This book utilizes both philosophical and biological approaches to address the various attitudes in the debate over animal rights. Rodd justifies ethical concern within a framework that is firmly grounded on evolutionary theory, and provides detailed discussion of practical situations in which ethical decisions have to be made. For moral philosophers, the book offers a biological background to the ethical questions involved. Biologists will find that it provides an approach to the ethics of animal rights which is rooted in biological (...) theory. This much-needed volume will be an invaluable guide to anyone who is concerned with animal welfare. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There are many points of similarity between the views of pacifists and those of people who argue that sentient non‐human animals have absolute rights. Both positions ultimately rest on the assertion that the consequences of a violent action which is intended to preserve some lives by terminating others are more far‐reaching than we generally suppose. When the total net consequences of such actions are considered, it can be seen that an ethic of complete non‐violence might turn out to be (...) optimific in the long run. Hence, absolutist moral positions of this sort should not be seen as irrational, or self‐serving, and are worthy of respectful consideration even if we finally decide that we ourselves cannot accept them. Until we have firm evidence as to whether non‐violence has positive or negative net consequences, the choice between absolute and situationist ethical positions must remain one which depends very largely on personal character. Absolutist positions do serve a valuable ‘conscience‐pricking’ function for the rest of us. They stand most chance of becoming more widely accepted if they are incorporated within a general ethic of positive helpfulness, rather than being presented as purely negative prohibitions. (shrink)

Biological theories about the nature and origin of ethics are important, j both because they may be largely true, and because distorted versions are sometimes effective in moulding people's ethical beliefs in curious i ways. The pernicious effects which sometimes follow the application of biology to ethics stem from an assortment of misinterpretations, while, correctly interpreted, even the most extreme biological determinism need not be supposed to diminish the worth of conscious individuals, nor be incompatible with genuinely ethical behaviour.

ABSTRACT If we accept that the behaviour of humans and other animals is very substantially channelled by evolutionary constraints, it might appear that there can be no place for animals within the protection of a human system of morality. However, the nature of plausible evolutionary constraints on the cognition of social animals, including humans, suggests that this is not so. It is likely that the most important element in our morality is the capacity to imagine the feelings of other individuals, (...) and this capacity is so important for our ability to understand and predict their behaviour that it would be likely to be preserved by evolution even if moral behaviour had no survival value in its own right. We also use this kind of imaginative sympathy to understand and predict the behaviour of other animals, and it is this which provides the main reason for the inclusion of such animals within a human moral system. The primitive elements of morality have a survival value that is probably common to many other social species of animals. Since one of our reasons for putting a special value on human life is the human capacity for moral behaviour, we ought also to view members of these species as being of special significance. (shrink)