In this paper I explore various grounds on which wilderness can be regarded as something which we should value, and I draw attention to the problems of resolving conftict which are generated by these diverse grounds. I conclude that our attitudes toward nature are partially determined by a background of metaphysical assumptions which derive in particular from the philosophy of Descartes. Thesemetaphysical preconceptions lead to the misconception that various alternative views about the natural environment are mystical or occult. Thus, an (...) alternative non-Cartesian mode ofconception involving holistic or systemic modes of-thought is required in order to develop a satisfactory basis for our attitude toward the natural world. (shrink)

In this paper I explore various grounds on which wilderness can be regarded as something which we should value, and I draw attention to the problems of resolving conftict which are generated by these diverse grounds. I conclude that our attitudes toward nature are partially determined by a background of metaphysical assumptions which derive in particular from the philosophy of Descartes. Thesemetaphysical preconceptions lead to the misconception that various alternative views about the natural environment are mystical or occult. Thus, an (...) alternative non-Cartesian mode ofconception involving holistic or systemic modes of-thought is required in order to develop a satisfactory basis for our attitude toward the natural world. (shrink)

Could Mark Antony have had all the properties of Julius Caesar and vice versa? This is a puzzle which was raised by N. L. Wilson, and I shall be concerned with it in Part I of this paper. The answer which we give to this puzzle has important implications for our notion of an identifiable individual. In Part II I examine some important consequences of accepting the coherence of a complete exchange of properties between two individuals—which we might call a (...) “biography-swap.” I argue that one consequence is to establish the inadequacy of some views about reference advocated, for example, by Russell and A. N. Prior. This leads on to a more general problem of how it is that concrete particulars are grasped as objects of thought; and in resolving this problem, I argue in Part III that demonstratives play a crucial role in reference to particulars. (shrink)

Arthur Prior is perhaps best known for his contributions to the philosophy of time. I shall argue here that his views about reference are not easily reconciled with his views about time, and suggest that his views about existence and his acceptance of some dubious Cartesian epistemological principles led him to increasingly bizarre and counter-intuitive claims about the sufficient conditions for successful reference to particulars. First he seems to have claimed that we cannot refer to individuals which no longer exist; (...) then that we can refer only to individuals which stand in a direct perceptual relationship to us; and finally that one can really only talk about oneself. In this paper I shall trace the development in Prior's thought which led him to this extraordinary conclusion. (shrink)

KAPIAN J.M. 8t PIGLIUcci, M. (2001). Genes "for" phenotypes: a modern history view. Bi- ology and Philosophy, 16, 189 — 213. PIOLIUcci, M. (2003). From molecules to phenotypes? The promise and limits of integrative biology. Basic and Applied Ecology, 4, 297— 306. WAGNER, G.P. (2001). The character concept in..