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Joseph Long [5]Joseph W. Long [3]Joseph C. Long [1]
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Joseph Long
State University of New York, Brockport
  1. Right-Making and Reference.Joseph Long - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):277-80.
    The following is a prominent version of the causal theory of reference, held by certain moral philosophers and philosophers of science: (CTR) A general term 'T' rigidly designates a property F iff the use of 'T' by competent users of the term is causally regulated by F. In a series of papers, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons present a thought experiment our intuitive responses to which provide evidence against (CTR). The present essay goes beyond Horgan and Timmons by offering a (...)
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  2.  75
    One’s an Illusion: Organisms, Reference, and Non-Eliminative Nihilism.Joseph Long - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):459-475.
    Gabriele Contessa has recently introduced and defended a view he calls ‘non-eliminative nihilism’. Non-eliminative nihilism is the conjunction of mereological nihilism and non-eliminativism about ordinary objects. Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composite objects do not exist, where something is a composite object just in case it has proper parts. Eliminativism about ordinary objects denies that ordinary objects exist. Eliminativism thus implies, for example, that there are no galaxies, planets, stars, ships, tables, books, organisms, cells, molecules, or atoms. Non-eliminativism is (...)
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    Mystery of the Trinity: A Reply to Einar Bøhn.Joseph Long - 2019 - Sophia 58 (2):301-307.
    In this journal, Einar Bøhn has proposed a solution to the so-called Trinitarian Paradox. After summarizing the Paradox and Bøhn’s proposed solution, I argue that those committed to Christian orthodoxy cannot accept the solution, for three reasons: First, it requires positing more kinds of divine entity than God and the Persons of the Trinity; second, it is based upon a false assumption; and, finally, the proposed solution amounts at best to a form of obscurantism.
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  4. In Defence of Cornell Realism: A Reply to Elizabeth Tropman.Joseph Long - 2014 - Theoria 80 (2):174-183.
    Cornell realists claim, among other things, that moral knowledge can be acquired in the same basic way that scientific knowledge is acquired. Recently in this journal Elizabeth Tropman has presented two arguments against this claim. In the present article, I attempt to show that the first argument attacks a straw man and the second mischaracterizes the Cornell realists' epistemology and ends up begging the question. I close by suggesting that, given Tropman's own apparent views, her objections are also probably misplaced.
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  5. Who's a Pragmatist: Distinguishing Epistemic Pragmatism and Contextualism.Joseph W. Long - 2002 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (1):39-49.
    There is a tendency among contemporary epistemologists to call every social or existential theory of knowledge pragmatism or neopragmatism. In this paper, I hope to show that this tendency is an error. In the first section, I will explore and attempt to define epistemic pragmatism. In the second section, I will explicate an existential alternative to pragmatism, epistemic contextualism, and differentiate it from pragmatism. In conclusion, I will apply my definition of pragmatism and the pragmatism-contextualism distinction in an attempt to (...)
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  6. Non-Cognitivism and the Problem of Moral-Based Epistemic Reasons: A Sympathetic Reply to Cian Dorr.Joseph Long - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-7.
    According to Cian Dorr, non-cognitivism has the implausible implication that arguments like the following are cases of wishful thinking: If lying is wrong, then the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife; lying is wrong; therefore, the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife. Dorr further claims that if non-cognitivism implies that the above argument and similar arguments are cases of wishful thinking, then non-cognitivism remains implausible even if one solves the so-called Frege-Geach problem. Dorr’s claims (...)
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  7. Kinds and Their Terms: On the Language and Ontology of the Normative and the Empirical.Joseph C. Long - 2009 - Dissertation,
    At the intersection of meta-ethics and philosophy of science, Nicholas Sturgeon’s “Moral Explanation” ([1985] 1988), Richard Boyd’s “How to be a Moral Realist” (1988), and David Brink’s Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (1989) inaugurated a sustained argument for the claim that moral kinds like right action and virtuous agent are scientifically investigable natural kinds. The corresponding position is called “non-reductive ethical naturalism,” or “NEN.” Ethical nonnaturalists, by contrast, argue that moral kinds are genuine and objective, but not natural. (...)
     
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  8. The Logical Mistake of Racism.Joseph W. Long - 2001 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8 (1):47-51.
    In this paper, I will explore and attempt to define one very important type of egregious discrimination of persons, racism. I will argue that racism involves a kind of logical mistake; specifically. I hope to show that racists commit the naturalistic fallacy. Finally, I will defend my account of racism against two challenges, the most important of which argues that if racism is merely a logical error then racists are not morally culpable.
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    When to Believe Upon Insufficient Evidence: Three Criteria.Joseph W. Long - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (2):176-184.
    It seems to me that many of our deepest, most cherished, and most stalwart beliefs lack epistemic justification and yet I think we have the right to hold many of these beliefs. In this paper, I will discuss what I will call salutary beliefs and distinguish them from epistemically justified beliefs. Next, I will discuss under what conditions it is proper for us to hold salutary beliefs, and finally, I will argue, that despite the fact that they lack epistemic justification, (...)
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