshevism, which Zdziechowski condemned in the strongest terms, was in his eyes not a continuation of pre-1917 Russian despotism, but emanated from the depths of Asia. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to investigate some of the possible sources of inspiration for Orwell’s concept of the artificial language called Newspeak, which, in his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, is shown as an effective tool of enslavement and thought control in the hands of a totalitarian state. The author discusses, in this context, the putative links between Newspeak and really existing artificial languages, first of all Esperanto, and also between Orwell’s notion of “doublethink”, which is an important feature of (...) the totalitarian mentality, and Czesław Miłosz’s notion of “ketman”, developed in his book The Captive Mind. But the main emphasis is on the connection between Orwell’s book and the slightly earlier novel by C.S. Lewis, That Hideous Strength. It is well known that Orwell knew Lewis’s book and expressed his mixed feelings about it. There are many specific, though far from obvious, similarities between the two books, but what seems to have been particularly inspiring for Orwell was Lewis’s vision of a thoroughly degenerate language that is used for political manipulation rather than for communication. (shrink)

Philip Larkin’s poem “Aubade” tackles the subject of mortality with technical facility and unsparing candour. It has a reputation for profoundly affecting its readers. Yet poets Seamus Heaney and Czeslaw Milosz think “Aubade” is bad for us and for poetry: it lures us into the underworld and traps us there, and betrays poetry’s purpose by transcribing rather than transforming the depressing facts of reality. Philosophers, however, quite like it. “Aubade” crops up repeatedly in contemporary philosophy of death. I examine the (...) various appeals that philosophers have made to Larkin’s poem with a view to drawing out subtleties in the poem and the philosophical texts, before turning my attention to broader questions of its merit. At first glance, philosophy’s affinity for “Aubade” may seem to confirm Heaney and Milosz’s contention that the poem is somehow against poetry and on the side of “reason, science, and science-inspired philosophy” (Milosz). I argue that the philosophical uses of the poem help to undercut if not entirely dissolve Heaney and Milosz’s polarising efforts; they are mistaken in their views about the different purposes of poetry and philosophy, but there is some philosophical support for their commitment to averting mortal despair. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Edward MacKinnon BORIS PASTERNAK'S CONCEPTION OF REALISM To desire truth is to desire direct contact with a piece of reality. To desire contact with a piece of reality is to love. —Simone Weil, The Needfor Roots According to czeslaw milosz, Boris Pasternak "did not pluck fruits from the tree of reason, the tree of life was enough for him. Confronted by argument, he replied with his sacred dance." (...) Pasternak's poetry, he concludes, is "antispeculative, anti-intellectual," and though he was compelled to make certain concessions in the course of writing Doctor Zhivago, speculative thought nonetheless remained for him a perennial and decided "adversary." ' However, the familiar and conveniently stark distinction between lyricist and thinker upon which such judgments depend is in fact both naive and tiresome since, plainly, creativity and reflection need in no way necessarily subvert one another. Accordingly, while it is indeed likely that the most valued feature of Pasternak's poetry and best prose is its detailed recording ofthe world's incessant change, of the magic and movement of weather and gardens, seasons and landscapes, Milosz is far from just in so readily and categorically dismissing any attribution of poetic thought to Pasternak. For as much as the whole of his poetry amounts to a celebration of life's small wonders, unrivaled in their greatness, there remains at bottom the inspiration of the thinker, of one who has seen and felt, but who at the same time has had to compile and consider in an attempt to make sense of the whole. As if in open challenge to Milosz, CM. Bowra notes that Pasternak's poetic sensibility is "both physical and intellectual." The mental states described in his poems, Bowra writes, "begin with sensations of the eye and ear but contain something else in their mental appreciation of the 211 212Philosophy and Literature situation," namely, his "gift for grasping abstract problems." 2 If Milosz remains unconvinced, and if Wladimir Weidle dismisses Pasternak's poetic thought as "puny and piteous," still more poets and critics have shared Bowra's view.3 Henry Gifford refers to Pasternak's "philosophical habit of mind," Ronald Hingley to the "pyrotechnics" ofhis "darting intellect," and Yury Lotman to his personal and "thoroughly professional philosophical culture." 4 In her review ofPasternak's My Sister, Life, meanwhile, Marina Tsvetaeva observes that "thought is what works in him, burrows in subterranean passages...." 5 And though Nadezhda Mandelstamclaims that the word of all poets "flows from a general, integrated view of the world," she acknowledges too that poets "vary in the range and depth of their understanding" and proceeds to cite Pasternak as her one example of a poet with a particularly unified worldview.6 If we were to agree with Francis Sparshott that "the fiercest hatreds spring from the closest relationships," we could assume in turn that the fundamental antagonism customarily alleged to obtain between the creative and critical faculties in fact indicates only some common, if confused, origin or inspiration.7 In creating, after all, it is predictable rather than idiosyncratic that the artist will be led to investigate the roots ofart within himself, tiiat he will be tempted by the urge to define, to entertain, that is, some rudimentary theory. And indeed, in Pasternak 's case, it is not simply a matter of his poetry and prose having been informed by certain tacit, if stray, aesthetic conceptions, but rather of his having supplemented his intensely thoughtful artwith aconcurrently developed theory. In this article, I want specifically to consider Pasternak's conception of realism, that standard of achievement which, according to his theory, constitutes the touchstone of all great art. In order more firmly to ground this notoriously vague and unwieldy notion, I will appeal not only to complementary theoretical conceptions of Pasternak's, but also to those central ideas advanced by Iris Murdoch in The Sovereignty of Good. My intention will be to locate Pasternak's brand of realism within what I take to be an identifiable tradition, or at least a conspicuous and pervasive theoretical tendency, according to which the most crucial criterion of artistic realism is judged to be not any properly physical aspect ofthe completed work, and certainly... (shrink)

This essay examines the work of Ewa Lipska, who, since the publication of her first book in 1967, has been among the most acclaimed of recent Polish poets but less well known in the West than Czesław Miłosz, Wisława Szymborska, or Adam Zagajewski. She is a philosophical poet, making frequent reference to the tradition of the Frankfurt School, in order to ironize the Enlightenment, Marxism, and Critical Theory, but also in order to assess the dangers of globalization. The focus (...) of the analysis is Lipska’s volume 1999, the linchpin of a poetic project that engages centuries of social systems (political, economic, scientific, technological, artistic) and their vocabularies in order to examine the viability of human knowledge and the motivations underlying its creation. (shrink)