The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality, it is often the case that some players cooperatively decide on their joint action in order to maximize the coalition’s total utility. This is modeled by Coalitional Congestion Games. Typical settings include truck drivers who work for the same shipping company, or routers that (...) belong to the same ISP. The formation of coalitions will typically imply that the resulting coalitional congestion game will no longer posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we provide conditions under which such games are potential games and posses a pure Nash equilibrium. (shrink)

The value of and the need for rich data for criminal justice research is increasingly apparent, especially following recent restrictions on primary data collection due to COVID-19. Whilst the benef...

In this study we introduce two new properties, the Midpoint Outcome on a Linear Frontier (MOLF) and Balanced Focal Point (BFP) properties, to replace the Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Symmetry (SYM) and Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations (IEUR) properties in the axiomatic characterizations of the two most prominent solution concepts, namely the Nash and Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions, respectively.

“Randomized dictatorship,” one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works as follows: a fair coin toss determines the “dictator”—the player to be given his first-best payoff. The two major bargaining solutions, that of Nash and that of Kalai and Smorodinsky, Pareto-dominate this process. However, whereas the existing literature offers axiomatizations of the Nash solution in which this ex ante domination plays a central role, it does not provide an analogous result for Kalai–Smorodinsky. This paper fills in (...) this gap: a characterization of the latter is obtained by combining the aforementioned domination with three additional axioms: Pareto optimality, individual monotonicity, and a weakened version of the Perles–Maschler super additivity axiom. (shrink)

In his book “Reconstruction of Scientific Change” R.M. Nugayev proposes a new model of theory change by analyzing the reasons for theory change in science. Nugayev’s theoretical concept is based on a realist’s philosophical attitude. The most important notions of Nugayev’ s conception of theory change are “theories’ cross” and “crossbred objects”, which he takes from the terminology of other Russian philosophers of science (Bransky, Podgoretzky, Smorodinsky). His investigations often refer to several famous Western philosophers. Yet his study is (...) not free of some drawbacks. Nevertheless, Nugayev’s book is worth reading and discussing within the current debate about the structure of scientific revolution and theory changes. (shrink)

This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decision-makers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of `Complete Ignorance' which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a `Principle of Preference-Basedness', according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule called `Simultaneous (...) Expected Utility Maximization'. It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment. An essential but non-standard feature of Simultaneous Expected Utility choices is their dependence on the entire choice set. This is justified by the conception of optimality as compromise rather than as superiority in pairwise comparisons. (shrink)

In this note, I provide an axiomatic characterization of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution to Nash bargaining problems. The solution is obtained when Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom is replaced by the weak linearity axiom, while retaining the other three axioms. RU maximizes the sum of proportional gains, or, equivalently, minimizes the sum of proportional losses. RU is scale invariant and compared to the Nash and Kalai and Smorodinsky solutions, it is ex ante efficient when the bargaining problem (...) is considered as a lottery of future bargaining problems. (shrink)

I. Musulʹmansʹka kulʹtura ĭ filosofii︠a︡ na pivdennoukraïnsʹkykh zemli︠a︡kh -- Filosofsʹkyĭ sufizm Ibrahima alʹ-Kyrymi -- Abu lʹBaka'alʹ-Kafauvi: paradyhma postklasychnoho syntezu nauk -- Rat︠s︡ionalizm Mukhammada alʹ-Kafauvi ta Mukhammada alʹ-Akkirmani -- II. Obraz ti︠u︡rksʹkykh narodiv v ukraïnsʹkiĭ literaturi rannʹomedrnoï doby.

Miyagawa (Games and Economics Behavior 41(2), 292–308 [2002]) provides a simple extensive game form that implements a large class of two-agent bargaining solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium. This class includes all of the Nash, Kalai–Smorodinsky, and relative utilitarian solutions. This note extends Miyagawa’s result to multi-agent bargaining problems.

The epistemological problems of unification of two distinct theories are discussed. An approach related to the work of Soviet authors (Stepin, Podgoretzky and Smorodinsky) is used and developed. The notion of ‘crossbred objects’—theoretical objects with contradictory properties which are part of the domain of application of two independent theories—is introduced which helps to describe the dynamics of revolutionary theory change. The occurrence of the cross-contradiction of two theories is reconstructed and the reductionistic and the synthetic means of its elimination (...) are proposed. The results of the methodological analysis are applied to the paradox of equivalence. (shrink)

Autor připomíná 300. výročí narození Davida Huma tím, že české odborné i studentské veřejnosti předkládá text Humova Dopisu lékaři, opatřený poznámkami zpřístupňujícími jeho obsah. Tento dopis představuje významné svědectví o počátcích Humovy filosofie a je místem, kde můžeme identifikovat "bod obratu" na cestu směřující k Traktátu. Zároveň je nepostradatelným dokumentem pro výklad Huma z pozice "kontextualistického přístupu" k ranně-novověké filosofii, jak jej uplatňují zejména Alexander Stewart a John P. Wright.

What are the reasons for theory change in science? –To give a sober answer a comprehensible model is proposed based on the works of V.P. Bransky, P. Feyerabend , T.S. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, K.R.Popper, V.S. Scwvyrev, Ya. Smorodinsky, V.S. Stepin, and others. According to model the origins of scientific revolutions lie not in a clash of fundamental theories with facts, but of “old” basic research traditions with each other, leading to contradictions that can only be eliminated in a more (...) general theory. The model is illustrated with reference to physics in the early 20th century, the three “old” research programmes in this case being Maxwellian electrodynamics, statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. Modern example, referring to general relativity and quantum field theory, is considered. Key words: Bransky, Feyerabend, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Stepin, Einstein, Lorentz, Planck. (shrink)