Behaviour norms are considered for decision trees which allow both objective probabilities and uncertain states of the world with unknown probabilities. Terminal nodes have consequences in a given domain. Behaviour is required to be consistent in subtrees. Consequentialist behaviour, by definition, reveals a consequence choice function independent of the structure of the decision tree. It implies that behaviour reveals a revealed preference ordering satisfying both the independence axiom and a novel form of sure-thing principle. Continuous consequentialist behaviour must be expected (...) utility maximizing. Other plausible assumptions then imply additive utilities, subjective probabilities, and Bayes' rule. (shrink)

The essays in this volume, first published in 1986, examine the philosophical foundations of social choice theory. This field, a modern and sophisticated outgrowth of welfare economics, is best known for a series of impossibility theorems, of which the first and most crucial was proved by Kenneth Arrow in 1950. That has often been taken to show the impossibility of democracy as a procedure for making collective decisions. However, this interpretation is challenged by several of the contributors here. Other central (...) issues discussed in the volume include the possibility of making interpersonal comparisons of utility, the question of whether all preferences are equally to be valued, and the normative individualism underlying the theoretical tradition. Criticisms of social choice theory are advanced and suggestions for alternative approaches are developed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article applies Deleuze's metaphysics of multiplicities to groups of people, arguing that organized groups can be said to have mental states in the same sense as individuals. I begin by outlining the genealogy of Deleuze's use of the concept of multiplicity, beginning with Riemann and continuing through Bergson. Deleuze's transformation of these two thinkers' ideas results in a concept of any individual as a conjunction of two types of multiplicity, one relating to its material parts and one relating (...) to its ideal or virtual parts. I then turn to Deleuze's theory of the mental faculties and argue that it describes a virtual multiplicity that, for Deleuze, is instantiated in human beings and other entities that can be said to think or have minds. I argue that many organized social groups have these mental faculties in the same way that individual people do and that therefore they can be said to have minds and mental states of their own, independent of the mental states of their members. (shrink)

Ramsey famously pronounced that discounting “future enjoyments” would be ethically indefensible. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion implying that all individuals’ welfare should be treated equally. By contrast, Arrow accepted, perhaps rather reluctantly, the logical force of Koopmans’ argument that no satisfactory preference ordering on a sufficiently unrestricted domain of infinite utility streams satisfies equal treatment. In this paper, we first derive an equitable utilitarian objective based on a version of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position, extended to allow a variable and uncertain (...) population with no finite bound. Following the work of Chichilnisky and others on sustainability, slightly weakening the conditions of Koopmans and co-authors allows intergenerational equity to be satisfied. In fact, assuming that the expected total number of individuals who ever live is finite, and that each individual’s utility is bounded both above and below, there is a coherent equitable objective based on expected total utility. Moreover, it implies the “extinction discounting rule” advocated by, inter alia, the Stern Review on climate change. (shrink)

This paper argues that the intentional actions of collective entities, such as corporations and agencies, are not necessarily joint intentional actions by several members of those collectives. I briefly summarize the social action theories of John Searle, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, and Seumas Miller, which I argue are all theories of joint action. I then describe a case based loosely on events from the 2008 financial crisis in which an intentional collective action is performed by a corporation due (...) to the actions of two employees who have no knowledge of one another, and therefore cannot be engaged in a joint intentional action. I argue that this shows that, contrary to what joint action theorists are committed to, every intentional collective action does not entail the existence of a joint intentional action. Finally, I suggest that we should look for a weaker notion of coordination than that employed by joint action theories, and that this might be provided by examining the command structures of organizations. (shrink)

Ramsey famously condemned discounting “future enjoyments” as “ethically indefensible”. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion which, when social choice is utilitarian, implies giving equal weight to all individuals’ utilities. By contrast, Arrow accepted, perhaps reluctantly, what he called Koopmans’ :287–309, 1960) “strong argument” implying that no equitable preference ordering exists for a sufficiently unrestricted domain of infinite utility streams. Here we derive an equitable utilitarian objective for a finite population based on a version of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position, where there is (...) an equal probability of becoming each person. For a potentially infinite population facing an exogenous stochastic process of extinction, an equitable extinction biased original position requires equal conditional probabilities, given that the individual’s generation survives the extinction process. Such a position is well-defined if and only if survival probabilities decline fast enough for the expected total number of individuals who can ever live to be finite. Then, provided that each individual’s utility is bounded both above and below, maximizing expected “extinction discounted” total utility—as advocated, inter alia, by the Stern Review on climate change—provides a coherent and dynamically consistent equitable objective, even when the population size of each generation can be chosen. (shrink)

Ramsey famously condemned discounting “future enjoyments” as “ethically indefensible”. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion which, when social choice is utilitarian, implies giving equal weight to all individuals’ utilities. By contrast, Arrow (Contemporary economic issues. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1999a; Discounting and Intergenerational Effects, Resources for the Future Press, Washington DC, 1999b) accepted, perhaps reluctantly, what he called Koopmans’ (Econometrica 28(2):287–309, 1960) “strong argument” implying that no equitable preference ordering exists for a sufficiently unrestricted domain of infinite utility (...) streams. Here we derive an equitable utilitarian objective for a finite population based on a version of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position, where there is an equal probability of becoming each person. For a potentially infinite population facing an exogenous stochastic process of extinction, an equitable extinction biased original position requires equal conditional probabilities, given that the individual’s generation survives the extinction process. Such a position is well-defined if and only if survival probabilities decline fast enough for the expected total number of individuals who can ever live to be finite. Then, provided that each individual’s utility is bounded both above and below, maximizing expected “extinction discounted” total utility—as advocated, inter alia, by the Stern Review on climate change—provides a coherent and dynamically consistent equitable objective, even when the population size of each generation can be chosen. (shrink)

The contemporary social world is one in which, in addition to interacting regularly with a variety of different individual people, we find ourselves more and more often interacting with entities that we more naturally think of as groups. Thus, in addition to my friends, my co-workers, and members of my family, I also have regular meaningful interactions with my bank, my employer, and my government. It seems correct to call corporations and similar entities groups of people rather than individuals, but (...) in our everyday practices we talk about them as having beliefs, motivations, and goals and as carrying out activities such as thinking, planning, and deciding. We frequently say things like “Airbus and Boeing are... (shrink)

The standard rationality hypothesis implies that behaviour can be represented as the maximization of a suitably restricted utility function. This hypothesis lies at the heart of a large body of recent work in economics, of course, but also in political science, ethics, and other major branches of social sciences. Though the utility maximization hypothesis is venerable, it remains an area of active research. Moreover, some fundamental conceptual problems remain unresolved, or at best have resolutions that are too recent to have (...) achieved widespread understanding among social scientists. The main purpose of the Handbook of Utility Theory is to make recent developments in the area more accessible. The editors selected a number of specific topics, and invited contributions from researchers whose work had come to their attention. Therefore, the list of topics and contributions is largely the editors' responsibility. Each contributor's chapter has been refereed, and revised according to the referees' remarks. This is the first volume of a two volume set, with the second volume focusing on extensions of utility theory. (shrink)

This article discusses three different approaches to human knowledge. The first is that of Peter Simons, a linguistic philosopher, who suggests that language has an underlying algebraic structure. The second approach is that of Ernest Nagel, a philosopher of science, who maintains that the key to knowledge lies in logical analysis. The third approach, due to Michael Polanyi, stresses the idea of tacit integration of parts into composite wholes. All three employ hierarchical schemes, the first two work from the top (...) down, whereas Polanyi works from the bottom up, using the idea of ‘emergence’. (shrink)

In single-person decision theory, Bayesian rationality requires the agent first to attach subjective probabilities to each uncertain event, and then to maximize the expected value of a von Neumann—Morgenstern utility function that is unique up to a cardinal equivalence class. When the agent receives new information, it also requires subjective probabilities to be revised according to Bayes’ rule.

This chapter focuses on the elements of time, memory and mystery in Veronica Mars. Both the plot and the visual style of Veronica Mars assign a huge importance to the past, suggesting that past events have a major impact on the present. The most straightforward way in which the past is accessible to us and has an impact on the present is through everyday memories. Much of the time when we voluntarily remember things, it's because something happening now has prompted (...) us to go looking for a memory designed to answer our question. The final episode of the first season ends with a touching sequence symbolizing the end of one particular detective story. Veronica dreams that she and Lilly are floating together in a pool, surrounded by flower petals, still in the soft focus of the past, but without the dark tints of foreboding and mystery. (shrink)

Although Polanyi regards technological knowledge as inferior to scientific knowledge, he uses the idea of machine-like operational principles as an analogy for both his epistemology and his ontology. Since his epistemology is based on personal knowledge, this suggest the need for a personal ontology. Polanyi tries to avoid such a conclusion by invoking impersonal evolutionary factors.

This chapter analyzes why it may be okay for Veronica Mars to break the law. Breaking the law is something that we morally disapprove of. We have to follow the law because we said we would. It's easy, of course, to understand why we would make that promise: we get something valuable out of the deal too. Likewise, if the law is supposed to provide us with protection and justice in exchange for our obedience, but fails to hold up its (...) end of the deal, then that might release us from the obligation to hold up ours. Now, the discussion shifts to Plato, who addressed a similar issue long ago and raised some points that might complicate the attempt to defend Veronica on these grounds. Veronica's law breaking can be seen as a protest or civil disobedience, a refusal to accept the rules imposed on her by an unjust society. (shrink)