Simple Characterizations of the Nash and Kalai/smorodinsky Solutions

Theory and Decision 45 (3):255-261 (1998)
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Abstract

In this study we introduce two new properties, the Midpoint Outcome on a Linear Frontier (MOLF) and Balanced Focal Point (BFP) properties, to replace the Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Symmetry (SYM) and Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations (IEUR) properties in the axiomatic characterizations of the two most prominent solution concepts, namely the Nash and Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions, respectively

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10.1023/a:1005027105436

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