The Löwenheim-Hilbert-Bernays theorem states that, for an arithmetical first-order language L, if S is a satisfiable schema, then substitution of open sentences of L for the predicate letters of S...

The aim of this article is to restore the radicality of W. V. O. Quine's argument against deviant logics, as found in Philosophy of Logic. The objective of this argument is to expose the emptiness of the concept of deviant logic, i.e., its nonsense. To give an account of this requires taking the full measure of the anti-psychological dimension of Quine's argument. Thus, I try to show that Quine's most radical challenge does not consist in pointing out to the deviant (...) logician that changing logical laws means changing the meaning of logical constant terms. (shrink)

This edited collection explores the philosophy of Clarence Irving Lewis through two major concepts that are integral to his conceptual pragmatism: the a priori and the given. The relation between these two elements of knowledge form the core of Lewis’s masterpiece _Mind and the World-Order_. While Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism is directed against any conception of the _a priori_ as constraining the mind and experience, it also emphasizes the inalterability and the unavoidability of the given that remains the same through any (...) interpretation of it by the mind. The essays in this volume probe Lewis’s new account of the relation between the a priori and the given in dialogue with other notable figures in 20 th -century philosophy, including Carnap, Friedman, Goodman, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Sellars, and Sheffer. _C.I. Lewis’s Conceptual Pragmatism_ __represents a focused treatment of a long-neglected figure in 20 th -century American philosophy. (shrink)

This edited collection explores the philosophy of Clarence Irving Lewis through two major concepts that are integral to his conceptual pragmatism: the a priori and the given. The relation between these two elements of knowledge form the core of Lewis's masterpiece Mind and the World-Order. While Lewis's conceptual pragmatism is directed against any conception of the a priori as constraining the mind and experience, it also emphasizes the inalterability and the unavoidability of the given that remains the same through any (...) interpretation of it by the mind. The essays in this volume probe Lewis's new account of the relation between the a priori and the given in dialogue with other notable figures in 20th-century philosophy, including Carnap, Friedman, Goodman, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Sellars, and Sheffer. C.I. Lewis: The A Priori and the Given represents a focused treatment of a long-neglected figure in 20th-century American philosophy. (shrink)

C. I. Lewis’s distinction between the given and the concept is often exposed as the key element of his treatment of the problem of intentionality in that the given and the concept would be necessary and sufficient conditions for objective purport. Such an account nonetheless offers a truncated picture of Lewis’s treatment of the problem of intentionality. The best way to appreciate this verdict is to state the predicament this account is confronted with: If the distinction between the given and (...) the concept apparently leads to a version of the same problem it was designed to address, how could it be the key element contributing to answering the problem of intentionality? Indeed, according to Lewis, the given and the concept are mutually independent so that prima facie nothing guarantees that concepts are applicable to the given. The difficulty is what Lewis calls “the problem of the a priori”: how to guarantee that our concepts can be imposed upon a content of experience which is independent and not yet given? This is a version of the problem that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction addresses: How can categories, as subjective conditions of experience, be objectively valid? A natural question is then: How does Lewis address the problem of the a priori? The main purpose of this essay is then to investigate how C. I. Lewis’s addresses the problem of the a priori and to contribute to restoring an appropriate understanding of Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism. (shrink)

This essay aims to explore the significance of Hilary Putnam’s reflections on the division of linguistic labor by putting them into contrast with those of Gareth Evans. Whereas Putnam’s reflections purport to uncover neglected aspects of the contribution of social environment to the meaning and the reference-fixing of conceptual terms, Evans’s reinterpretation of the division of linguistic labor results in obliterating its antisubjectivist and instrumentalist dimension. The crux of the disagreement between Putnam and Evans on the significance of the division (...) of linguistic labor lies in Evans endorsing, while Putnam rejects, the principle of discrimination—a generalization of what Evans calls “Russell’s principle.”. (shrink)

Nous traduisons, pour la première fois en langue française, l’essai célèbre de Clarence Irving Lewis, « A pragmatic conception of the a priori ». Cette traduction est précédée d’une introduction revenant sur les deux moments argumentatifs clés de la refonte par Lewis des notions d’a priori et de catégorie : la critique des conceptions traditionnelles de l’a priori et de la manière dont elles comprennent les deux éléments constitutifs du concept d’a priori, à savoir la nécessité et l’indépendance à l’égard (...) de l’expérience ; l’alternative que C. I. Lewis élabore en lieu et place de ces conceptions et qui peut être entendue comme une conception tout à la fois pratique et pragmatique de l’a priori et des catégories. C’est la pièce angulaire du pragmatisme conceptuel élaboré dans le maître ouvrage de C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order qui se trouve ainsi élucidée. (shrink)

Nous traduisons, pour la première fois en langue française, l’essai célèbre de Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964), « A pragmatic conception of the a priori » (1923). Cette traduction est précédée d’une introduction revenant sur les deux moments argumentatifs clés de la refonte par Lewis des notions d’a priori et de catégorie : (1) la critique des conceptions traditionnelles de l’a priori et de la manière dont elles comprennent les deux éléments constitutifs du concept d’a priori, à savoir la nécessité et (...) l’indépendance à l’égard de l’expérience ; (2) l’alternative que C. I. Lewis élabore en lieu et place de ces conceptions et qui peut être entendue comme une conception tout à la fois pratique et pragmatique de l’a priori et des catégories. C’est la pièce angulaire du pragmatisme conceptuel élaboré dans le maître ouvrage de C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (1929) qui se trouve ainsi élucidée. (shrink)