Annotations to the Dbu ma'i spyi don zab don gsal ba'i sgron me by Paṇ-chen Bsod-nams-grags-pa, 1478-1554.

The work explores the historical and intellectual context of Tsongkhapa's philosophy and addresses the critical issues related to questions of development and originality in Tsongkhapa's thought. It also deals extensively with one of Tsongkhapa's primary concerns, namely his attempts to demonstrate that the Middle Way philosophy's de-constructive analysis does not negate the reality of the everyday world. The study's central focus, however, is the question of the existence and the nature of self. This is explored both in terms of Tsongkhapa's (...) de-construction of the self and his re-construction of person. Finally, the work explores the concept of reality that emerges in Tsongkhapa's philosophy, and deals with his understanding of the relationship between critical reasoning, no-self, and religious experience. (shrink)

本书不仅介绍了藏传因明的产生发展,而且也介绍了作为藏族文化重要组成部分的藏传因明的理论意义,以便能探讨藏传因明的深层内涵,挖掘其理论价值。.

On elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

On Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Exegesis on comparative philosophical positions (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

Study on critical points of Buddhist dialectic and debating.

Basic course of study of elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Compilation of some important works on basic course of study of elementary Buddhist logic and dialectrical studies of Bkra-śis-lhun-po Monastery, a college of Buddhist studies in Bylakuppe, Karnataka, India.

Study on general principles of Buddhist logic.

The eleventh-century Indian Buddhist master Ratnākaraśānti presents a unique Yogācāra interpretation of tantric _maṇḍala_ visualisation in the _*Guhyasamājamaṇḍalavidhiṭīkā_. In this text, he employs the neither-one-nor-many argument to assert that the qualities of the mind represented by the deities in the _maṇḍala_ are neither the same nor different from the mind itself. He also provides five scenarios of meditation to explain the necessity of practising both the perfection method (_pāramitānaya_) and the mantra method (_mantranaya_) together in Mahāyāna. Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation exerts a (...) significant influence on the works of later Buddhist masters in India and Tibet, with parts of it being reused in the _*Śrīherukopadeśanāmasvādhiṣṭhānakrama_ by Śūnyasamādhivajra (c. the eleventh century), the eighteenth chapter of the _Āmnāyamañjarī_ by Abhayākaragupta (from the late eleventh to the twelfth century) and the tantric compendium _sNgags rim chen mo_ by the Tibetan master Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419). This paper explores how Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation has been reused and modified in these subsequent works. While Śūnyasamādhivajra faithfully reproduced Ratnākaraśānti’s Yogācāra explanation, Abhayākaragupta modified it to align with his Madhyamaka view. Abhayākaragupta in turn influenced Tsong kha pa, who accepted Abhayākaragupta’s Madhyamaka modification in his works. This paper also engages with current scholarly discussions on textual reuse and the underlying reasons behind it. While Śūnyasamādhivajra and Abhayākaragupta assimilated Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation without acknowledgement, Tsong kha pa quoted the text by name and acknowledged Abhayākaragupta’s reuse of Ratnākaraśānti’s explanation. This paper concludes by discussing the factors that determine whether the reused text is acknowledged or not, and the possible reasons behind textual reuse. (shrink)

Literal explanation of the ʼJam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa Ṅag-dbaṅ-brtson-ʼgrus's text Grub mthaʼi rnam par bźag pa ʼkhrul spoṅ gdoṅ lṅaʼi sgra dbyaṅs kun mkhyen lam bzaṅ gsal baʼi rin chen sgron me, deals on comparative study of the philosophical systems (siddhānta) of Buddhism and Hinduism.

Basic course of study of elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Explanation of the philosophical position (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

Self learning book for beginner on Buddhist debate and dialectic.

Selected philosophical works by Mongolian Buddhist monk Zava Damdin, translated from Tibetan.

What are the most important points of difference between the major schools of Buddhist philosophy? This rich, medium-length survey offers a lively answer. The introduction, aimed at those new to Buddhist thought, sets up a dialogue between the schools on the most controversial topics in Buddhist philosophy. Jamyang Shayba was the greatest Tibetan writer on philosophical tenets. Losang Gonchok's Clear Crystal Mirror, a concise commentary on Jamyang Shayba's root text, represents a distillation of many centuries of Indian and Tibetan scholarship. (...) Buddhist Philosophy skims the cream of Jamyang Shayba's intellect, providing a rare opportunity to sharpen our intellect and expand our view of Buddhist thought. (shrink)

Study on development of different religious sects of Tibetan Buddhism and their interpretation of Buddhist philosophy.

Indian schools -- Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism -- The Nyingma tradition -- The Kadam tradition -- The Kagyü tradition -- The Shijé tradition -- The Sakya tradition -- The Jonang and minor traditions -- The Geluk tradition 1: Tsongkhapa -- The Geluk tradition 2: Tsongkhapa's successors -- The Geluk tradition 3: the distinctiveness of Geluk -- The Bon tradition -- Chinese traditions 1: non-Buddhist -- Chinese traditions 2: Buddhist -- Central Asian traditions.

Collection of Buddhist canonical texts translated from Sanskrit into Tibetan.

Commentary on Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, a classical verse work on the Vaibhāṣika school in Buddhist philosophy.

Translation and commentaries to the famous Mongolian Buddhist philosophy work written by Zanabazar.

Views on Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophical positions (siddhānta).

Critical study on philosophical positions (sidhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hinduism.

Philosophy of Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang-grags-pa's Lam rim chen mo.

It is well known in contemporary Madhyamaka studies that the seventh century Indian philosopher Candrakīrti rejects the foundationalist Abhidharma epistemology. The question that is still open to debate is: Does Candrakīrti offer any alternative Madhyamaka epistemology? One possible way of addressing this question is to find out what Candrakīrti says about the nature of buddha’s epistemic processes. We know that Candrakīrti has made some puzzling remarks on that score. On the one hand, he claims buddha is the pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa (person of (...) epistemic and moral authority), sarvākārajñatājñānaṃ (omniscient, wise), pratyakṣalakṣaṇam (exclusively perceptual in characteristic) [Candrakīrti (MABh VI.214)], and claims that there are clearly four pramāṇas—epistemic warrants—direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), testimony (āgama) and analogy (upamāna) [Candrakīrti (Pp I.3), cf. MacDonald 2015, pp. 287–288]. On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically, Candrakīrti claims that buddhahood is an embodiment of a complete cessation of “mind and mental processes” [Candrakīrti (MABh XI.1, 155a; MAB XI.17d)] Now how are we to make sense of these two seemingly contradictory statements? Do these statements reflect any deeper conflicts within Candrakīrti’s system or is there a coherent way to interpret these statements? The Tibetan Prāsaṅgika interpreters of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka largely agree that there is no internal contradiction in Candrakīrti’s system, and agree there is a way to make coherent sense of these statements. Nevertheless, the Tibetans exegetes bring to the table two radically conflicting proposals to approach Candrakīrti’s Mādhyamaka; both claiming to successfully address the apparent tension arising from Candrakīrti’s statements. One proposal is made by Tsongkhapa Losang Dakpa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419), who maintains the tension can be plausibly resolved by demonstrating that Candrakīrti’s unique non-foundationalist epistemological program renders him an epistemological coherentist. In contrast Taktsang Lotsawa Sherap Rinchen (sTag tshang Lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405–1477) argues that according to Candrakīrti buddha is a global agnostic, on the ground of the nonexistence of mind and mental processes for those who have attained fully awakening. Taktsang instead proposes the no-mind thesis as a more plausible way to resolve the tension in Candrakīrti’s philosophy, categorically refusing to attribute to buddha any cognitive processes and epistemic warrants. This paper is an analysis of Taktsang’s no-mind thesis—the claim that buddhas utterly lack any knowledge of the world because they do not have epistemic processes and warrants to perceive the world—in what follows a rational reconstruction of his arguments is developed in order to evaluate his thesis. We shall then assess the implications of accepting Taktsang’s no-mind thesis. (shrink)