This essay analyses the second chapter of the Zhuangzi 莊子, the “Qiwulun 齊物論.” After a brief examination of its main ideas, it will be argued that the “Qiwulun” needs to be considered not as an equalization that makes everything indistinguishable but as a discourse on corresponding things. A more attentive analysis of this correspondence among the myriad things will lead to the consideration of their mutual transformation. The conclusion is that, contrary to the ontotheological nature of Western metaphysics (...) that imposes a single logic for its hierarchical structure Being-beings, the correspondence of myriad things allows the differentiation and assimilation of values in a comprehensive and harmonious fashion. Thus, the essay offers an ethical reading of the “Qiwulun” and considers its significance in the contemporary world. (shrink)

This article investigates a central yet perplexing term yiming in the ‘Qiwulun’ chapter of the Zhuangzi. Yiming describes a crucial way to detach from epistemic distinctions and debates. This term is often explained as ‘using ming’ or contradictorily as ‘stopping ming’. Yet neither of the two explanations can provide a full understanding of how yiming is adopted. I take three steps to explain yiming. First, taking an etymological approach, I argue that ming can be formulated as ‘X shining on (...) Y’. Second, I use the formula of ‘X shining on Y’ to account for yiming and argue that this term refers specifically to ‘using tian to shine on everything’. Third, I unpack a cluster of tian-associated metaphors, which provides a deep understanding of yiming as an ideal way to mental tranquility. (shrink)

In this paper, as an example, describes the dynamic Chinese philosophical texts and images intertwined with language movement. First proposed interpretation of the text should follow the sequence of "internal context", "coherence agreement" "minimal changes" and "Maximum read the" principle of reciprocity, and attention to text features of Chinese philosophy, focusing on "metaphor" and "narrative" to express "image - View of Concept "and the contemplative, artistic, moral and historical experience all undivided. Text in the pragmatics of the dynamic development process, (...) In order to express the dynamic context of what I call doctrine, and to show images and narrative, the establishment of Chinese philosophy based on "image - View of Concept" thinking, the two are integrated in the language can be described using kinetic into . This article paragraph by paragraph analysis text and in the cause of the "image - View of Concept" or images, in order to release such I view the Chinese philosophy of hermeneutics. This paper takes Qiwulun, the second chapter of the Zhuangzi, to illustrate the pragmatic movement of text and image-ideas in Chinese Philosophy. I sustain a dynamic contextualism in the reading of Chinese philosophical texts and develop a set of general rules for interpreting them, to be followed one after another: principle of intratextuality, principle of coherence, principle of minimum amendment and principle of maximal reading. Also, there is a particular rule for respecting the special characteristic of Chinese philosophy that emphasizes the use of metaphor more than concept, narrative more than argumentation, in order to express its image-ideas rather than pure ideas. The pragmatic development of a philosophical text like Qiwulun depends on the dynamic structuration of writing and reading based on these principles of dynamic contextualism, and the movement of metaphorical images and their narrative unfolding into stories or parables is based on what I call the philosophy of image-ideas, and these two are integrated into a dynamic pragmatics. This paper will analyze section by section the Qiwulun to illustrate my hermeneutics of Chinese Philosophy. (shrink)

In the “Qiwulun” 齊物論 chapter of the Zhuangzi, the author recommends a better way of arguing for a conclusion in the debates that are recorded in the books Discourse on Pointing at Things and White Horse Discourse 1:To use an attribute to show that attributes are not attributes is not as good as using a non-attribute to show that attributes are not attributes. To use a horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good (...) as using a non-horse to show that a horse is not a horse. Heaven and earth are one attribute; the ten thousand things are one horse.2Later in the same chapter, Zhuangzi gives a lengthy, disparaging speech on discerning the real winner in.. (shrink)

Recent interest in the Zhuangzi by Western philosophers arises from the sense that Zhuangzi offers a form of philosophical theory, such as perspectivism. A key issue for this line of interpretation is how best to resolve alleged contradictions between the central philosophical claims of the "Qiwulun" with other claims made in the text. A more radical reading of this chapter will avoid these problems if it can find some way to understand this chapter as philosophically interesting because it scrupulously (...) avoids and rejects making any philosophical claims. This reading will be developed by focusing on Zhuangzi's assertion: "The person who understands does not use the inflexible 'that's it' (wei shi), but dwells in the ordinary (yu zhu yong)." I will argue that, understood in context, this assertion takes Zhuangzi out of the philosophical game. According to this interpretation, Zhuangzi's writings have a philosophical significance similar to that of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations as expressed in his dictum "The real discovery is the one that lets me stop doing philosophy when I want to.". (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn contrast to his contemporaries who take the heart–mind as the ruler of a person, Zhuangzi suggests that one’s action is guided by the spirit. Questions arise as one articulates the function of spirit and its relationship with the heart–mind. In this article, I articulate the relationship between heart–mind and spirit to show three points: first, spirit is a kind of qi 氣 that can be tied or run smoothly, or rather the mechanism triggered by the functioning of smooth qi. (...) This reading brings the skill passages together with the fasting of heart–mind passage. Second, the proceeding of spirit admits no fixed ways and is not confined to any particular organ or faculty, so it avoids the problem of self-assertion mentioned in Qiwulun. Third, the proceeding of spirit implies that one’s practice takes as many particularities of the context as possible into account, so the person has a higher chance to reduce conflict in interacting with things and other people and bring out their p.. (shrink)

This essay thinks through Nanguo Ziqi’s famous “I lost myself” (wu sang wo 吾喪我) remark in the Qiwulun 齊物論 in light of Weil’s notion of decreation. The desire to undo the self is paradoxical, and most philosophical interpretations of the Zhuangzi passage try to avoid the paradox of “I lost myself” by positing various levels of self. Weil’s decreation embraces the paradox, and thereby helps clarify how Nanguo’s “I lost myself” connects with his subsequent metaphor of pipes of Heaven. (...) More broadly, this essay is a first step in drawing together these two uniquely unsystematic and paradoxical thinkers. (shrink)

To avoid the one-sidedness and abuse of the rule of xieju 絜矩, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 redefines zhong-shu 忠恕, the Confucian golden rule, as two separate yet complementary principles, the idea of which is most manifestly drawn from Zhuangzi’s 莊子 “Qiwulun 齊物論”. Zhang’s association of zhong-shu and qiwu 齊物 is based upon his vision of equality premised on recognition of and respect for differences. In Zhang’s reading of the Zhuangzi in light of Yogācāra, the crucial “concept matching” is the explanation (...) of cheng xin 成心 as seeds in the ālaya consciousness. Cheng xin in this sense not only refers to the natural pattern of things and so is the basis for inference and deduction, but also serves as the means to deal with the diversity of opinions. In moral practice, Zhang proposes the liang xing 兩行 approach of his qiwu philosophy: to recognize the equal worth of all beings on one hand, and to take the particular characteristics and desires of individuals into account on the other. Thus, it requires the dual practice of zhong and shu: to acquire firsthand observation through personal experience, and to imagine oneself in the position of the other. (shrink)

It is usually believed that the concept of ‘qiwu 齊物’ in the Zhuangzi means ‘equalizing things’. This reading of the Zhuangzi, however, presupposes that things are originally separated and exist independently. The equality of things is just a mental construct in a specific state of mind. In this paper, we will argue that this reading does not stand; what Zhuangzi does in the ‘Qiwulun 齊物論’is to examine how myriad things are created from the original oneness. According to Zhuangzi’s philosophy (...) of thing, things are created by objectification through fact and value imposing. Oneness is therefore not a mere perspective but the condition for things being objectified. This understanding of the things’ being is comparable to Heidegger’s classification of thing and equipment, but it differs from Heidegger by its special implication on the Daoist liberation. (shrink)

Identifying the theme of self and death as central to the “Qiwulun” — or Discussion on Making All Things Equal3 — is at odds with a majority of interpreters: they tend to see issues such as the possibility of knowledge and the nature of language or epistemic perspectives as lying at the core of the concerns for Zhuangzi. Chad Hansen, for instance, ascribes a thoroughgoing version of skepticism and relativism to Zhuangzi, a position stating that nothing can be known (...) and no school of thought enjoys a privileged status over others (Hansen 1983, 1992). Some philosophers are reluctant to ascribe such a radical form of skepticism to Zhuangzi. For example, Paul Kjellberg holds that Zhuangzi offers relevant considerations .. (shrink)