Ralph Cudworth’s theory of mind was the most fully developed philosophical psychology among the Cambridge Platonists. Like his seventeenth-century contemporaries, Cudworth discussed mental powers in terms of soul rather than mind and considered the function of the soul to be not merely intellectual, but vital and moral. Cudworth conceived the soul as a single self-determining unit which combined many powers. He developed this against a philosophical agenda set by Descartes and Hobbes. But he turned to ancient philosophy, especially the philosophy (...) of Plotinus, to develop a psychology which is distinguished by the attention he gives to both conscious and unconscious states, and to the powers which enable it to reflect on itself, to co-ordinate its activities and direct them to good ends. I argue that in so doing, Cudworth sought to elaborate a theory of mind which accounted for observable experience of mental operations. My paper outlines the complexities of Cudworth’s taxonomy of mental powers, focusing on three key powers which Cudworth developed through his reading of Plotinus: energy, self-power, and sympathy. (shrink)

► I present an intellectual history of Ptolemy’s accounts of the human soul. ► I assess the accounts for consistency. ► I argue that disparities in the psychological accounts are significant. ► I argue that the disparities demonstrate the maturation of his scientific method.

Thirteen essays on the treatment of a criterion for truth by such classical writers as Parmenides, Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Philo, Epicurius, the Stoics, Plotinus, and Ptolemy, whose neglected Greek work on the subject is included here, along with an annotated English translation. The price $LB12.50, has been estimated to US $24. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

This paper attempts to reconstruct the views of the Stoic Posidonius on the emotions, especially as presented by Galen’s On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. This is a well-studied area, and many views have been developed over the last few decades. It is also significant that the reliability of Galen’s account is openly at issue. Yet it is not clear that the interpretative possibilities have been fully demarcated. Here I develop Galen’s claim that Posidonius accepted a persistent, non-rational aspect (...) of the soul that he connects with the merely animal part of humans. The aim is to begin from this testimony in answering two questions: (1) How might the possession of a non-rational element of the soul operate alongside the hêgemonikon (leading-part of the soul) as a source of impulse for Posidonius. (2) How does this persistent animal aspect conform to the Stoic ontological classification found in their scala naturae? I shall argue in response to these that (a) Posidonius distinguished the merely cognitive aspects of the soul from those that are rational, and (b) that the hêgemonikon itself is not to be identified with what is rational. Accepting a persistent non-rational source of emotional impulses allows Posidonius a richer framework for explaining human affective responses and behaviours. I also briefly address Galen’s motivation for the account he offers. It is in view of Posidonius’ approach to Plato’s Timaeus that Galen’s discussion finds its most plausible interpretation. (shrink)

This article presents a research on the occurrences of Pithanon in Galen’s On Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP). Galen writes PHP to critique doctors, Peripatetics, and stoics about the powers that govern man. He considers his criticism to be justifiable because they have come to the wrong conclusions because of the wrong selection of premises. According to him, his opponents' conclusions are based on persuasive, mistaken, ambiguous or false assumptions. Pithanon is a key word he uses to identify one (...) of the premises that is applied by the stoics in order to prove their thesis about the hegemonikon. (shrink)

In this book the author intends to present a careful analysis of the Stoic teaching on human action and to apply it to the moral doctrine of mainly Zeno and Chrysippus. The work is divided into two parts: the first deals with the structure of human action, whereas the second applies the result of the performed analysis to the moral theory, especially to the teaching on passions and the ethical evolution of an individual from a pre-moral to a moral stage. (...) In the first chapter the author draws the attention to the Aristotelian background of the Stoic theory: the notion of phantasia, being the faculty which provides images of sensible reality and interprets them, plays an important part in both doctrines. In his analysis of action Aristotle uses logical and linguistic concepts and the Stoics proceed in the same way. According to Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, human soul comprises eight parts, one of them being the hegemonikon or the mind. Within the mind four powers are distinguished: presentation, assent, impulse and reason; they are enduring and stable entities and they govern the activities corresponding to them. So they exist even when they are not being exercised, they are dispositions of the pneuma of the mind. In spite of their determinism the Stoics were anxious to preserve man's responsibility: therefore they stressed particularly the importance of assent, which causes impulse, whereas impulse produces action. Assent is an internal factor: man is a responsible being because his actions are the result of a personal assent. In this respect man differs from mere animals, which are unable to produce such an act; as a matter of fact assent is not given to a presentation as such, but to the meaning or content of a presentation. Since mere animals are unable to form lekta, they do not have the capacity of performing an act of assent. However mere animals may have something similar, which is called yielding. According to the Stoics no human action is performed without an act of assent, even when the agent is not aware of it: in these cases the assent is implicitly present in the action. This factor does not coincide with the Aristotelian bouleusis: within the Stoic theory of action there is no room for deliberation. The assent is the internal cause of an impulse, which is directed at a predicate, related to an imperative: in this way impulse is the immediate cause of action. (shrink)

El primer enfoque del artículo consiste en un análisis y una interrogación sobre el uso del término voluntad en el estoicismo y su traducción en griego. Dicho análisis revela que la expresión actividad voluntaria traduce plenamente la especificidad de este sistema del mundo que es la filosofía del pórtico. Luego, el ejercicio mismo de la filosofía, que es una puesta en práctica de los saberes físicos, lógicos y éticos, se observa a través de cada una de las meditaciones del emperador (...) como un esfuerzo para cultivar la parte principal del alma. Así, la perfección interior lograda incluye un sentimiento de hermandad humana y de solidaridad cósmica vinculado con uno de los dogmas esenciales de la escuela: el vivir de acuerdo con la naturaleza. (shrink)