Lawrie Reznek addresses these questions and more in his controversial investigation of the insanity defense in Evil or Ill ? Drawing from countless intriguing case examples, he aims to understand the concept of an excuse, and explains why the law excuses certain actions and not others. In his easily accessible and elegant style, he explains that in law, there exists two excuses derived from Aristotle: the excuses of ignorance and compulsion. Reznek, however proposes a third excuse - the excuse of (...) character change. In introducing this third excuse, Reznek raises a controversial possibility - the abolition of the insanity defence. (shrink)

Lawrie Reznek addresses these questions and more in his controversial investigation of the insanity defense in _Evil or Ill_? Drawing from countless intriguing case examples, he aims to understand the concept of an excuse, and explains why the law excuses certain actions and not others. In his easily accessible and elegant style, he explains that in law, there exists two excuses derived from Aristotle: the excuses of ignorance and compulsion. Reznek, however proposes a third excuse - the excuse of character (...) change. In introducing this third excuse, Reznek raises a controversial possibility - the abolition of the insanity defence. (shrink)

Psychiatry is plagued with philosophical questions. What is a mental illness? Is it different from brain disease? Is there any objective way of determining whether behaviors such as criminal activity are mental illnesses? Should we explain "abnormal" behavior by reference to psychological forces, learning processes, social factors, or disease processes? This book aspires to answer these and other questions. Broadly divided into two halves, the first analyzes the arguments of psychiatry's critics and covers the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as (...) Freud, Eysenck, Laing, Szasz, Sedgewick, and Foucault. The second aims to provide a resolution to the problems raised in the first half by establishing a philosophical defense of the theory and practice of psychiatry. Dr. Reznek's stimulating work is the first to provide a comprehensive philosophical account of the main issues in psychiatry, including free will and responsibility, the excusing power of mental illness, and involuntary hospitalization. (shrink)

By first analysing the arguments of psychiatry's critics and the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as Freud, Eysenck, Laing, Szasz, Sedgwick and Foucault and by then providing answers to the many contentious and diverse questions raised, Dr. Reznek aims to establish a philosophical defence of the theory and practice of psychiatry. As both a qualified philosopher and psychiatrist, the author is exceptionally p[laced to undertake the examination of a subject which has hitherto remained untackled. It will be easily accessible to (...) a wide variety of non-specialists as well. It will be of specific interest to those involved in the practice of philosophy, psychiatry, clinical psychology, social work and psychiatric nursing. (shrink)

By first analysing the arguments of psychiatry's critics and the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as Freud, Eysenck, Laing, Szasz, Sedgwick and Foucault and by then providing answers to the many contentious and diverse questions raised, Dr. Reznek aims to establish a philosophical defence of the theory and practice of psychiatry. As both a qualified philosopher and psychiatrist, the author is exceptionally p[laced to undertake the examination of a subject which has hitherto remained untackled. It will be easily accessible to (...) a wide variety of non-specialists as well. It will be of specific interest to those involved in the practice of philosophy, psychiatry, clinical psychology, social work and psychiatric nursing. (shrink)

I argued that a value-free account of our concept of disease cannot be given. Part of this argument consisted in showing that diseases as a class do not constitute a natural kind. To understand this, we need only see that we define and classify conditions into diseases and non-diseases not in terms of their causes but in terms of their effects. While no philosophical position is watertight, the arguments overwhelmingly favour the conclusion that diseases do not constitute a natural kind. (...) Keywords: Disease, natural kind, value-laden CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)