O texto volta-se ao estudo da noção de epieikeia (equidade) na tradição aristotélica, procedendo-se à análise do instituto e a uma tentativa crítica de conceituação, destacando-se o problema da generalidade da lei e da singularidade dos casos. Ainda, vê-se brevemente a epieikeia na obra de Tomás de Aquino.

In the last few years it has become fashionable to 'rethink′ the heritage of the western secularist modernity and claim that it is, basically, Christian. One possibility of proving this thesis is to show that the founding fathers of secularism themselves argued from an – at least implicitly – Christian point of view, above all when setting up the normative standards for politics. One such deliberately secular founding father is Thomas Hobbes, and contrary to Christian or religious interpretations of his (...) political philosophy two things can be shown: firstly his political philosophy doesn′t depend upon religion or religious commitments and, furthermore, the underlying systematic arguments in favour of a political theology are not plausible, let alone effective. (shrink)

In the last few years it has become fashionable to 'rethink' the heritage of the western secularist modernity and claim that it is, basically, Christian. One possibility of proving this thesis is to show that the founding fathers of secularism themselves argued from an - at least implicitly - Christian point of view, above all when setting up the normative standards for politics. One such deliberately secular founding father is Thomas Hobbes, and contrary to Christian or religious interpretations of his (...) political philosophy two things can be shown: firstly his political philosophy doesn't depend upon religion or religious commitments and, furthermore, the underlying systematic arguments in favour of a political theology are not plausible, let alone effective. (shrink)

It is a widely supported claim that liberal democratic institutions should treat citizens with equal respect. I neither dispute nor champion this claim, but investigate how it could be fulfilled. I do this by asking, as a sort of litmus test, how liberal democratic institutions should treat with respect citizens holding minority convictions, and thereby dissenting from a deliberative output. The first step of my argument consists in clarifying the sense in which liberal democracies have a primary concern for the (...) respectful treatment of citizens qua self-legislating persons. Taking the second step, I address critically the common tendency in the literature to concentrate on what I have termed the ex ante legem phase, focusing solely on the structure of institutionalized decision-making processes. I submit, rather, that the principle of equal respect for persons demands more of liberal democratic institutions to enhance citizens' chances to give voice to their consciences and influence, on that ground, the formulation of the rules to which they should conform. Fulfilling this commitment requires democratic theorizing to go beyond the ex ante legem phase and regard forms of ex post legem contestation as an extension of citizens' right to political participation. Against this backdrop, I take the third and last step and argue that a promising way forward consists in the adoption of an ex post legem version of conscientious exemptionism, granting citizens a conditional moral right to request exemptions on the grounds of conscience from certain controversial legal and political provisions. (shrink)

In this article a case is made for considering the liturgy as theological norm par excellence. The case is built up by relying on an emphatic current of thought within the field of liturgical studies, namely the ‘liturgical theology’ as it was developed by Alexander Schmemann, Aidan Kavanagh, and David W. Fagerberg. After presenting the concept of ‘liturgical theology’ and the context out of which it emerged, its major characteristics are discussed. Particular attention is devoted to the radicalness of their (...) position. It can be called radical because the reversal of the relation between doctrine and liturgy is by no means evident for the vast majority of modern believers and theologians. However, ‘liturgical theology’ claims that it is not doctrine which determines liturgy but liturgy which determines doctrine. According to liturgical theologians, the liturgy is not simply the ritual expression of the content of faith, but itself theology, even theologia prima . Correspondingly, liturgical theologians point to the original wording of the famous adage lex orandi lex credendi , which is the following: ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi . Whereas the usual formulation suggests equality and mutual dependence, the original context lays bare a clear priority of the rule of prayer over the rule of faith. In the final part of the article I explore some avenues to the evaluation of ‘liturgical theology’. I argue that there is need for a more profound philosophical underpinning and historical adequacy. But nevertheless the idea that the liturgy constitutes a theological norm stands firmly and should be considered far more broadly and seriously among contemporary systematic theologians. (shrink)

Arbejderne i denne publikation er dels tidligere udgivne tidsskriftartikler, dels ikke før publiceret materiale. De afspejler en vedvarende og relevant forskning i antikkens opfattelse af psyken og af især den sokratiske samtale, som har gennemgribende indflydelse på mange forskellige områder i moderne tid: pædagogik, retsvæsen, sundhedsområdet, retorik osv. Teksterne falder i fire grupper: Sokrates (samtalens logik), Platon (især moralfilosofi og psykologi), Aristoteles (moralfilosofi, gudsbegreb og hverdagsargumentation) og Senere Filosofi (stoisk naturfilosofi, nyplatonisme, Augustins erkendelsesteori, og sjæl-legeme-opfattelsen i antikken). Læseren præsenteres her (...) for en række emner, der vil interessere den, der ønsker at fordybe sig i de ‘evige’ spørgsmål. (shrink)

One of the most important pieces of evidence which we possess concerning the judicial rights of Roman provincials, particularly their status in relation to the governor's tribunal, is provided by Cicero's brief outline of those provisions of the lex Rupilia, the Sicilian provincial charter, which dealt with judicial administration. The passage reads as follows: Siculi hoc iure sunt ut, quod civis cum cive agat, domi certet suis legibus, quod Siculus cum Siculo non eiusdem civitatis, ut de eo praetor iudices ex (...) P. Rupili decreto, quod is de decem legatorum sententia statuit, quam legem Rupiliam vocant, sortiatur. Quod privatus a populo petit ant populus a privato, senatus ex aliqua civitate qui iudicet datur, cum alternae civitates reiectae sunt; quod civis Romanus a Siculo petit, Siculus index, quod Siculus a civi Romano, civis Romanus datur; ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex conventu civium Romanorum nr000ni solent. (shrink)

sola scripturarum ars est, quam sibi omnes passim uindicent: ‘scribimus indocti doctique poemata passim’ [Hor. Epist. 2.1.117]. hanc garrula anus, hanc delirus senex, hanc soloecista uerbosus, hanc uniuersi praesumunt, lacerant, docent, antequam discant. alii adducto supercilio grandia uerba trutinantes inter mulierculas de sacris litteris philosophantur, alii discunt—pro pudor!—a feminis, quod uiros doceant, et, ne parum hoc sit, quadam facilitate uerborum, immo audacia disserunt aliis, quod ipsi non intellegunt. taceo de meis similibus, qui si forte ad scripturas sanctas post saeculares litteras (...) uenerint et sermone conposito aurem populi mulserint, quicquid dixerint, hoc legem dei putant nec scire dignantur, quid prophetae, quid apostoli senserint, sed ad sensum suum incongrua aptant testimonia, quasi grande sit et non uitiosissimum dicendi genus deprauare sententias et ad uoluntatem suam scripturam trahere repugnantem. quasi non legerimus Homerocentonas et Vergiliocentonas ac non sic etiam Maronem sine Christo possimus dicere Christianum, quia scripserit: ‘iam redit et uirgo, redeunt Saturnia regna, iam noua progenies caelo demittitur alto’ [Verg. Ecl. 4.6–7], et patrem loquentem ad filium: ‘nate, meae uires, mea magna potentia solus’ [Verg. Aen. 1.664], et post uerba saluatoris in cruce: ‘talia perstabat memorans fixusque manebat’ [Verg. Aen. 2.650]. puerilia sunt haec et circulatorum ludo similia, docere, quod ignores, immo, et cum stomacho loquar, nec hoc quidem scire, quod nescias. (shrink)

In Cicero, In Vatinium, § 29, occur the words: ‘ Fecerisne foedera tribunus plebis cum ciuitatibus, cum regibus, cum tetrarchis?’ With this are to be compared: Ad Fam. I. 9, 7:‘In quo omnia dicta sunt libertate animoque maximo de ui, de auspiciis, de donatione regnorum.’ Att. II. 9, I:‘Irnprobitate istorum, qui auspicia, qui Aeliam legem, qui Iuniam et Liciniam, qui Caeciliam et Didiam neglexerunt … qui regna quasi praedia tetrarchis … dederunt.

This article builds upon the distinction between pluralism and plurality, the latter in the sense of variety or diversity. Plurality is an empirical fact, such as the biological diversity of the human species. In contrast, pluralism is a normatively underpinned social pattern according to which the diversity of interests, opinions, values, ideas, etc., of individuals and groups is recognized as a constitutive element of a political order. Pluralism can materialize only if a political order is not based upon the claim (...) of one undisputable truth. An embryonic form of pluralism through law emerged in ancient Greece with the institution of courts in which the parties to a legal dispute could argue over what the law said and hence officially present divergent meanings of justice. For the modern development the separation of law and justice was a major step towards pluralism insofar as the authority of the polity and the binding force of the law were no longer based upon the contention of one exclusive truth – auctoritas, non veritas facit legem. This Hobbesian principle banned religious, moral, philosophical and political discourses to the pre-political domain of privacy and secrecy from which pluralism could not result. Referring to the distinction between regulative and constitutive norms I submit that only the latter, not the former, can function as sources of pluralism. (shrink)