This book gives a descriptive analysis of specific Madhyamika texts. It compares the ideology of Kumarajiva (a translator of the four Madhyamika treatises 400 A.D.) with the ideologies of the three Chinese contemporaries - HuiYuan, Seng-Jui and Seng-Chao. It envisages an intercultural transmission of religious and philosophical ideas from India to China.

The philosophy of time and change in Chinese Buddhism originated in a short treatise written by an early Chinese monk, Sengzhao (c. 384-414 CE). In this treatise, “On the Immutability of Things (wubuqianlun),” Sengzhao proposed a revolutionary theory of time and change that opposed the traditional Chinese notion of change established by Confucianism and Daoism. His thesis of the immutability of things also seemingly defies a fundamental Buddhist teaching about the impermanence of things. More than a thousand years after Sengzhao, (...) a monk in the Ming dynasty, Kongyin Zhencheng (1546–1617) published the “Logical Investigation of the Thesis of No-Motion of Things (Wubuqian zhengliang lun) to refute Sengzhao's theory of the immutability of things. Because of Sengzhao's esteemed status as one of the early founders of Chinese Buddhism, Zhencheng's critique of Sengzhao caused an uproar among his contemporaries. The ensuing exchange constituted one of the major debates in the history of Chinese Buddhism (Lin 2018; Liu et al., 2020; Fang 1998; Zhu 2012) and was considered a significant event in the “rise of Buddhist scholasticism” (Liu et al., 2020: 7). This entry will carefully analyze Sengzhao's treatise on time and the immutability of things, highlighting the philosophical disagreements between him and Zhencheng. It will also place Sengzhao in his philosophical lineage to examine how he derived insights from Kumarajiva and Nāgārjuna, and how he might have influenced Chan Buddhism's conception of time. This entry will present the uniqueness of Sengzhao's conception of time that marks his departure from the Chinese tradition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 296-298 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Le Sutra D'amida Prêché Par Le Buddha Le Sutra D'amida Prêché Par Le Buddha. By Jérôme Ducor. Schweizer Asiatische Studien: Monographien; Vol. 29. Bern: Peter Lang, 1998. 216 pp. Paper. $35.95 (in U.S.A.; available from the New York office of the publisher) It is immediately clear that this edition of the Smaller Sukhavativyuha Sutra must be regarded as (...) the standard work on it in a European language. Ducor is both a scholar (at the University of Lausanne and at the Museum of Ethnography in Geneva) and a practitioner (an ordained minister of the Honganji branch of Jodo Shinshu) [End Page 296] and he combines his skills to produce a well-rounded and balanced treatment that demonstrates, by comparison, the limitations of the standard Buddhological approach to Sutra studies.The methodology of sutra translation is, I believe, a Buddhist-Christian problem, since, ostensibly Buddhist, it often proceeds along crypto-Christian lines. Why do we translate sutras at all? Or, rather, why are the sutras as a rule translated nude, as it were, quivering in the scholar's spotlight, bereft of their seemly covering of s´astras? Sutras are, by themselves, largely unintelligible. They are nuggets of Dharma, to be, on the one hand, digested by the teachers so that they might (to paraphrase St. Bernard of Clairvaux) proffer the milk of nourishing discourses to their disciples and, on the other hand, chanted in mystifying, often artificial, languages, for their meritorious and pacifying effect. When chanted, it is the sound that matters, not the meaning. It is said that a pigeon was reborn as a monk because Asaga compassionately chanted out loud the texts that he was studying. We are to suppose that the fortunate pigeon was not well versed in Sanskrit, yet it benefited remarkably from the chanting. Ducor is aware of this traditional use of the sutras and includes a discussion on "The Amida Sutra in Liturgical Practice" (pp. 131-137). He cites Gyoyo, writing in fifteenth-century Japan, to the effect that the incomprehensible Sino-Japanese "preserves multiple meanings: the masses, on hearing them, mysteriously, according to their capacities, achieve enlightenment," whereas the Japanese translation "bears only a single sense" and therefore "for normal chanting it is best to chant in the Sino-Japanese pronunciation" (p. 134).But Eurocentric, especially Anglophone, Buddhologists have insisted on translating only the sutras and ignoring their attendant s´astras. Often enough the translations are done from an archaic or even an invented version which is never used in practice but is preferred simply because it is in Sanskrit. The scholar then searches, in the presumed "more original" text, for precisely that single meaning against which Gyoyo warns us. Something seems familiar. Can it be Martin Luther whom we espy lurking behind our Monier Williams? Are we still in thrall to Max Muller, who, even after having naturalized as British, was evangelisch to the core and fought in the Academy under the banner of sola scriptura, believing, with Luther, that a sacred text, because it is revealed, is most truly interpreted by reference to itself, and that its meaning would only be obscured by a human, and therefore fallible, commentary? Perhaps: for the bionic Belgian Buddhologists, we note, were more Catholic in their approach, and translated the summa of the great Buddhist scholastics.The point is that a sutra can only be said to have been properly presented for our study when it is displayed in its native context, that is, with full reference to the commentarial tradition. Ducor does this. He opens with a translation from the rufubon (the textus receptus or "vulgate" as he calls it) version of the Chinese, attributed to Kumarajiva, and follows it with notes on Kumarajiva, on the principal doctrines of the sutra, and on the place of the sutra in the trilogy (sambukyo) tradition in Japan. Then he repeats the translation, interspersing it with references to the commentaries in China, Korea, and Japan. This is followed by detailed textual notes... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 296-298 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Le Sutra D'amida Prêché Par Le Buddha Le Sutra D'amida Prêché Par Le Buddha. By Jérôme Ducor. Schweizer Asiatische Studien: Monographien; Vol. 29. Bern: Peter Lang, 1998. 216 pp. Paper. $35.95 (in U.S.A.; available from the New York office of the publisher) It is immediately clear that this edition of the Smaller Sukhavativyuha Sutra must be regarded as (...) the standard work on it in a European language. Ducor is both a scholar (at the University of Lausanne and at the Museum of Ethnography in Geneva) and a practitioner (an ordained minister of the Honganji branch of Jodo Shinshu) [End Page 296] and he combines his skills to produce a well-rounded and balanced treatment that demonstrates, by comparison, the limitations of the standard Buddhological approach to Sutra studies.The methodology of sutra translation is, I believe, a Buddhist-Christian problem, since, ostensibly Buddhist, it often proceeds along crypto-Christian lines. Why do we translate sutras at all? Or, rather, why are the sutras as a rule translated nude, as it were, quivering in the scholar's spotlight, bereft of their seemly covering of s´astras? Sutras are, by themselves, largely unintelligible. They are nuggets of Dharma, to be, on the one hand, digested by the teachers so that they might (to paraphrase St. Bernard of Clairvaux) proffer the milk of nourishing discourses to their disciples and, on the other hand, chanted in mystifying, often artificial, languages, for their meritorious and pacifying effect. When chanted, it is the sound that matters, not the meaning. It is said that a pigeon was reborn as a monk because Asaga compassionately chanted out loud the texts that he was studying. We are to suppose that the fortunate pigeon was not well versed in Sanskrit, yet it benefited remarkably from the chanting. Ducor is aware of this traditional use of the sutras and includes a discussion on "The Amida Sutra in Liturgical Practice" (pp. 131-137). He cites Gyoyo, writing in fifteenth-century Japan, to the effect that the incomprehensible Sino-Japanese "preserves multiple meanings: the masses, on hearing them, mysteriously, according to their capacities, achieve enlightenment," whereas the Japanese translation "bears only a single sense" and therefore "for normal chanting it is best to chant in the Sino-Japanese pronunciation" (p. 134).But Eurocentric, especially Anglophone, Buddhologists have insisted on translating only the sutras and ignoring their attendant s´astras. Often enough the translations are done from an archaic or even an invented version which is never used in practice but is preferred simply because it is in Sanskrit. The scholar then searches, in the presumed "more original" text, for precisely that single meaning against which Gyoyo warns us. Something seems familiar. Can it be Martin Luther whom we espy lurking behind our Monier Williams? Are we still in thrall to Max Muller, who, even after having naturalized as British, was evangelisch to the core and fought in the Academy under the banner of sola scriptura, believing, with Luther, that a sacred text, because it is revealed, is most truly interpreted by reference to itself, and that its meaning would only be obscured by a human, and therefore fallible, commentary? Perhaps: for the bionic Belgian Buddhologists, we note, were more Catholic in their approach, and translated the summa of the great Buddhist scholastics.The point is that a sutra can only be said to have been properly presented for our study when it is displayed in its native context, that is, with full reference to the commentarial tradition. Ducor does this. He opens with a translation from the rufubon (the textus receptus or "vulgate" as he calls it) version of the Chinese, attributed to Kumarajiva, and follows it with notes on Kumarajiva, on the principal doctrines of the sutra, and on the place of the sutra in the trilogy (sambukyo) tradition in Japan. Then he repeats the translation, interspersing it with references to the commentaries in China, Korea, and Japan. This is followed by detailed textual notes... (shrink)

Academic studies of Chinese Buddhist views of language generally focus on issues such as paradox, contradiction, and the limits of expression and thought. However, such studies seldom seem to focus on the fact that many Buddhist texts deliberately use an ambiguous mode of linguistic expression, one that actually constitutes their compositional patterns and is designed to enhance and promote the Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriological goal—namely, liberation from suffering via detachment from falseness. In fact, many of the Chinese masters’ treatises and exegetical (...) commentaries develop a textual pragmatics rooted in the ambiguous and paradoxical rhetoric of early Madhyamaka scriptures translated by Kumārajīva. This paper discusses the philosophical and soteriological significance of such a linguistic pragmatics as we find it in the early Chinese Madhyamaka scriptures. The Buddhist doctrines such as “the two truths of the conventional and ultimate,” “emptiness,” “non-duality,” “differentiation,” as well as “the middle way” are the focus of the present paper. (shrink)

The discourse on epistemological, ontological, and linguistic issues in the Zhuangzi and in Guo Xiang’s commentary influenced Sengzhao’s reception and interpretation of Indian Madhyamaka thought introduced to the Chinese literati by Kumārajīva, the famous translator from the Wei Jin period and Sengzhao’s Buddhist master.This article explores the philosophical conditions and conceptual affinities based on which early Madhyamaka thought in China integrates Daoist and Xuanxue terms into its own conceptual framework and further develops into the indigenous Buddhist schools of the Tiantai (...) and Sanlun traditions. After examining some key terms, such as nature, thing, name, knowing, from the Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang’s commentary, this article further analyzes Sengzhao’s reinterpretation referencing the soteriological context of Buddhist “liberation.”. (shrink)

One of the arguments that has been directed against the Buddhist anātman (“non-self”) theory, by Dan Zahavi among others, is that the doctrine cannot account for why we never mistake our own bodies for the bodies of others. This is not, however, a new objection; it can be found, for example, in a list of objections to the anātman doctrine in the Dazhidulun (“Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom”), a medieval compendium attributed to Nāgārjuna and compiled and translated (and (...) perhaps partially authored) by Kumārajīva in the early fifth century. The text offers several responses to this objection, the most interesting of which is the claim that there is indeed an instance of a person experiencing himself as another. We then hear the tale of a young man who went through a “body transplant”—his body is replaced, piece by piece, with that of a corpse. In my chapter, I analyze this amusing but nonetheless illuminating narrative, showing how the story is a classic example of a medieval Buddhist “thought experiment” (Gedankenspiel), which was freely altered by Buddhist authors as it was deployed in different doctrinal/philosophical contexts. I conclude with some reflections on how our approach to such didactic tales affects our understanding and appreciation of Buddhist philosophy writ large. (shrink)

This article critically re-examines the “received wisdom” on Buddhism— its history, traditional lore, monastic institutions, and ritual practices— acknowledging the fact of violence within Buddhism while striving for a nuanced understanding by looking at the life of Kumarajiva (ca. 344–413). A legendary figure in Sino-Japanese Buddhism, Kumarajiva has long been lauded as a wondrous exemplar of the Dharma at work, making accounts of his life valuable resources for understanding Buddhism in medieval China, including the place of violence. My (...) intention is not to condemn Buddhism as a “violent religion” but to encourage us to consider just how pervasive and complex the role of “violence” seems to be within Buddhism (both in the past and in the present), and critically trace out some of its implications. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:2005 International Lotus Sutra ConferenceLeo D. LefebureIn May 2005 Rissho Kosei-kai sponsored its annual conference on the Lotus Sutra for the first time in China, at the new conference center of Beijing Normal University. Chinese Buddhist scholars Zhang Fenglei and Wei Dedong of Renmin University participated, offering discussions of "Earthly Orientation of Tiantai Buddhist Doctrine" and "Zhanran's Doctrine about the Nature of Insentient Beings and Its Ecological Implications," respectively. (...) While the main focus of the discussions at the conference was on Buddhist interpretations of the Lotus Sutra in the T'ien T'ai and Tendai traditions, the organizers invited two Christian theologians, Ruben Habito and Leo Lefebure, to participate, thereby adding an interreligious dimension. An illness in his family prevented Habito from attending, but the paper he had prepared, "Ultimate Reality and Religious Praxis: The Lotus Sutra, T'ien T'ai, and Nichiren," was presented and discussed. On the morning of the first full day, Lefebure presented the paper "Wisdom, Compassion, and Charity: The Lotus Sutra and Augustine." In it he compared the rhetorical strategies of the Lotus Sutra and Augustine. The Lotus Sutra and Augustine articulate a dilemma of communication: the Sutra notes that only another Buddha can understand the wisdom of Shakyamuni Buddha, and Augustine warns that no human understanding is adequate to comprehend the mystery of God. According to the Lotus Sutra, the resolution of this difficulty comes through the use of upaya or, more specifically, upaya-kausalya, variously translated as "expedient" or "skillful" or "appropriate" means, including similes and parables. The wisdom of the Buddha that cannot be captured conceptually through pondering or analysis may nonetheless be conveyed in nonliteral form through concrete narratives, and the Lotus Sutra presents a number of celebrated examples. These narratives promise to transform human existence decisively, freeing humans from attachments and awakening them to wisdom (prajna) and compassion (karuna). Through [End Page 195] wisdom and compassion the Buddha establishes skillful means in order heal the suffering of human beings and to lead them into these virtues.During the same time that Kumarajiva and his companions were translating the Lotus Sutra into Chinese, Augustine of Hippo proclaimed that the gospel of Jesus Christ offered humans the possibility of victory over ignorance, sin, and death and supreme bliss in union with God in heaven. But he also insisted that God is strictly incomprehensible and the divine reality cannot be captured in any concept or image. Pondering and analysis cannot grasp the meaning of God, and so Augustine warned his congregation, "If you have comprehended, what you have comprehended is not God." Despite the inadequacy of all human thought and language to comprehend God, Augustine trusted that God has used finite signs, like the narratives of the Bible, to communicate the saving knowledge of God's love. Signs point to realities; even though the signs posited by God never express the divine reality adequately and literally, they can nonetheless reorient human life away from untrammeled, self-destructive desire (cupiditas) and toward the self-giving love that Augustine calls charity (caritas). The wisdom and charity of God are the origin and content of the salvific signs, whose goal is to lead humans into the wisdom and charity of God.Other papers explored the journey of the Lotus Sutra on the Silk Road (Mariko Walter), Mind/Nature in Zhanran and Zhili (Brook Ziporyn), relative and absolute subtlety in Zhiyi and Jizang (Kanno Hiroshi), interpretations of the theory of Buddha-nature (Linda Penkower and Sandra Wawrytko), later Japanese Tendai interpretations (Paul Groner and Jacqueline Stone), and the making of vows in the Lotus Sutra (Shinozaki Michio). While Lefebure's paper was the only explicitly Buddhist-Christian discussion, comparisons between the traditions ran throughout many of the conversations.On the morning of the last day of the conference, Lefebure responded to Shinozaki's paper and to many of the themes that had been circulating throughout the week. He agreed strongly with Shinozaki's insistence that "how we read the sutra, where we read it, when we read it, and for whom we read it are quite important." There is no view from nowhere or from everywhere. Our contemporary horizon increasingly includes the situation... (shrink)

One of the most popular Asian classics for roughly two thousand years, the Vimalakirti Sutra stands out among the sacred texts of Mahayana Buddhism for its conciseness, its vivid and humorous episodes, its dramatic narratives, and its eloquent exposition of the key doctrine of emptiness or nondualism. Unlike most sutras, its central figure is not a Buddha but a wealthy townsman, who, in his mastery of doctrine and religious practice, epitomizes the ideal lay believer. For this reason, the sutra has (...) held particular significance for men and women of the laity in Buddhist countries of Asia, assuring them that they can reach levels of spiritual attainment fully comparable to those accessible to monks and nuns of the monastic order. Esteemed translator Burton Watson has rendered a beautiful English translation from the popular Chinese version produced in 406 C.E. by the Central Asian scholar-monk Kumarajiva, which is widely acknowledged to be the most felicitous of the various Chinese translations of the sutra and is the form in which it has had the greatest influence in China, Japan, and other countries of East Asia. Watson's illuminating introduction discusses the background of the sutra, its place in the development of Buddhist thought, and the profundities of its principal doctrine: emptiness. (shrink)

This is a fine exposition of the view of Mädhyamika Buddhism established by Indian pandit Nägärjuna and its subsequent transmission to China. The teaching of Emptiness, the central doctrine of the Mädhyamika, was first brought to China in detail by Kumärajiva. A number of documents written within fifteen years of Kumaräjiva's arrival in China are analyzed to determine the aspects that were and were not understood by those students. Writings of Hui-Yuan, Seng-jui, and Seng-chao serve as the basis of the (...) investigation; they are first treated individually in order to investigate their views and terminology and then are compared in a short summary chapter. The end of the book consists of fifty-eight pages of their writings, either question and answer tracts on Emptiness, introductions to Indian translations, or short treatises on Emptiness or the lack of own-being. The book is a must for those who wish to understand either the Mädhyamika or the transmission of it to China. Though it is well written and the chapters on China read easily, the subject matter of the chapter on the philosophy of Nägärjuna makes the going rougher.--P. J. H. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Shōbōgenzō: Yui Butsu yo Butsu [and] ShōjiJoan StambaughShōbōgenzō: Yui Butsu yo Butsu [and] Shōji = [parallel French title:] Shōbōgenzō :Seul Bouddha connaît Bouddha [and] Vie-mort: Extrait de Shōbōgenzō de Dōgen Zenji[,] Maître Zen de XIIièème Sieècle = [parallel English title:] Shōbōgenzō: Only Buddha Knows Buddha [and] Life-death: Extract from Shōbōgenzō by Dōgen Zenji[,] XIIth Century Zen Master. By Dōgen. Traduit du japonais et annoté par Eido Shimano Rō (...) shi et Charles Vacher = Translated from Japanese and annotated by Eido Shimano Rō shi and Charles Vacher [trilingual edition]. La Versanne, France: Encre Marine, 1999. Pp. 152.Eidō Shimano Rōshi and Charles Vacher have completed their second effort at translating selections from Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō into English and French. Their first effort was a translation of Uji (Being-time), an early work. Now later works follow: Yui Butsu yo Butsu (Only Buddha knows Buddha) and Shōji (Life-death).The most striking feature of the translation here of the "Yui Butsu yo Butsu" fascicle is a more meaningful rendering of the title. Whereas most other translations read "Only Buddha and Buddha"—which is at best enigmatic, if not [End Page 320] unintelligible—this translation has "Only Buddha knows Buddha," a distinct improvement. The fascicle deals with the ability to know and recognize other beings of the same kind: fish knowing the fishes' heart, birds finding the birds' trail. Four-legged animals have no inkling of the birds' trail; it lies outside their ken. Similarly, an ordinary person, lacking the Buddha-eye, cannot recognize a buddha, able to see only the outside surface, only attributes and not the traces or trails. "Trace" or "trail" is intended here in the sense not of anything left over or behind—a kind of defilement—but rather of an indicator of where a buddha has gone.The phrase immediately following "Only Buddha knows Buddha" and repeated throughout the fascicle much like a Leitmotif reads: naino gūjin, complete combustion. These words are not to be found in the Sanskrit "original" text of the Lotus Sūtra, but were formulated by Kumārajīva, the translator of the Lotus Sūtra into Chinese. He was thus inspired to capture the gist of the Suō tra: only Buddha knows Buddha: complete combustion. With these words the nonduality of the working and presencing of Buddha with that of the entire universe is given expression.It is the particular merit of this translation to formulate "Only Buddha knows Buddha," in contrast to other translations that have a nearly meaningless "Only Buddha and Buddha," and to recapture Kumārajīva's brilliant interpretive words "complete combustion." The two are inseparable. When only Buddha knows Buddha, complete combustion, that is, penetration and presencing, takes place, the nonduality of samsāra and nirvāna.To say that searching for the true self is the unavoidable fate of human beings (p. 79) sounds a bit deterministic. It would perhaps be preferable to say that it is the wish or desire of all human beings.Shōji (life-death) has been used in China and Japan to translate samsāra, the repeated cycles of birth and death. The brief fascicle "Shōji" emphasizes the non-duality of samsāra and Buddha (nirvāna). Buddha or awakening is to be found in samsāra, nowhere else. The commonsense attitude is that life turns into—becomes—death. In contrast, Doōgen states that life is a temporary condition with its before and after. Thus, life is beginningless. Death is a temporary condition with its before and after. Thus, death is deathless. If we crave life and abhor death, we lose the very life of the Buddha that is to be found nowhere else than in the midst of the whole of birth-life-death.The fascicle concludes with the admonition to remain unattached, yet to have compassion for all beings.This process of birth-life-death is not something that begins at physical birth and terminates with physical death, but is ongoing from moment to moment. Thus... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative SemioticsYouru WangBuddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative Semiotics. By Youxuan Wang. London: Curzon Press, 2001. Pp. xiv + 242. Hardcover $65.00.Youxuan Wang's Buddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative Semiotics is a full-length study comparing Derridean and Buddhist discourse, especially their deconstruction of the notion of sign. Since Robert Magliola's 1984 publication Derrida on the Mend, which involved his pioneering comparison of Derrida (...) and Nāgārjuna, many articles or book chapters have contributed to the growing body of comparative studies on Derridean and various (Indian, Chinese, or Japanese) Buddhist thought. However, a more systematic study of Buddhist deconstruction had not been achieved until the publication of Wang's book. In my view, as long as the investigation of deconstructive strategies in important Buddhist texts has not been completed, the comparison of Derridean and Buddhist deconstruction will never be sufficient. Wang's book provides substantial development of this topic. The understanding of sign and the conception of the Same are the major threads running [End Page 486] through his detailed investigation of Derridean texts and the Chinese texts of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism.Wang denies that the objects of his study are "representatives of Buddhist philosophy" but rather believes they are "specimens of Buddhist literary production" (p. 11). This attitude enables him to be open to different Buddhist texts, to discover different strategies and styles, without being fettered by the problem of the self-identity of each text and its authorship. Consequently, the author's selection of a particular set of Buddhist texts has proven distinctive and philosophically significant. The texts he investigates are written neither by famous Indian Mādhyamika philosophers such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti nor by great indigenous Chinese thinkers such as Sengzhao, Jizang, and the Chan Buddhists. Such texts, with their greater names, are popular among contemporary scholars for their study of Buddhist deconstruction. What Wang examines, however, is a set of peripheral texts, including the Dazhidu Iun (translated and edited by Kumārajīva but attributed to Nāgārjuna) and the Treatise on the Eighteen Points about Emptiness (translated and edited by Paramārtha but also attributed to Nāgārjuna). Because of their problems of alleged authorship, these have largely been neglected by modern scholarship. Wang's study in fact subverts this kind of judgment of central/marginal texts by revealing their significance to the historical development of the understanding of Mahāyāna teaching in Chinese Buddhism and their critical usefulness in the postmodern discourse of sign.The subversiveness of Wang's study lies not only in his use of marginal Mādhyamika texts, but also in his bold approach to a couple of Yogācāra texts. To my limited knowledge, no serious discussion of Buddhist deconstruction has specifically referred to any Yogācāra text. Most discussions have hitherto referred to Nāgārjuna, Prāsangika, or Chan/Zen texts. It has been a common impression that Yogācāra Buddhism somehow smuggles a form of substantialization into Mahāyāna teaching through the back door. But this is not the case with the texts Wang studies. Although these texts may also be considered marginal compared to some others, Wang convincingly demonstrates in them a Yogācāra deconstruction of substantialization through the three categories of absence-of-being (san wu xing) and other strategies, with regard to a Yogācāra understanding of the Same or True Suchness.The first two chapters concentrate on a survey of the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika metaphysical-semiotic themes in the list of seventy-five existential factors and how they are undone by Kumārajīva and Paramārtha's commentaries on the Mahāyāna list of eighteen points about emptiness. Wang's analysis reveals the deconstructive power of these commentaries while doing justice to the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika refutation of naive realism. The central semiotic theme as involved in the soteriology of Mahāyāna Buddhism, according to these commentaries and Wang's interpretation, is the "true character of all dharmas"—the emptiness of all existential factors (pp. 76... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:2005 International Lotus Sutra ConferenceLeo D. LefebureIn May 2005 Rissho Kosei-kai sponsored its annual conference on the Lotus Sutra for the first time in China, at the new conference center of Beijing Normal University. Chinese Buddhist scholars Zhang Fenglei and Wei Dedong of Renmin University participated, offering discussions of "Earthly Orientation of Tiantai Buddhist Doctrine" and "Zhanran's Doctrine about the Nature of Insentient Beings and Its Ecological Implications," respectively. (...) While the main focus of the discussions at the conference was on Buddhist interpretations of the Lotus Sutra in the T'ien T'ai and Tendai traditions, the organizers invited two Christian theologians, Ruben Habito and Leo Lefebure, to participate, thereby adding an interreligious dimension. An illness in his family prevented Habito from attending, but the paper he had prepared, "Ultimate Reality and Religious Praxis: The Lotus Sutra, T'ien T'ai, and Nichiren," was presented and discussed. On the morning of the first full day, Lefebure presented the paper "Wisdom, Compassion, and Charity: The Lotus Sutra and Augustine." In it he compared the rhetorical strategies of the Lotus Sutra and Augustine. The Lotus Sutra and Augustine articulate a dilemma of communication: the Sutra notes that only another Buddha can understand the wisdom of Shakyamuni Buddha, and Augustine warns that no human understanding is adequate to comprehend the mystery of God. According to the Lotus Sutra, the resolution of this difficulty comes through the use of upaya or, more specifically, upaya-kausalya, variously translated as "expedient" or "skillful" or "appropriate" means, including similes and parables. The wisdom of the Buddha that cannot be captured conceptually through pondering or analysis may nonetheless be conveyed in nonliteral form through concrete narratives, and the Lotus Sutra presents a number of celebrated examples. These narratives promise to transform human existence decisively, freeing humans from attachments and awakening them to wisdom (prajna) and compassion (karuna). Through [End Page 195] wisdom and compassion the Buddha establishes skillful means in order heal the suffering of human beings and to lead them into these virtues.During the same time that Kumarajiva and his companions were translating the Lotus Sutra into Chinese, Augustine of Hippo proclaimed that the gospel of Jesus Christ offered humans the possibility of victory over ignorance, sin, and death and supreme bliss in union with God in heaven. But he also insisted that God is strictly incomprehensible and the divine reality cannot be captured in any concept or image. Pondering and analysis cannot grasp the meaning of God, and so Augustine warned his congregation, "If you have comprehended, what you have comprehended is not God." Despite the inadequacy of all human thought and language to comprehend God, Augustine trusted that God has used finite signs, like the narratives of the Bible, to communicate the saving knowledge of God's love. Signs point to realities; even though the signs posited by God never express the divine reality adequately and literally, they can nonetheless reorient human life away from untrammeled, self-destructive desire (cupiditas) and toward the self-giving love that Augustine calls charity (caritas). The wisdom and charity of God are the origin and content of the salvific signs, whose goal is to lead humans into the wisdom and charity of God.Other papers explored the journey of the Lotus Sutra on the Silk Road (Mariko Walter), Mind/Nature in Zhanran and Zhili (Brook Ziporyn), relative and absolute subtlety in Zhiyi and Jizang (Kanno Hiroshi), interpretations of the theory of Buddha-nature (Linda Penkower and Sandra Wawrytko), later Japanese Tendai interpretations (Paul Groner and Jacqueline Stone), and the making of vows in the Lotus Sutra (Shinozaki Michio). While Lefebure's paper was the only explicitly Buddhist-Christian discussion, comparisons between the traditions ran throughout many of the conversations.On the morning of the last day of the conference, Lefebure responded to Shinozaki's paper and to many of the themes that had been circulating throughout the week. He agreed strongly with Shinozaki's insistence that "how we read the sutra, where we read it, when we read it, and for whom we read it are quite important." There is no view from nowhere or from everywhere. Our contemporary horizon increasingly includes the situation... (shrink)