Access to communication is critical for individuals with late-stage amyotrophic lateral sclerosis and minimal volitional movement, but they sometimes present with concomitant visual or ocular motility impairments that affect their performance with eye tracking or visual brain-computer interface systems. In this study, we explored the use of modified eye tracking and steady state visual evoked potential BCI, in combination with the Shuffle Speller typing interface, for this population. Two participants with late-stage ALS, visual impairments, and minimal volitional movement completed a (...) single-case experimental research design comparing copy-spelling performance with three different typing systems: commercially available eye tracking communication software, Shuffle Speller with modified eye tracking, and Shuffle Speller with SSVEP BCI. Participant 1 was unable to type any correct characters with the commercial system, but achieved accuracies of up to 50% with Shuffle Speller eye tracking and 89% with Shuffle Speller BCI. Participant 2 also had higher maximum accuracies with Shuffle Speller, typing with up to 63% accuracy with eye tracking and 100% accuracy with BCI. However, participants’ typing accuracy for both Shuffle Speller conditions was highly variable, particularly in the BCI condition. Both the Shuffle Speller interface and SSVEP BCI input show promise for improving typing performance for people with late-stage ALS. Further development of innovative BCI systems for this population is needed. (shrink)

I state and prove formal versions of the claim that the Nash bargaining solution creates a compromise between egalitarianism and utilitarianism, but that this compromise is “biased”: the Nash solution puts more emphasis on utilitarianism than it puts on egalitarianism. I also extend the bargaining model by assuming that utility can be transferred between the players at some cost ; I use the extended model to better understand the connections between egalitarianism and utilitarianism.

For every 2-person bargaining problem, the Nash bargaining solution selects a point that is “between” the relative utilitarian point and the relative egalitarian point. Also, it is “between” the utilitarian and egalitarian points. I improve these bounds. I also derive a new characterization of the Nash solution which combines a bounds property together with strong individual rationality and an axiom which is new to Nash’s bargaining model, the sandwich axiom. The sandwich axiom is a weakening of Nash’s IIA.

The first-order condition of the Nash bargaining solution equates the ratio of utilities to the ratio of marginal utilities. It turns out that this common ratio plays a role in determining whether the Nash solution, roughly speaking, is “more utilitarian” or “more egalitarian.” More specifically, I propose a sense of proximity to utilitarianism and/or egalitarianism according to which, in bargaining problems with distinct utilitarian and egalitarian points, the Nash solution is closer to utilitarianism if the aforementioned ratio is smaller than (...) one, and closer to egalitarianism if that ratio is greater than one. (shrink)

In the Nash demand game n players announce utility demands, the demands are implemented if they are jointly feasible, and otherwise no one gets anything. If the utilities set is the simplex, the game is called “divide-the-dollar”. Brams and Taylor studied variants of divide-the-dollar, on which they imposed reasonableness conditions. I explore the implications of these conditions on general NDGs. In any reasonable NDG, the egalitarian demand profile cannot be obtained via iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Further, a reasonable (...) NDG may fail to have a Nash equilibrium, even in mixed strategies. In the 2-person case, existence of pure strategy equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a value, in the sense that each player can secure the egalitarian payoff level independent of his opponent’s play. This result does not extend to reasonable NDGs with more than two players. Interestingly, there are results for reasonable NDGs that hold for two and three players, but not for n≥4\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$n\ge 4$$\end{document} players. (shrink)

Two players bargain to select a utility allocation in some set X⊂R+2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$X\subset {\mathbb {R}}_+^2$$\end{document}. Bargaining takes place in infinite discrete time, where each period t is divided into two sub-periods. In the first sub-period, the players play a simultaneous-move game to determine that period’s proposer, and bargaining takes place in the second sub-period. Rejection triggers a one-period delay and move to t+1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$t+1$$\end{document}. For (...) every x∈X∩R++2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$x\in X\cap {\mathbb {R}}^2_{++}$$\end{document}, there exists a cutoff δ<1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\delta <1$$\end{document}, such that if at least one player has a discount factor above δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}, then for every y∈X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$y\in X$$\end{document} that satisfies y≥x\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$y\ge x$$\end{document} there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium with immediate agreement on y. The equilibrium is supported by “dictatorial threats.” These threats can be dispensed with if X is the unit simplex and the target-vector is Pareto efficient. The results can be modified in a way that allows for arbitrarily long delays in equilibrium. (shrink)

“Randomized dictatorship,” one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works as follows: a fair coin toss determines the “dictator”—the player to be given his first-best payoff. The two major bargaining solutions, that of Nash and that of Kalai and Smorodinsky, Pareto-dominate this process. However, whereas the existing literature offers axiomatizations of the Nash solution in which this ex ante domination plays a central role, it does not provide an analogous result for Kalai–Smorodinsky. This paper fills in this gap: (...) a characterization of the latter is obtained by combining the aforementioned domination with three additional axioms: Pareto optimality, individual monotonicity, and a weakened version of the Perles–Maschler super additivity axiom. (shrink)

We add a stage to Nash’s demand game by allowing the greedier player to revise his demand if the demands are not jointly feasible. If he decides to stick to his initial demand, then the game ends and no one receives anything. If he decides to revise it down to 1-x\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$1-x$$\end{document}, where x is his initial demand, the revised demand is implemented with certainty. The implementation probability changes linearly between these two (...) extreme cases. We derive a condition on the feasible set under which the two-stage game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is first-stage agreement on the egalitarian demands. We also study two n-player versions of the game. In either version, if the underlying bargaining problem is “divide-the-dollar,” then equal division is sustainable in a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if the number of players is at most four. (shrink)

The question of what works in psychotherapy has been a subject of debate in the recent years, occupying both clinicians and researchers. In this study, we aimed to assess the current perspectives held by clinicians regarding the processes which produce changes in psychotherapy, as well as the predictors of specific views. Licensed therapists, consisting mainly of psychodynamically and integratively oriented psychologists, were asked to write in their own words what they think works in psychotherapy. Thematic analysis was employed to assess (...) the main mechanisms of change as perceived by the therapists. Differences in the prevalence of specific themes were assessed using Friedman and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Univariate logistic regressions were employed to assess the factors that predict the probability of reporting a specific mechanism of change. The results indicated that the therapeutic bond was the most highly reported mechanism of change, followed by theory-driven mechanisms of change, therapist characteristics, therapist professionalism, and client motivation. Male therapists were more likely to indicate the professionalism as a mechanism of change compared to female therapists. Higher education was associated with lower reports of therapists’ characteristics as the mechanisms of change. These results suggest that therapists acknowledge the importance of the working alliance, and that the perception of the mechanism of change is associated with various factors which comprise therapist orientation. Limitations and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

Reading “The Tale of Genji”: Sources from the First Millennium. Edited by Thomas Harper and Haruo Shirane. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Pp. xx + 610. $65.

Japan and the Culture of the Four Seasons: Nature, Literature, and the Arts. By Haruo Shirane. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. Pp. xviii + 311. $29.

Japanese Hermeneutics provides a forum for the most current international debates on the role played by interpretative models in the articulation of cultural discourses on Japan. It presents the thinking of esteemed Western philosophers, aestheticians, and art and literary historians, and introduces to English-reading audiences some of Japan's most distinguished scholars, whose work has received limited or no exposure in the United States. In the first part, "Hermeneutics and Japan," contributors examine the difficulties inherent in articulating "otherness" without falling into (...) the trap of essentialization and while relying on Western epistemology for explanation and interpretation. In the second part, "Japan's Aesthetic Hermeneutics," they explore the role of aesthetics in shaping discourses on art and nature in Japan. The essays in the final section of the book, "Japan's Literary Hermeneutics," rethink the notion of "Japanese literature" in light of recent findings on the ideological implications of canon formations and transformations within Japan's prominent literary circles. Contributors: Amagasaki Akira, Haga Toru, Hamashita Masahiro, Inaga Shigemi, Kambayashi Tsunemichi, Thomas LaMarre, John C. Maraldo, Michael F. Marra, Mark Meli, Ohashi Ryosuke, Otabe Tanehisa, Graham Parkes, J. Thomas Rimer, Sasaki Ken'ichi, Haruo Shirane, Suzuki Sadami, Stefan Tanaka, Gianni Vattimo. (shrink)