In contrast to Anglophone debates on personal identity initially formed by John Locke’s investigation of personal identity in the sense of personal continuity or persistence through time, the Continental tradition focuses on what constitutes ipseity in the sense of individuality or uniqueness of the human being “constituted” by its continuous transformation through changing experience. In this study, I claim that contemporary phenomenological research in France—especially the “phenomenology of the event” as represented by Henri Maldiney and Claude Romano—contributes to this Continental (...) discussion in a significant way: it formulates the conditions of personal uniqueness or distinctiveness with regard to other persons, conditions not to be found in Heidegger’s existential conception of selfhood in Being and Time. More precisely, Maldiney and Romano allow us to answer the principal questions of this study: In what does the personal uniqueness consist? What exactly individualizes the first-person selfhood disclosed in Dasein’s relation to death? In my three-stage analysis, I first deal with Heidegger’s conception of selfhood in Being and Time and its limits with respect to the question of personal uniqueness. Next, I analyse Maldiney’s conception of “eventful selfhood” in which he “completes” Heidegger’s conception of selfhood by describing Dasein’s openness to ontical, and yet fully authentic events. Finally, I develop the argumentation by presenting Romano’s even more radical conception of the “happening subjectivity”, which allows us to return to the second major feature of personal identity: personal persistence. Nonetheless, I conclude that the connection between personal uniqueness and persistence is not sufficiently examined in the phenomenology of the event, which opens the path towards another related inquiry into the following problem: What is the proper subjective dimension or the “underlying thing” in the background of personal persistence which somehow resists events? (shrink)

While correctly emphasizing that the idea of theological inspiration in phenomenology and vice versa might be very fecund, the current discussion on the theological turn does not always affirm that Janicaud was simply wrong as regards the characterization of new French phenomenology. This is why it is necessary to create a more balanced image of the discussions on the theological turn and contemporary phenomenology. The paper achieves this aim 1) by demonstrating that there was no theological turn in French phenomenology; (...) 2) by analysing the true nature of the turn taking place in phenomenology. It concludes by affirming that contemporary French phenomenology—freed from the label “theological turn”—is a living branch of philosophy capable of contributing to the solution of some of the burning issues of today’s world, such as ecological crisis. (shrink)

Eco-phenomenology is a young branch of contemporary phenomenology and environmental ethics that attempts to put aside all preconceptions burdening the relationship between humans and nature, to describe it purely on the basis of how it appears phenomenologically, and to draw ethical implications that could contribute to solving the ecological crisis. Authors inspired by Levinas’ ethics play an important role in this project, asking whether it could be extended to non-human beings. The article addresses two of them in particular: it shows (...) how Ch. Diehm – who sees the core of Levinas’ ethics in sensitivity to the suffering of the vulnerable body – succeeded in comparison to his predecessor S. Benso and her ethics of things, but also marks the limits of his attempt, thus indicating what remains a challenge for Levinas-inspired eco-phenomenology in the future. (shrink)

This article embodies the result of a collective work that seeks to understand the manner in which the notion of conflict is transformed by the attempt to apply it to reality, according to the doctrines hereby comprise as “ontologies of conflict”. It seems that there are three resulting “logics of conflict” which may receive the following qualifications: logic of contradiction, logic of contrariety and logic of difference.

Le devenir-autre de l'existence est une étude phénoménologique à la fois systématique et historique. En prenant pour fil conducteur un problème systématique, celui de l'événementialité de l'apparaître et de la subjectivité, elle confronte cinq représentants majeurs de la phénoménologie contemporaine française : Maldiney, Romano, Marion, Barbaras et Richir. L'étude entre dans la phénoménologie avec Husserl avant de présenter plusieurs concepts-clés forgés par les deux générations de philosophes qui jalonnent la voie menant à la phénoménologie contemporaine (Heidegger, Sartre, Straus, Merleau-Ponty, Patocka, (...) Lévinas). Puis elle se focalise sur la phénoménologie de l'événement de Maldiney et de Romano qui envisagent l'existant et le monde dans leur coappartenance : l'événement est considéré avant tout comme co-naissance du sujet et du monde. Or, puisque l'existence qui devient-autre est nécessairement une existence finie radicalement séparée de la transcendance métaphysique du monde, on est conduit à intégrer à la discussion trois autres philosophes : d'abord Marion dont l'adonné est conçu comme limite de la donation, puis Barbaras et Richir qui thématisent la subjectivité au sein d'une métaphysique"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)