This is a study of John Dewey's philosophy based on three interrelated themes. I maintain, first, that the best understanding of Deweys work is achieved by a Peircean reading. On that reading Deweys philosophy is partly interpreted through the conceptual framework provided by C. S. Peirce. Second, I argue that a detailed grasp of Dewey's theory of inquiry is essential for a convincing assessment of his philosophical views. Third, I show that Dewey's theory of inquiry creates a common context for (...) different kinds of inquiry. ;Problem-solving is at the core of Dewey's philosophy. A general notion of inquiry does not presuppose that successful methods need to be copied. To understand inquiry as an activity sharing common features one needs to see how problem-solving in one field can be facilitated by problem-solving in other fields. ;I discuss recent debates on Dewey's philosophy based on Rorty's interpretation of his work and argue that because of a failure to emphasise Dewey's methodological approach, some Dewey-scholars who claim to be true to Dewey's word and spirit present implausible objections to the work of philosophers who, like Rorty, interpret Dewey liberally. Although I do not think that Rorty presents a very useful interpretation of Dewey, I do think that the attempt to incorporate Dewey's work into a forceful and spirited philosophical argument is more useful and interesting than a learned discussion about what Dewey's views were exactly at any given point in time. ;The second chapter of my study is devoted to an exploration of some central parts of Charles Peirce's philosophy, especially the role and place of the belief/doubt model in Peirce's thought. The belief/doubt model outlines a framework for inquiry that defines the basic tenets of pragmatism. ;The chapters that follow deal with Dewey's theory of inquiry. I discuss the central parts of this theory arguing that Dewey's presentation of reasoning at the early defining stages of inquiry makes it plausible to understand it as abductive reasoning. Such reasoning is concerned with selecting possible hypotheses. Thus for Dewey the stage in inquiry where hypotheses are selected is the crucial stage. ;Dewey's idea of natural science as a model for inquiry is derived from the view that scientific success in modern times secures natural science a special status. This, according to Dewey, is something the philosophical community has failed to appreciate. Dewey's examination of some concepts and procedures of natural science leads him to criticise many common philosophical assumptions, such as the idea that science must be based on a strict distinction between objective facts and subjective factors. Knowledge for Dewey should be characterised in terms of a certain relationship between an agent and his environment rather than in terms of true statements of objective facts. (shrink)

In the last chapter of The Public and its Problems John Dewey outlines the alleged fallacy of "the democratic creed". According to him the fallacy is described as conflating emancipation with the capacity to rule, i.e. the capacity to make policy decisions. His point is that the power to make decisions does not entail a capacity to make good choices. Capable are those in the know, the experts who are "intellectually qualified". The answer to the fallacy is to propose epistocracy: (...) The rule of experts – as Walter Lippman had come close to arguing. But Dewey tries to refute the argument for epistocracy. He rehearses the old platonic wisdom that the harmonious state... (shrink)

John Greco (2020) sets out to create a unified virtue-theoretic account of knowledge generation and transmission in his book The Transmission of Knowledge. One of the advantages of his view is that it can defend the achievement view from a known strand of counterexamples. To accomplish that, he relies on joint agency being essential to knowledge transmission. Joint agency can be characterized as a sort of interdependent and interactive cooperation between speaker and hearer that share an intention to transmit knowledge. (...) This paper introduces the phenomenon of unwanted knowledge transmission which shows that joint agency, as Greco presents it, is not essential to knowledge transmission. Four types of unwanted knowledge transmissions will be introduced that pose threats to Greco’s account by showing that shared intention, a key characteristic of joint agency, is not present in all instances of knowledge transmission. Finally, some potential ways to defend Greco’s view will be considered and discussed. (shrink)

This paper discusses reconciliation as a strategy to heal social wounds caused by dictatorial regimes or deep economic crises. The paper treats two such examples: The failed attempts of the Icelandic government to reach a deal with the UK and the Netherlands about the repayment of debts incurred by the bankrupt Landsbanki Íslands and the prosecution of Mr. Geir Haarde, formerly Prime Minister of Iceland. It is argued that although reconciliation strategies have in some cases been partially successful, it can (...) be counterproductive to prefer moral aspirations or goals, such as rebuilding trust after serious political, social or economic disintegration, to strictly legal ways of dealing with individual cases. As the case with Mr. Haarde shows, the endeavor to achieve moral goals using legal means can backfire in unexpected ways. (shrink)

At the end of her book, Pragmatism and Social Hope, Judith Green asks why one should want to spend time on expanding opportunities for participation in democratic governance (248). The reason, according to her, is a desire that a "deeper rationality of human spirit" would direct decision-making in the world. We are currently captives of economic/military/political rationality, according to her. Only through participatory democracy, or "second-strand democracy" can the spell be broken (195). Although this does not become apparent until one (...) has read a good deal of the book, the author is primarily interested in democratic participation as a way to "deepen" democracy. Yet the (perhaps rhetorically intended) question.. (shrink)

Sleep has received limited attention in economics and sleep duration is usually made exogenous and fixed in models of time allocation. In our framework sleeping involves investing in alertness but also a sacrifice of waking time. We show how the inter-temporal utility-maximization problem on the length of sleep is analogous to the optimality conditions for resource extraction. We then test the theoretical predictions that emerge from the model, which include the effects of labor market opportunities and having children, on sleep (...) patterns. (shrink)

Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) a passe toute sa vie en Boheme, qui faisait encore partie de l'Empire autrichien. Apres des etudes de philosophie, mathematique et theologie, il est devenu pretre et professeur de Science de la religion a l'Universite de Prague. Heritier de l'Aufklarung, il a consacre sa vie a la reforme de la semi-feodale societe autrichienne et a la reforme des sciences a priori: logique, mathematique et theologie. Ses critiques de la constitution et de l'ordre existant lui valurent d'etre destitue (...) de sa chaire en 1819 et de passer le reste de sa vie en exil interieur entoure d'un petit cercle d'amis, ecrivant ses grands traites: le Traite de science de la religion (1834), la Theorie de la science (1837), la Theorie des grandeurs ainsi que l'utopie Du meilleur Etat et les Paradoxes de l'infini (1851). Le texte De la methode mathematique, extrait de l'Introduction a la Theorie des grandeurs, resume quelques unes de ses plus importantes innovations en logique et presente sa philosophie des mathematiques, concue en opposition a Kant. Bolzano l'a choisi pour l'envoyer a Franz Exner, nomme professeur de philosophie a l'Universite de Prague en 1831. L'echange epistolaire qui s'en est suivi tourne autour des deux theses controversees de la logique de Bolzano: sa conception des objets logiques en soi, independants de la pensee et de la langue, et son concept d'intuition. Dans cette controverse s'est joue le sort de la philosophie autrichienne. Bolzano n'a pas reussi a convaincre Exner, qui lui oppose avec tenacite les idees de Herbart. (shrink)