The dogma that the propositional logic of metaphysical modality is S5 is rebutted in related installments (previously published and unpublished essays).

Hardcore actualism (HA) grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world (see, e.g., Borghini and Williams (2008), Jacobs (2010), Vetter (2015)). I bolster HA, and elucidate the very nature of possibility (and necessity) according to HA, by considering if it can validate S5 modal logic. Interestingly, different considerations pull in different directions on this issue. To resolve the tension, we are forced to think hard about the nature of the hardcore actualist's modal reality and how radically (...) this departs from possible worlds orthodoxy. Once we achieve this departure, the prospects of a hardcore actualist validation of S5 look considerably brighter. This paper thus strengthens hardcore actualism by arguing that it can indeed validate S5–arguably the most popular logic of metaphysical modality–and, in the process, it elucidates the very nature of modality according to this revisionary, but very attractive, modal metaphysics. (shrink)

It is known that a theory in S5‐epistemic logic with several agents may have numerous models. This is because each such model specifies also what an agent knows about infinite intersections of events, while the expressive power of the logic is limited to finite conjunctions of formulas. We show that this asymmetry between syntax and semantics persists also when infinite conjunctions (up to some given cardinality) are permitted in the language. We develop a strengthened S5‐axiomatic system for such infinitary logics, (...) and prove a strong completeness theorem for them. Then we show that in every such logic there is always a theory with more than one model. (shrink)

In classically based modal logic, there are three common conceptions of necessity, the universal conception, the equivalence relation conception, and the axiomatic conception. They provide distinct presentations of the modal logic S5, all of which coincide in the basic modal language. We explore these different conceptions in the context of the relevant logic R, demonstrating where they come apart. This reveals that there are many options for being an S5-ish extension of R. It further reveals a divide between the universal (...) conception of necessity on the one hand, and the axiomatic conception on the other: The latter is consistent with motivations for relevant logics while the former is not. For the committed relevant logician, necessity cannot be the truth in all possible worlds. (shrink)

Abstract: I argue that the solution to the Red Hat Problem, a puzzle derived from interactive epistemic logic, requires S5. Interactive epis- temic logic is set out in formal terms, and an attempt to solve the red hat puzzle is made in K, K, and K, each of which fails, showing that a stronger system, K is required.

In this paper I introduce a sequent system for the propositional modal logic S5. Derivations of valid sequents in the system are shown to correspond to proofs in a novel natural deduction system of circuit proofs (reminiscient of proofnets in linear logic, or multiple-conclusion calculi for classical logic). -/- The sequent derivations and proofnets are both simple extensions of sequents and proofnets for classical propositional logic, in which the new machinery—to take account of the modal vocabulary—is directly motivated in terms (...) of the simple, universal Kripke semantics for S5. The sequent system is cut-free and the circuit proofs are normalising. (shrink)

We study set algebras with an operator (SAO) that satisfy the axioms of S5 knowledge. A necessary and sufficient condition is given for such SAOs that the knowledge operator is defined by a partition of the state space. SAOs are constructed for which the condition fails to hold. We conclude that no logic singles out the partitional SAOs among all SAOs.

We study set algebras with an operator (SAO) that satisfy the axioms of S5 knowledge. A necessary and sufficient condition is given for such SAOs that the knowledge operator is defined by a partition of the state space. SAOs are constructed for which the condition fails to hold. We conclude that no logic singles out the partitional SAOs among all SAOs.

Aristotelian Actualism is the conjunction of the theses that absolutely everything is actual, that individuals are neither reducible to nor dependent on independently identified properties, and that some individuals are genuine contingent existents. Robert Adams and Gregory Fitch, two prominent proponents of Aristotelian Actualism, have argued that this view has a consequence that any modal logic stronger than M, and so any modal logic in which symmetry and reflexivity are frame conditions, is inadequate. We argue that this is incorrect.

This paper is organised as follows: first, I present Salmon’s theory of modality and compare it with the standard interpretation of modality: ‘the nonrelativized S5-friendly interpretation of metaphysical modality’. Second, I explain Murray and Wilson’s ‘two-dimensional S5-friendly interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality’. In the third and last part, I put forward a few arguments against Murray and Wilson’s attempt to provide an essentialist S5-friendly theory for modality. In general, this paper argues that if one wants to hold an essentialist theory (...) for relativized modality, then his best option in the market right now is to stick with Salmon’s proposal, which better represents a genuine essentialist interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality. (shrink)

Propositional quantifiers are added to a propositional modal language with two modal operators. The resulting language is interpreted over so-called products of Kripke frames whose accessibility relations are equivalence relations, letting propositional quantifiers range over the powerset of the set of worlds of the frame. It is first shown that full second-order logic can be recursively embedded in the resulting logic, which entails that the two logics are recursively isomorphic. The embedding is then extended to all sublogics containing the logic (...) of so-called fusions of frames with equivalence relations. This generalizes a result due to Antonelli and Thomason, who construct such an embedding for the logic of such fusions. (shrink)

In the paper a decision procedure for S5 is presented which uses a cut-free sequent calculus with additional rules allowing a reduction to normal modal forms. It utilizes the fact that in S5 every formula is equivalent to some 1-degree formula, i.e. a modally-flat formula with modal functors having only boolean formulas in its scope. In contrast to many sequent calculi for S5 the presented system does not introduce any extra devices. Thus it is a standard version of SC but (...) with some additional simple rewrite rules. The procedure combines the proces of saturation of sequents with reduction of their elements to some normal modal form. (shrink)

An interpolation theorem holds for many standard modal logics, but first order $S5$ is a prominent example of a logic for which it fails. In this paper it is shown that a first order $S5$ interpolation theorem can be proved provided the logic is extended to contain propositional quantifiers. A proper statement of the result involves some subtleties, but this is the essence of it.

The numerous modal systems between S4 and S5 are investigated from an epistemological point of view by interpreting necessity either as knowledge or as (strong) belief. It is shown that-granted some assumptions about epistemic logic for which the author has argued elsewhere-the system S4.4 may be interpreted as the logic of true belief, while S4.3.2 and S4.2 may be taken to represent epistemic logic systems for individuals who accept the scheme knowledge = true belief only for certain special instances. There (...) is strong evidence in favor of the assumption that S4.2 is the logic of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper is mostly about the role of modal system S5 in conceivability arguments against, as well as in the defense of, different versions of physicalism. Jonathon VandenHombergh argued in a recent article that “[s]o far as the modal epistemology of reduction is concerned, therefore, it pays to go intrinsic.” His reasoning is that while the weaker, extrinsic version of reductive physicalism is vulnerable to conceivability arguments, the stronger, intrinsic, version is uniquely resistant to this type of challenge. To get (...) to this surprising conclusion, VandenHombergh claims that the standard strategies of preempting the Dualist’s reasoning rely on some premise(s) that the Dualist can do without: one such premise is axiom-scheme S5. I will argue that the use of S5 is legitimate in countering the Dualist, as she herself relies on it, not to secure the _validity_ of her arguments as VandenHombergh assumes, but rather, its _soundness_. I will also argue that this axiom-scheme is tacitly present in the auxiliary premises the stronger, intrinsic version of physicalism relies on: Kripke’s postulates about identity and non-identity statements. Indeed, this paper will forge an interesting and potentially important connection between Kripke’s postulates and modal system S5. (shrink)

Natural deduction systems for classical, intuitionistic and modal logics were deeply investigated by Prawitz [D. Prawitz, Natural Deduction: A Proof-theoretical Study, in: Stockholm Studies in Philosophy, vol. 3, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1965. Reprinted at: Dover Publications, Dover Books on Mathematics, 2006] from a proof-theoretical perspective. Prawitz proved weak normalization for classical logic only for a language without logical or, there exists and with a restricted application of reduction ad absurdum. Reduction steps related to logical or, there exists and classical (...) negation bring about many problems solved only rather recently. For classical S5 modal logic, Prawitz defined a normalizable system, but for a language without logical or, there exists, ◊ and, for a propositional language without ◊, Medeiros [M.da P.N. Medeiros, A new S4 classical modal logic in natural deduction, Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 799–809] presented a normalizable system for classical S4. We can mention many cut-free Gentzen systems for S4, S5 and K45/K45D, some normalizable natural deduction systems for intuitionistic modal logics and one more for full classical S4, but not for full classical S5. Here our focus is on the definition of a classical and normalizable natural deduction system for S5, taking not only □ and ◊ as primitive symbols, but also all connectives and quantifiers, including classical negation, disjunction and the existential quantifier. The normalization procedure is based on the strategy proposed by Massi [C.D.B. Massi, Provas de normalizaçaõ para a lógica clássica, Ph.D. Thesis, Departamento de Filosofia, UNICAMP, Campinas, 1990] and Pereira and Massi [L.C. Pereira, C.D.B. Massi, Normalização para a lógica clássica, in: O que nos faz pensar, Cadernos de Filosofia da PUC-RJ, vol. 2, 1990, pp. 49–53] for first-order classical logic to cope with the combined use of classical negation, disjunction and the existential quantifier. Here we extend such results to deal with □ and ◊ too. The elimination rule for ◊ uses the notions of connection and of essentially modal formulas already proposed by Prawitz for the introduction of □. Beyond weak normalization, we also prove the subformula property for full S5. (shrink)

Standard models for model predicate logic consist of a Kripke frame whose worlds come equipped with relational structures. Both modal and two-sorted predicate logic are natural languages for speaking about such models. In this paper we compare their expressivity. We determine a fragment of the two-sorted language for which the modal language is expressively complete on S5-models. Decidable criteria for modal definability are presented.

Modal potentialism as proposed by Barbara Vetter (2015) is the view that every possibility is grounded in something having a potentiality. Drawing from work by Jessica Leech (2017), Samuel Kimpton-Nye (2021) argues that potentialists can have an S5 modal logic. I present a novel argument to the conclusion that the most straightforward way of spelling out modal potentialism cannot validate an S5 modal logic. Then I will propose a slightly tweaked version of modal potentialism that can validate an S5 modal (...) logic and still does justice to the core claim of potentialism. (shrink)

The topological semantics for modal logic interprets a standard modal propositional language in topological spaces rather than Kripke frames: the most general logic of topological spaces becomes S4. But other modal logics can be given a topological semantics by restricting attention to subclasses of topological spaces: in particular, S5 is logic of the class of almost discrete topological spaces, and also of trivial topological spaces. Dynamic Topological Logic interprets a modal language enriched with two unary temporal connectives, next and henceforth. (...) DTL interprets the extended language in dynamic topological systems: a DTS is a topological space together with a continuous function used to interpret the temporal connectives. In this paper, we axiomatize four conservative extensions of S5, and show them to be the logic of continuous functions on almost discrete spaces, of homeomorphisms on almost discrete spaces, of continuous functions on trivial spaces and of homeomorphisms on trivial spaces. (shrink)

Justification logics are logics of knowledge in which explicit reasons are formally represented. Standard logics of knowledge have justification logic analogs. Connecting justification logics and logics of knowledge are Realization Theorems. In this paper we give a new, constructive proof of the Realization Theorem connecting S5 and its justification analog, JS5. This proof is, I believe, the simplest in the literature.

In the second chapter of his Modality, Probability and Rationality, James Sennett argues that Plantinga’s famed S5 Modal Argument (hereafter “MA”) for the existence of an unsurpassably great being is objectionably circular since it’s impossible for one to understand the premises of Plantinga’s MA without understanding these premises to logically entail its conclusion. That is to say, Sennett’s charge is that Plantinga’s MA is circular since there is no understanding of the premises of Plantinga’s MA that is independent of its (...) conclusion. In this paper I argue that Sennett has shown no such thing and that, contrary to strong prima facie appearances, there is an understanding of the premises of Plantinga’s MA that is independent of its conclusion. Consequently, Plantinga’s MA is not circular inthe way that Sennett alleges. (shrink)

Discusses alternative interpretations of the modal operators, for the modal propositional logic S5.

In this paper we continue the study of the variety \ of monadic Gödel algebras. These algebras are the equivalent algebraic semantics of the S5-modal expansion of Gödel logic, which is equivalent to the one-variable monadic fragment of first-order Gödel logic. We show three families of locally finite subvarieties of \ and give their equational bases. We also introduce a topological duality for monadic Gödel algebras and, as an application of this representation theorem, we characterize congruences and give characterizations of (...) the locally finite subvarieties mentioned above by means of their dual spaces. Finally, we study some further properties of the subvariety generated by monadic Gödel chains: we present a characteristic chain for this variety, we prove that a Glivenko-type theorem holds for these algebras and we characterize free algebras over n generators. (shrink)

The combinatorial theory of modality has long been dogged by the supposed problem that it entails that S5 is not the correct logic for metaphysical modality. In this paper, I suggest a modification to combinatorialism, to eliminate this tension with S5. I argue that the resulting view is more in the spirit of combinatorialism than the original position.

There are logics where necessity is defined by means of a given identity connective: \ is a tautology). On the other hand, in many standard modal logics the concept of propositional identity \ can be defined by strict equivalence \}\). All these approaches to modality involve a principle that we call the Collapse Axiom : “There is only one necessary proposition.” In this paper, we consider a notion of PI which relies on the identity axioms of Suszko’s non-Fregean logic SCI. (...) Then S3 proves to be the smallest Lewis modal system where PI can be defined as SE. We extend S3 to a non-Fregean logic with propositional quantifiers such that necessity and PI are integrated as non-interdefinable concepts. CA is not valid and PI refines SE. Models are expansions of SCI-models. We show that SCI-models are Boolean prealgebras, and vice-versa. This associates non-Fregean logic with research on Hyperintensional Semantics. PI equals SE iff models are Boolean algebras and CA holds. A representation result establishes a connection to Fine’s approach to propositional quantifiers and shows that our theories are conservative extensions of S3–S5, respectively. If we exclude the Barcan formula and a related axiom, then the resulting systems are still complete w.r.t. a simpler denotational semantics. (shrink)