We show that Bounded Forcing Axioms (for instance, Martin's Axiom, the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom, or the Bounded Martin's Maximum) are equivalent to principles of generic absoluteness, that is, they assert that if a $\Sigma_1$ sentence of the language of set theory with parameters of small transitive size is forceable, then it is true. We also show that Bounded Forcing Axioms imply a strong form of generic absoluteness for projective sentences, namely, if a $\Sigma^1_3$ sentence (...) with parameters is forceable, then it is true. Further, if for every real x, $x^{\sharp}$ exists, and the second uniform indiscernible is less than $\omega_2$ , then the same holds for $\Sigma^1_4$ sentences. (shrink)

We prove a variety of theorems about stationary set reflection and concepts related to internal approachability. We prove that an implication of Fuchino–Usuba relating stationary reflection to a version of Strong Chang’s Conjecture cannot be reversed; strengthen and simplify some results of Krueger about forcing axioms and approachability; and prove that some other related results of Krueger are sharp. We also adapt some ideas of Woodin to simplify and unify many arguments in the literature involving preservation of (...) class='Hi'>forcing axioms. (shrink)

We show that bounded forcing axioms are consistent with the existence of -gaps and thus do not imply the Open Coloring Axiom. They are also consistent with Jensen's combinatorial principles for L at the level ω2, and therefore with the existence of an ω2-Suslin tree. We also show that the axiom we call BMM3 implies 21=2, as well as a stationary reflection principle which has many of the consequences of Martin's Maximum for objects of size 2. Finally, we (...) give an example of a so-called boldface bounded forcing axiom implying 20=2. (shrink)

We consider forcing axioms for suitable families of μ‐complete ‐c.c. forcing notions. We show that some form of the condition “ have a in ” is necessary. We also show some versions are really stronger than others.

We prove that MM (Martin maximum) is equivalent (in ZFC) to the older axiom SPFA (semiproper forcing axiom). We also prove that SPFA does not imply SPFA + or even PFA + (using the consistency of a large cardinal).

We prove rigidity results for large classes of corona algebras, assuming the Proper Forcing Axiom. In particular, we prove that a conjecture of Coskey and Farah holds for all separable [Formula: see text]-algebras with the metric approximation property and an increasing approximate identity of projections.

We prove rigidity results for large classes of corona algebras, assuming the Proper Forcing Axiom. In particular, we prove that a conjecture of Coskey and Farah holds for all separable [Formula: see text]-algebras with the metric approximation property and an increasing approximate identity of projections.

Suppose that T^∗ is an ω_1-Aronszajn tree with no stationary antichain. We introduce a forcing axiom PFA(T^∗) for proper forcings which preserve these properties of T^∗. We prove that PFA(T^∗) implies many of the strong consequences of PFA, such as the failure of very weak club guessing, that all of the cardinal characteristics of the continuum are greater than ω_1, and the P-ideal dichotomy. On the other hand, PFA(T^∗) implies some of the consequences of diamond principles, such as the (...) existence of Knaster forcings which are not stationarily Knaster. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 02, August 2022. We introduce bounded category forcing axioms for well-behaved classes [math]. These are strong forms of bounded forcing axioms which completely decide the theory of some initial segment of the universe [math] modulo forcing in [math], for some cardinal [math] naturally associated to [math]. These axioms naturally extend projective absoluteness for arbitrary set-forcing — in this situation [math] — to classes [math] with [math]. Unlike (...) projective absoluteness, these higher bounded category forcing axioms do not follow from large cardinal axioms but can be forced under mild large cardinal assumptions on [math]. We also show the existence of many classes [math] with [math] giving rise to pairwise incompatible theories for [math]. (shrink)

The purpose of this communication is to present some recent advances on the consequences that forcing axioms and large cardinals have on the combinatorics of singular cardinals. I will introduce a few examples of problems in singular cardinal combinatorics which can be fruitfully attacked using ideas and techniques coming from the theory of forcing axioms and then translate the results so obtained in suitable large cardinals properties.The first example I will treat is the proof that the (...) proper forcing axiom PFA implies the singular cardinal hypothesis SCH, this will easily lead to a new proof of Solovay's theorem that SCH holds above a strongly compact cardinal. I will also outline how some of the ideas involved in these proofs can be used as means to evaluate the “saturation” properties of models of strong forcing axioms like MM or PFA.The second example aims to show that the transfer principle ↠ fails assuming Martin's Maximum MM. Also in this case the result can be translated in a large cardinal property, however this requires a familiarity with a rather large fragment of Shelah's pcf-theory.Only sketchy arguments will be given, the reader is referred to the forthcoming [25] and [38] for a thorough analysis of these problems and for detailed proofs. (shrink)

We show that under $\mathsf {BMM}$ and “there exists a Woodin cardinal, $"$ the nonstationary ideal on $\omega _1$ cannot be defined by a $\Pi _1$ formula with parameter $A \subset \omega _1$. We show that the same conclusion holds under the assumption of Woodin’s $(\ast )$ -axiom. We further show that there are universes where $\mathsf {BPFA}$ holds and $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is $\Pi _1(\{\omega _1\})$ -definable. Lastly we show that if the canonical inner model with one Woodin cardinal (...) $M_1$ exists, there is a generic extension of $M_1$ in which $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is saturated and $\Pi _1(\{ \omega _1\} )$ -definable, and $\mathsf {MA_{\omega _1}}$ holds. (shrink)

If the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom BPFA holds, then Mouse Reflection holds at N₂ with respect to all mouse operators up to the level of Woodin cardinals in the next ZFC-model. This yields that if Woodin's ℙ max axiom (*) holds, then BPFA implies that V is closed under the "Woodin-in-the-next-ZFC-model" operator. We also discuss stronger Mouse Reflection principles which we show to follow from strengthenings of BPFA, and we discuss the theory BPFA plus "NS ω1 is precipitous" and (...) strengthenings thereof. Along the way, we answer a question of Baumgartner and Taylor. [2, Question 6.11]. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the forcing axiom for the class of proper forcing notions which do not add ω sequence of ordinals. We study the relationship between this forcing axiom and many cardinal invariants. We use typical iterated forcing with large cardinals and analyse certain property being preserved in this process. Lastly, we apply the results to distinguish several forcing axioms.

The bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA is the statement that for any family of ℵ 1 many maximal antichains of a proper forcing notion, each of size ℵ 1 , there is a directed set meeting all these antichains. A regular cardinal κ is called Σ 1 -reflecting, if for any regular cardinal χ, for all formulas $\varphi, "H(\chi) \models`\varphi'"$ implies " $\exists\delta . We investigate several algebraic consequences of BPFA, and we show that the consistency strength of (...) the bounded proper forcing axiom is exactly the existence of a Σ 1 -reflecting cardinal (which is less than the existence of a Mahlo cardinal). We also show that the question of the existence of isomorphisms between two structures can be reduced to the question of rigidity of a structure. (shrink)

We introduce the Bounded Axiom A Forcing Axiom . It turns out that it is equiconsistent with the existence of a regular ∑2-correct cardinal and hence also equiconsistent with BPFA. Furthermore we show that, if consistent, it does not imply the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom.

After presenting a general setting in which to look at forcing axioms, we give a hierarchy of generalized bounded forcing axioms that correspond level by level, in consistency strength, with the members of a natural hierarchy of large cardinals below a Mahlo. We give a general construction of models of generalized bounded forcing axioms. Then we consider the bounded forcing axiom for a class of partially ordered sets Γ 1 such that, letting Γ (...) 0 be the class of all stationary-set-preserving partially ordered sets, one can prove the following: (a) $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma_1$ , (b) Γ 0 = Γ 1 if and only if NS ω 1 is ℵ 1 -dense. (c) If P $\notin \Gamma_1$ , then BFA({P}) fails. We call the bounded forcing axiom for Γ 1 Maximal Bounded Forcing Axiom (MBFA). Finally we prove MBFA consistent relative to the consistency of an inaccessible Σ 2 -correct cardinal which is a limit of strongly compact cardinals. (shrink)

We show that the Proper Forcing Axiom implies the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis. The proof uses the reflection principle MRP introduced by Moore in [11].

I analyze the hierarchies of the bounded and the weak bounded forcing axioms, with a focus on their versions for the class of subcomplete forcings, in terms of implications and consistency strengths. For the weak hierarchy, I provide level-by-level equiconsistencies with an appropriate hierarchy of partially remarkable cardinals. I also show that the subcomplete forcing axiom implies Larson’s ordinal reflection principle atω2, and that its effect on the failure of weak squares is very similar to that of (...) Martin’s Maximum. (shrink)

We show that in a σ‐closed forcing extension, the bounded forcing axiom for Namba forcing fails. This answers a question of J. T. Moore.

The paper discusses various relationships between the concepts mentioned in the title. In Section 1 Todorcevic functions are shown to arise from both morasses and square. In Section 2 the theme is of supplements to morasses which have some of the flavour of square. Distinctions are drawn between differing concepts. In Section 3 forcing axioms related to the ideas in Section 2 are discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to present some results which suggest that the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis follows from the Proper Forcing Axiom. What will be proved is that a form of simultaneous reflection follows from the Set Mapping Reflection Principle, a consequence of PFA. While the results fall short of showing that MRP implies SCH, it will be shown that MRP implies that if SCH fails first at κ then every stationary subset of reflects. It will also be (...) demonstrated that MRP always fails in a generic extension by Prikry forcing. (shrink)

A $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth for λ is a pair 〈Q, ψ〉 so that Q ⊆ Hλ, ψ is a first order formula with one free variable, and there exists B ⊆ Hλ+ such that (Hλ+; ε, B) $(H_{\lambda +};\in ,B)\vDash \psi [Q]$ . A cardinal λ is $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ indescribable just in case that for every $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth 〈Q, ψ〉 for λ, there exists $\overline{\lambda}<\lambda $ so that $\overline{\lambda}$ is a cardinal and $\langle Q\cap H_{\overline{\lambda}},\psi \rangle $ is a (...) $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth for $\overline{\lambda}$ . More generally, an interval of cardinals [κ, λ] with κ ≤ λ is $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ indescribable if for every $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth 〈Q, ψ〉 for λ, there exists $??\leq \overline{\lambda}<\kappa,??\subseteq H_{\overline{\lambda}}$ , and π: $H_{\overline{\lambda}}\rightarrow H_{\lambda}$ so that $??$ is a cardinal, $\langle ??,\psi \rangle $ is a $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ truth for $??$ , and π is elementary from $(H_{\overline{\lambda}};\in,??,??)$ with $\pi \,|\,??={\rm id}$ . We prove that the restriction of the proper forcing axiom to c-linked posets requires a $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ indescribable cardinal in L, and that the restriction of the proper forcing axiom to c⁺-linked posets, in a proper forcing extension of a fine structural model, requires a $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ indescribable 1-gap [κ, κ⁺]. These results show that the respective forward directions obtained in " Hierarchies of Forcing Axioms I" by Neeman and Schimmerling are optimal. (shrink)

We prove new upper bound theorems on the consistency strengths of SPFA (θ), SPFA(θ-linked) and SPFA(θ⁺-cc). Our results are in terms of (θ, Γ)-subcompactness, which is a new large cardinal notion that combines the ideas behind subcompactness and Γ-indescribability. Our upper bound for SPFA(c-linked) has a corresponding lower bound, which is due to Neeman and appears in his follow-up to this paper. As a corollary, SPFA(c-linked) and PFA(c-linked) are each equiconsistent with the existence of a $\Sigma _{1}^{2}$ -indescribable cardinal. Our (...) upper bound for SPFA(c-c.c.) is a $\Sigma _{2}^{2}$ -indescribable cardinal, which is consistent with V = L. Our upper bound for SPFA(c⁺-linked) is a cardinal κ that is $(\kappa ^{+},\Sigma _{1}^{2})$ -subcompact, which is strictly weaker than κ⁺-supercompact. The axiom MM(c) is a consequence of SPFA(c⁺-linked) by a slight refinement of a theorem of Shelah. Our upper bound for SPFA(c⁺⁺-c.c.) is a cardinal κ that is $(\kappa ^{+},\Sigma _{2}^{2})$ -subcompact, which is also strictly weaker than κ⁺-supercompact. (shrink)

We prove that a number of axioms, each a consequence of PFA (the Proper Forcing Axiom) are equivalent. In particular we show that TOP (the Thinning-out Principle as introduced by Baumgartner in the Handbook of set-theoretic topology), is equivalent to the following statement: If I is an ideal on ω 1 with ω 1 generators, then there exists an uncountable $X \subseteq \omega_1$ , such that either [ X] ω ∩ I = ⊘ or $\lbrack X\rbrack^\omega \subseteq I$.

In the absence of Woodin cardinals, fine structural inner models for mild large cardinal hypotheses admit forcing extensions where bounded forcing axioms hold and yet the reals are projectively well-ordered.

In this paper we show that the Proper Forcing Axiom is preserved under forcing over any poset PP with the following property: In the generalized Banach–Mazur game over PP of length , Player II has a winning strategy which depends only on the current position and the ordinal indicating the number of moves made so far. By the current position we mean: The move just made by Player I for a successor stage, or the infimum of all the (...) moves made so far for a limit stage. As a consequence of this theorem, we introduce a weak form of the square principle and show that it is consistent with PFA. (shrink)

I investigate the relationships between three hierarchies of reflection principles for a forcing class $\Gamma $ : the hierarchy of bounded forcing axioms, of $\Sigma ^1_1$ -absoluteness, and of Aronszajn tree preservation principles. The latter principle at level $\kappa $ says that whenever T is a tree of height $\omega _1$ and width $\kappa $ that does not have a branch of order type $\omega _1$, and whenever ${\mathord {\mathbb P}}$ is a forcing notion in $\Gamma (...) $, then it is not the case that ${\mathord {\mathbb P}}$ forces that T has such a branch. $\Sigma ^1_1$ -absoluteness serves as an intermediary between these principles and the bounded forcing axioms. A special case of the main result is that for forcing classes that don’t add reals, the three principles at level $2^\omega $ are equivalent. Special attention is paid to certain subclasses of subcomplete forcing, since these are natural forcing classes that don’t add reals. (shrink)

Various theorems for the preservation of set-theoretic axioms under forcing are proved, regarding both forcing axioms and axioms true in the Lévy collapse. These show in particular that certain applications of forcing axioms require to add generic countable sequences high up in the set-theoretic hierarchy even before collapsing everything down to ‮א‬₁. Later we give applications, among them the consistency of MM with ‮א‬ω not being Jónsson which answers a question raised in the (...) set theory meeting at Oberwolfach in 2005. (shrink)

We introduce a new simple way of defining the forcing method that works well in the usual setting under FA, the Foundation Axiom, and moreover works even under Aczel's AFA, the Anti-Foundation Axiom. This new way allows us to have an intuition about what happens in defining the forcing relation. The main tool is H. Friedman's method of defining the extensional membership relation ∈ by means of the intensional membership relation ε .Analogously to the usual forcing and (...) the usual generic extension for FA-models, we can justify the existence of generic filters and can obtain the Forcing Theorem and the Minimal Model Theorem with some modifications. These results are on the line of works to investigate whether model theory for AFA-set theory can be developed in a similar way to that for FA-set theory.Aczel pointed out that the quotient of transition systems by the largest bisimulation and transition relations have the essentially same theory as the set theory with AFA. Therefore, we could hope that, by using our new method, some open problems about transition systems turn out to be consistent or independent. (shrink)

In this paper we study the question assuming MA+⌝CH does Sacks forcing or Laver forcing collapse cardinals? We show that this question is equivalent to the question of what is the additivity of Marczewski's ideals 0. We give a proof that it is consistent that Sacks forcing collapses cardinals. On the other hand we show that Laver forcing does not collapse cardinals.

In this paper we define the forcing relation and prove its basic properties in the context of the theory ZFCA, i.e., ZFC minus the Foundation axiom and plus the Anti-Foundation axiom.

Iris Murdoch’s interpreters have often tried to read her as putting forward an alternative form of ethical foundationalism. On this reading, Murdoch is taken to be proposing ‘loving attention’ or ‘the Good’ as a fundamental moral principle that would play the same unifying role as the principle of utility or the categorical imperative. Here, I argue that a careful reading of chapter 17 of Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals shows that the foundationalist reading is untenable. Murdoch, I suggest, is (...) better understood as a methodological descriptivist. She is not simply offering us an alternative moral theory, but a radically different approach to the business of moral philosophy itself. (shrink)

We present an approach to forcing with finite sequences of models that uses models of two types. This approach builds on earlier work of Friedman and Mitchell on forcing to add clubs in cardinals larger than $\aleph_{1}$, with finite conditions. We use the two-type approach to give a new proof of the consistency of the proper forcing axiom. The new proof uses a finite support forcing, as opposed to the countable support iteration in the standard proof. (...) The distinction is important since a proof using finite supports is more amenable to generalizations to cardinals greater than $\aleph_{1}$. (shrink)

We introduce the resurrection axioms, a new class of forcing axioms, and the uplifting cardinals, a new large cardinal notion, and prove that various instances of the resurrection axioms are equiconsistent over ZFC with the existence of an uplifting cardinal.