This paper illustrates how external symbol grounding can be studied in simulations with large populations. We discuss how we can simulate language evolution in a relatively complex environment which has been developed in the context of the New Ties project. This project has the objective of evolving a cultural society and, in doing so, the agents have to evolve a communication system that is grounded in their interactions with their virtual environment and with other individuals. A preliminary experiment is presented (...) in which we investigate the effect of a number of learning mechanisms. The results show that the social symbol grounding problem is a particularly hard one; however, we provide an ideal platform to study this problem. (shrink)

This paper illustrates how external symbol grounding can be studied in simulations with large populations. We discuss how we can simulate language evolution in a relatively complex environment which has been developed in the context of the New Ties project. This project has the objective of evolving a cultural society and, in doing so, the agents have to evolve a communication system that is grounded in their interactions with their virtual environment and with other individuals. A preliminary experiment is presented (...) in which we investigate the effect of a number of learning mechanisms. The results show that the social symbol grounding problem is a particularly hard one; however, we provide an ideal platform to study this problem. (shrink)

Cross-situational learning has recently gained attention as a plausible candidate for the mechanism that underlies the learning of word-meaning mappings. In a recent study, Blythe and colleagues have studied how many trials are theoretically required to learn a human-sized lexicon using cross-situational learning. They show that the level of referential uncertainty exposed to learners could be relatively large. However, one of the assumptions they made in designing their mathematical model is questionable. Although they rightfully assumed that words are distributed according (...) to Zipf's law, they applied a uniform distribution of meanings. In this article, Zipf's law is also applied to the distribution of meanings, and it is shown that under this condition, cross-situational learning can only be plausible when referential uncertainty is sufficiently small. It is concluded that cross-situational learning is a plausible learning mechanism but needs to be guided by heuristics that aid word learners with reducing referential uncertainty. (shrink)

Research into child language reveals that it takes a long time for children to learn the correct mapping of colour words. Steels & Belpaeme's (S&B's) guessing game, however, models fast learning of words. We discuss computational studies based on cross-situational learning, which yield results that are more consistent with the empirical child language data than those obtained by S&B.

What is the one big idea of Koselleck’s Historik understood as a methodological framework for the attempt to combine a theory of historical times with a theory of historical time? In part (1) of this paper, I criticize the two most basic attempts to understand Koselleck’s one big idea as mistaken because they are exclusively interested either in history (in the singular) or in histories (in the plural) and thus miss the central relevance of structures of repetition (“Wiederholungsstrukturen”) for Koselleck’s (...) Historik. In part (2), I will clarify the rather hidden pre-history, the main ambition, the theoretical context and the substantial content of Koselleck’s concept of structures of repetition in history and language. In part (3), I will discuss four historiographical consequences of Koselleck’s structures of repetition. I will end the paper by observing a remarkable theoretical affinity between Barrington Moore’s search for recurring patterns in the field of sociology and Koselleck’s structures of repetition in history and language. Moore’s work illustrates the historiographical potential of the one big idea of Koselleck’s Historik better than any other work I am aware of. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung: In Abschnitt (1) dieses Aufsatzes diskutiere ich Rawls’ theologische Kritik des Verdienstes in seiner frühen Schrift Über Sünde, Glaube und Religion. Im Gegensatz zur Theorie der Gerechtigkeit kritisiert der frühe Rawls eine Berufung auf das eigene Verdienst nicht als kognitiven Irrtum oder moralische Willkür, sondern sieht darin den sündhaften Ausdruck menschlichen Stolzes. Diese Kritik des Stolzes beruht auf einem schöpfungstheologischen Argument und mündet in ein Plädoyer für religiöse Demut. Abschnitt (2) zeigt, dass Rawls’ Diskussion von Verteilungsgrundsätzen in den übergreifenden (...) Versuch einer gerechtigkeitstheoretischen Zähmung des Zufalls eingebettet ist. Rawls entwickelt in der Theorie der Gerechtigkeit eine bestimmte Typologie des Zufalls und diskutiert, wie die vier von ihm diskutierten Lesarten des zweiten Grundsatzes der Gerechtigkeit auf den Zufall reagieren. Die gerechtigkeitstheoretische Zähmung des Zufalls distanziert sich sowohl von der Dystopie einer völligen Eliminierung des Zufalls als auch von einer fatalistischen Affirmation des Zufalls. In Abschnitt (3) erläutere ich zunächst die unterschiedlichen Begriffe des Verdienstes, welche Rawls in der Theorie der Gerechtigkeit vorstellt. Ich versuche Rawls’ Kritik des Verdienstes zu klären, indem ich diese gegen ein Missverständnis in Schutz nehme, welches Samuel Schefflers und Thomas Scanlons Interpretationen kennzeichnet. Schließlich beschäftige ich mich mit Robert Nozicks Suche nach dem „positive argument“ von Rawls’ Kritik des Verdienstes, komme dabei jedoch zu einem ganz anderen Ergebnis als Nozick. Meiner Meinung findet sich das „positive argument“, nach dem Nozick vergeblich sucht, nicht in der Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, sondern verdankt sich dem kreatürlichen Egalitarismus von Rawls’ theologischer Frühschrift. (shrink)

Philip Vogt reassesses specific aspects of Lockean rhetoric: the theory and use of analogy, the characteristic tropes, the topoi that connected Locke with his original and later audiences.

Locke, Eden and Two States of Nature: The Fortunate Fall Revisited PHILIP VOGT TWO STATES OF NATURE, not one, figure in the political writings of John Locke. The more frequently discussed of the two, the "State of Nature" proper, is defined in the second of the Two Treatises of Government as the condition of perfect freedom abandoned by mankind upon the advent of political society.' Whether Locke viewed this "state" as a purely theoretical construct or as an actual moment in (...) human history is open to debate. 2 There is no basis, however, for doubting his belief in the literal reality of that other state of nature, the Garden of Eden. In Eden, mankind in the person of Adam-turned-rebel ob- tained its perfect, prepolitical freedom in exchange for the bliss of perfect obedience to a divinely ordained "Law of Nature." Without reference to man's tenancy of nature in both its prepolitical and prelapsarian states, Locke's discus- sion of the equilibrium struck in political society between obedience and free- dom is incomprehensible. Likewise, reference to both states is required for Valuable comments on the preliminary drafts of this article were given by Nancy Struever, Peter Vinten-Johansen, J. G. A. Pocock, Kirstie McClure, John Marshall, Carol Pech, Edward Schneider and two anonymous referees for the Journal of the History of Philosophy. 'John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett , II/ii/4. 9 While Locke.. (shrink)

The idea of immanent transcendence is constitutive for Winch's philosophy of religion and his ethics. Winch's philosophy of religion insists on the ‘immanent’ dimension of religion. His ethics insists on the ‘transcendent’ dimension of ethics. In this sense, both religion and ethics embody a perspective ‘beyond’ this world and yet must have practical consequences in this world. Transcendence without immanence is idle, and immanence without transcendence is empty—this is the kernel of Winch's philosophy of religion and of his ethics.

There are various perspectives from which the meaning of historicism can be understood. Historically, the interpretation of historicism has predominantly been interested in either questions concerning historical methodology, or the relationship between the natural and human sciences, or the normative consequences of historicism. My intention is not to cast doubt upon the legitimacy of these different research approaches, but rather to supplement them by confronting the meaning of historicism from the perspective of a different question. Did historicism in the late (...) 18th and the early 19th centuries formulate a notion of historical chance or of historical contingency, a notion of what is neither necessary nor impossible in history but rather the result of accident and chance? To answer this question, I begin with Reinhart Koselleck's interpretation of historicism presented in two rather short essays, "Der Zufall als Motivationsrest in der Geschichtsschreibung" and "Über die Verfügbarkeit von Geschichte". In the next step of my analysis, I confront Koselleck's interpretation of the historicist sensibility for contingency and chance with Odo Marquard's conceptual distinction between two notions of contingency and chance. This line of argumentation gives rise to a definition of historicism as a theoretical sensibility for the "fatefully accidental" (Marquard). I further support this claim with an analysis of Savigny's legal history, of Schleiermacher's theology and of the "anti-Faustian" (Werner Busch) art of Caspar David Friedrich. Historicism ultimately teaches us that history is never the exact outcome of the intentions of historical actors. Though human beings undeniably act in history, they cannot make history or at least cannot make it as they please. It is in this regard that I find, in my concluding remarks, Hermann Lübbe's description of historicism as a "sermon of human finitude" to be wholly accurate. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 16 This paper looks at modern philosophy of history in the sense of the German concept of “Geschichtsphilosophie”. “Geschichtsphilosophie”, as it was formulated since the heydays of German Idealism, always implied the belief that it is possible to make true statements about the future. I will take a closer look at such a version of philosophy of history by reconstructing Odo Marquard’s arguments against “Geschichtsphilosophie” and Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner’s defense of it. These two authors were asking (...) precisely the same question about the essence of “Geschichtsphilosophie”, but came to totally different conclusions. I will defend Marquard’s position and thus will come to the position that history cannot be made or at least cannot be made in the way agents want it to be made. However, my insistence on the inevitable limits of any project to make history as it has been constitutive for modern philosophy of history, in no way precludes the possibility of making politics. Thus, at the very end of my paper, I argue for the fundamental difference between the making of history and the making of politics. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 16 This paper looks at modern philosophy of history in the sense of the German concept of “Geschichtsphilosophie”. “Geschichtsphilosophie”, as it was formulated since the heydays of German Idealism, always implied the belief that it is possible to make true statements about the future. I will take a closer look at such a version of philosophy of history by reconstructing Odo Marquard’s arguments against “Geschichtsphilosophie” and Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner’s defense of it. These two authors were asking (...) precisely the same question about the essence of “Geschichtsphilosophie”, but came to totally different conclusions. I will defend Marquard’s position and thus will come to the position that history cannot be made or at least cannot be made in the way agents want it to be made. However, my insistence on the inevitable limits of any project to make history as it has been constitutive for modern philosophy of history, in no way precludes the possibility of making politics. Thus, at the very end of my paper, I argue for the fundamental difference between the making of history and the making of politics. (shrink)