This study concerns the ideas of one particular philosopher, Henri Bergson, whose views of time, intuition, and creativity have had a significant impact on art, literature, and the humanities, both in his time and in our own. Although it is generally recognized that Bergson's ideas have significantly impacted the arts and the humanities, it has not been recognized how they have also had a creative influence on the sciences as well. Nor has it been realized that this was (...) one of his most basic contentions. Bergson's conception of intuition--his fundamental insight into reality--was not limited to fugitive insights into human existence. By realizing previously unsuspected possibilities for research and discovery, his endeavors were also meant to make possible new advances in the sciences. If it enabled his cousin by marriage, Marcel Proust, to explore human memory in depth, it also inspired psychologists like Daniel Schachter to use Bergson's ideas to make real contributions to contemporary memory science. If his notion of creative evolution brought many thinkers to a belief in human creative freedom, it brought others (notably Alexis Carrel and Pierre Lecomte de Noüy) to a scientific study of biological time. Among his successful speculations was the theory of the Big Bang cosmology. 'Getting Bergson Straight' shows many points at which Bergson's ideas anticipated future developments in the sciences. This was seen clearly by the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Luis de Broglie who viewed Bergson's physics as presaging quantum physics. Thus, the text is well situated for arts, humanities, social science, and natural science classrooms studying creative thinking and/or intellectual history. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty a placé la primauté d'autrui au centre de la structure du sujet, inaugurant une philosophie de l'hospitalité à contre-courant des phénoménologies du conflit (Hegel, Husserl, Sartre, etc.), et en dépassement radical du cogito cartésien et husserlien : la Phénoménologie de la perception institue le pluralisme ontologique tiré de la transcendantalité de l'intersubjectivité. L'étude précise (chapitre 1) que la montée des théories essentialistes a profité de l'analyse de la crise sociale des années 1960. Samuel P. Huntington en a été (...) l'un des leaders, qui animait un débat sur les identités rentré récemment dans l'arène académique. Au fond, on ne peut parler philosophiquement et sérieusement de l'identité et de l'essentialisme qu'en partant de la découverte cartésienne d'un cogito insulaire (chapitre 2), qui hante les Méditations cartésiennes : la réduction eidétique ne dépasse le cogito cartésien qu'en en gardant la caractéristique essentielle, qui est la transcendance (chapitre 3). Radicale et hérétique, la démarche de Merleau-Ponty s'en tient à l'analyse de l'expérience ingénue tirée du dernier Husserl (chapitre 4), pour faire du sujet lui-même un être (en) dehors (de soi). La transcendance de l'intersubjectivité est primordiale (chapitre 5) et éclaire singulièrement le passage de l'analytique du sujet à la politique et à l'histoire (chapitre 6). Repenser le politique à partir d'une telle approche, c'est faire du pluralisme ontologique le concept de déconstruction des constellations historiques (communauté, nationalité, ethnicité, etc.) rigidifiées par les essentialistes (chapitre 7). L'appendice du livre réfléchit sur les relations que cette thèse neuve sur la Lebenswelt peut entretenir au plenum de la sociologie radicale. (shrink)

Husserl's investigations of internal time-consciousness take sound as the primary temporal object. However, in these investigations, the structure of the flux of temporal subjectivity is established to the detriment of the rich tonal content of sound. Just as Husserl has enlarged the significance of the spatial object of mathematical physics to include the historically-sedimented layers of its appearance, so the temporal object will receive additional intelligibility if the rich texture of musical sound is taken into consideration. Particularly useful for this (...) task is Bergson's philosophy of the listening experience. (shrink)

As seen by Professor Capek, Bergson’s views about the nature of matter were either misunderstood or ignored in the decades following their publication at the turn of the century. The explanation for this attitude of both Bergson’s opponents and his disciples lies in the fact that, at that time, although there were rumblings under the foundations of classical physics, "hardly anybody could then guess even remotely the extent of the coming scientific revolution." One of the main stumbling blocks (...) for Bergson’s readers was the non-pictorial character of his ‘model’ of matter, which was conceived as consisting of imageless events. In Bergson and Modern Physics, Capek attempts to remove this stumbling block and to evaluate the relation between Bergson’s thought and modern physics as it stands today. The book consists of three parts: Bergson’s biological theory of knowledge, his theory of duration, and his theory of the physical world and its relations to contemporary physics. Three appendices deal with Russell’s complex relation to Bergson, with the much discussed relation of microphysical indeterminancy to freedom, and with Bergson’s views on entropy and modern cosmogony, respectively. The book is indexed and carries extensive references to the scientific and philosophical literature. With this book Capek provides a competent exposition and historical perspective of Bergson’s philosophy and its relation to modern physics.—D. R. P. (shrink)

This is a brief, clear, and vigorous reinterpretation of Bergson's philosophy. The author attempts to prove that, far from being an irrationalist, Bergson is a systematic metaphysician firmly committed to the concept of final cause.

This is a well chosen anthology of articles, both modern and classical, on logical, epistemic, and metaphysical issues of time. The editor, whose own work on the philosophy of time is well known, has provided interesting and informative introductory essays to each of the five sections of the book. Topics dealt with include general philosophical inquiry into the nature of time ; static versus dynamic theories of time, including Donald Williams' celebrated article, "The Myth of Passage," as well as two (...) articles by Findlay and Smart which are practical prerequisites for any subsequent inquiries into modal tense logic; a section on "open future" theories, leading off with Aristotle's famous passage from De Interpretatione. This section also includes a brilliant article on temporal logic by Nicolas Rescher. Section concerns problems of "human" time. Philosophically, this is the least substantial group of selections in the book. Worthy of mention, however, is Grünbaum's controversial theory of temporal becoming, represented by an extract from the first chapter of his recent book on Zeno's paradoxes. These paradoxes, finally, comprise the topic of the final section of this book, and here again Grünbaum scores high with his article "Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes of Motion." Also contained in this final section are articles by Bergson and J. F. Thomson. The book has a bibliography which unfortunately is arranged textually rather than indexically. This makes it difficult to use.—H. P. K. (shrink)

In this popular essay, Bergson presents the view that the indistinct sensations of the disinterested dreamer serve to choose those memories which will come from the unconscious. The translation is easy and accurate.--R. P.

This first English translation of a well-known work presents the 1954 German edition. It includes material discussing Bergson, Schopenhauer, Jaspers, and Heidegger in relation to various Platonic problems. An essay by Huntington Cairns on Plato as jurist is reprinted here as well.--R. P.

A well-written translation of Cournot's Essai sur les fondements de nos connaissances et sur les caractères de la critique philosophique. The author, little known in this country except for his work in mathematics and economics, first published this work in 1851. The Essay is part rationalism, part empiricism. The first half of the Essay argues for Cournot's theory of knowledge; the second relates his theory to problems of mathematics, logic, law, history, psychology, ethics, esthetics, and to his philosophical predecessors. It (...) is a work which will reward careful study and which will be of special interest to students of Peirce and Bergson. The translator has provided a lengthy introduction which will be of value to those unfamiliar with Cournot and Cournot literature, and an excellent index. --R. P. (shrink)

This article examines the role of time as a methodological tool and pathological focus of clinical psychiatry and psychology in the first half of the 20th century. Contextualizing ‘psychopathologies of time’ developed by practitioners in Europe and North America with reference to the temporal theories implicit in Freudian psychoanalysis and Henri Bergson’s philosophy of durée, it illuminates how depression, schizophrenia, and other mental disorders such as obsessive-compulsive behaviours and aphasia were understood to be symptomatic of an altered or disturbed (...) ‘time-sense’. Drawing upon a model of temporal synthesis whereby in healthy individuals, a subjective temporal sense ( Ichzeit, durée, or personal lifetime) was perceived and understood in relation to objective time frameworks ( Weltzeit, clock-time, or quantitative time models like historical chronology), clinicians argued that mentally ill patients were unable to synthesize Ichzeit and Weltzeit, using variations in this disturbance to define specific pathological conditions. (shrink)

Polish philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s survey of epistemological and metaphysical problems, taken from a positivist orientation, is notable for its brief, clear characterizations of philosophical problems and its well placed, simplified expositions of the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Bergson and Husserl. He focusses on the logical limitations of the solutions for clearly defined problems. Any lack of depth in this book is compensated for by the accurate outlines which encourage the reader to question the foundations (...) of classical positions. In the first part of the book, the theory of truth is given logical priority to epistemology. We "... should define truth as agreement of thought with final and irrevocable criteria," to avoid the contradiction of extreme skepticism which could not be formulated without, at least, tacit reference to "reality." Because of this positive but stipulative orientation, a priorism in epistemology is given a thorough exposition. Realism, "... we can know reality only on the basis of experience," is proposed to balance the abstractness of a priorism. (shrink)

Professor Lee presents us with a thoroughly worked out and clear epistemology from a pragmatic-naturalist standpoint; his acknowledged intellectual mentors have been C. I. Lewis, G. H. Mead, and H. Bergson. A neo-Kantian without Kant’s fixed structures, Lee holds that the categories by which we interpret the "intuitive flux" need not be rigid because the flux itself is not of this character. "The concepts are derived from experience; thus there is no mystery or miracle involved in their application to (...) experience." Where does the necessary or apodictic element in knowledge come from? There is none; Lee holds it to be the distinctive advance of twentieth-century science to have recognized the hypothetical-deductive nature of all knowledge. It is to critically underscore this open-ended dimension to knowledge that Lee introduces his concept of the "continuum." Lee attempts to find an epistemic locus in an experience of continuity or "passage," "the vaguely felt wholeness that contains no gaps or separateness," but argues his case chiefly by exploiting the discoveries in mathematics of the discrepancy between our "intuition" of continuity on the one hand, and our ability to express this intuition in a formal system or work our way back to it from discrete parts. The fallacy of "misplaced discreteness" consists in taking a selection from the continuous flux as an adequate representation or definitive characterization of the entire flux. But "a continuum is not to be obtained from discrete parts, no matter how tightly they are jammed up against each other." Lee attacks the view that "one and only one analysis of the situation is correct. Such a demonstration is impossible if events are cut from a continuum; the assumption of a single analysis is unjustified.". (shrink)

Hitherto unavailable except in the original French, Bergson's Durée et Simultanéité is an engaging contribution to the philosophy of relativity theory, space, and time. The book appeared during a period of great debate on the philosophical status of Einstein's Special Theory, and it treats, therefore, of it to the exclusion of the more conceptually difficult General Theory. Bergson is mainly concerned with trying to explicate the problems of the twin and clock 'paradoxes' which are presently again under some (...) critical discussion. Bergson tries to show that there is a symmetry in the aging of the two twins, not the usual asymmetry. Although Bergson is not usually considered a philosopher of science, those interested in the conceptual foundations of a modern physical theory might do well to consider his refreshing conclusions. The publishers are to be congratulated for making available this stimulating book.—P. J. M. (shrink)

As seen by Professor Capek, Bergson’s views about the nature of matter were either misunderstood or ignored in the decades following their publication at the turn of the century. The explanation for this attitude of both Bergson’s opponents and his disciples lies in the fact that, at that time, although there were rumblings under the foundations of classical physics, "hardly anybody could then guess even remotely the extent of the coming scientific revolution." One of the main stumbling blocks (...) for Bergson’s readers was the non-pictorial character of his ‘model’ of matter, which was conceived as consisting of imageless events. In Bergson and Modern Physics, Capek attempts to remove this stumbling block and to evaluate the relation between Bergson’s thought and modern physics as it stands today. The book consists of three parts: Bergson’s biological theory of knowledge, his theory of duration, and his theory of the physical world and its relations to contemporary physics. Three appendices deal with Russell’s complex relation to Bergson, with the much discussed relation of microphysical indeterminancy to freedom, and with Bergson’s views on entropy and modern cosmogony, respectively. The book is indexed and carries extensive references to the scientific and philosophical literature. With this book Capek provides a competent exposition and historical perspective of Bergson’s philosophy and its relation to modern physics.—D. R. P. (shrink)

New Blackfriars, Volume 103, Issue 1105, Page 396-407, May 2022.

This paper seeks to highlight the importance of spatial cognition in Bergson’s Données immédiates by engaging with Robert Watt’s reconstruction of Bergson’s argument that every idea of number involves the idea of space. We focus on the second stage of Watt’s reconstruction, where Bergson argues that only space can provide the distinction required for our counting of otherwise identical items. Watt bases his reconstruction on a premise regarding the possibility that identical objects, in the absence of spatial (...) distinction, might remain identical across different “temporal locations”. Our paper raises the prospect that Bergson is committed to a stronger thesis, namely one implying that identical objects would necessarily remain indistinguishable without the intervention of space. The paper thus concludes by emphasizing the indispensability of space for knowledge according to Bergson. (shrink)

To avoid this blunt and embarrassing alternative seems to be the goal of much recent philosophy--and especially of continental European thought. It becomes apparent at once that these problems cannot be separated from our experience and interpretation of process and duration, of time and change, and of our place within them. It is this consideration, recognized as the very heart of the matter, to which Professor Chaix-Ruy has turned his attention. He finds his central problem to be an ancient and (...) recurring one, and he pays as much attention to Augustine and Pascal as to Bergson and Einstein. There results a panorama of Western thought apprehended from an unusual point of view. The detailed studies included are often fresh and penetrating and the whole argument is of absorbing interest. We may introduce this argument by indicating that at one point, although at one point only, Chaix-Ruy agrees completely with Sartre: the relation of essence to existence in human life is a unique one, quite different from that to be found elsewhere among non-human or sub-human beings. This contrast involves a description of man's relation to time and to change. Human nature is subject to change, or better, man subjects himself to change. "Chez nous l'essence est in fieri". We are reminded of Sartre's "Faire et en faisant se faire," although, as we shall soon see, we need not think of the initiative as lying wholly with our existence, as opposed to our essence. After all, an existence capable of transforming essence must have a structure of its own and a modus operandi. Even the freest choice is "structured." This would seem to be true even if our creative self-realization in some way embraces or contains nonbeing. (shrink)

To avoid this blunt and embarrassing alternative seems to be the goal of much recent philosophy--and especially of continental European thought. It becomes apparent at once that these problems cannot be separated from our experience and interpretation of process and duration, of time and change, and of our place within them. It is this consideration, recognized as the very heart of the matter, to which Professor Chaix-Ruy has turned his attention. He finds his central problem to be an ancient and (...) recurring one, and he pays as much attention to Augustine and Pascal as to Bergson and Einstein. There results a panorama of Western thought apprehended from an unusual point of view. The detailed studies included are often fresh and penetrating and the whole argument is of absorbing interest. We may introduce this argument by indicating that at one point, although at one point only, Chaix-Ruy agrees completely with Sartre: the relation of essence to existence in human life is a unique one, quite different from that to be found elsewhere among non-human or sub-human beings. This contrast involves a description of man's relation to time and to change. Human nature is subject to change, or better, man subjects himself to change. "Chez nous l'essence est in fieri". We are reminded of Sartre's "Faire et en faisant se faire," although, as we shall soon see, we need not think of the initiative as lying wholly with our existence, as opposed to our essence. After all, an existence capable of transforming essence must have a structure of its own and a modus operandi. Even the freest choice is "structured." This would seem to be true even if our creative self-realization in some way embraces or contains nonbeing. (shrink)

Paper edition (unseen), $14.95. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

La Philosophie Bergsonienne was Maritain’s earliest work. It has now been translated into English for the first time. Already, when the book was written, Maritain was a follower of St. Thomas; in his foreword to the present edition he modestly describes it as “probably a fair to middling account of basic Thomistic Philosophy”. As the title of the book suggests, Bergson’s thought, at least in its basic doctrines, is given not for its own sake but rather to enable us (...) to see how Thomistic thought can face up to the problems Bergson sought to answer. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

William Alston et Henri Bergson semblent défendre une même thèse : celle de la valeur de l’expérience mystique pour la connaissance. L’étude comparée de la manière dont chacun d’entre eux la formule et la défend constitue un bon angle pour envisager la différence entre tradition « analytique » et tradition « continentale » en philosophie de la religion. Cet article vise à montrer les divergences et les convergences entre les deux auteurs, mais surtout à situer le point d’origine des (...) divergences. Il apparaît que celui-ci n’est pas à chercher dans deux conceptions irréductibles de la philosophie ou de la rationalité, mais dans une différence de compréhension de la mystique. (shrink)