Authors
Joseph Long
State University of New York, Brockport
Abstract
According to Cian Dorr, non-cognitivism has the implausible implication that arguments like the following are cases of wishful thinking: If lying is wrong, then the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife; lying is wrong; therefore, the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife. Dorr further claims that if non-cognitivism implies that the above argument and similar arguments are cases of wishful thinking, then non-cognitivism remains implausible even if one solves the so-called Frege-Geach problem. Dorr’s claims have faced a number of objections, but I believe that Dorr is on to something. So, after summarizing Dorr’s argument and briefly describing three flaws in what Dorr claims, I shall present a distinct objection to non-cognitivism and use the preceding to show what Dorr’s argument gets right and what it gets wrong.
Keywords Non-cognitivism  Expressivism  Moral semantics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v10i3.186
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Non‐Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking.Cian Dorr - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):97–103.
Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
Noncognitivism and Wishfulness.James Lenman - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):265-274.
How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking.David Enoch - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):527-545.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
Are Expressivists Guilty of Wishful Thinking?Robert Mabrito - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1069-1081.
Noncognitivism and Wishfulness.James Lenman - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):265-274.
Non‐Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking.Cian Dorr - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):97–103.
The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism.Matti Eklund - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.
Against Moral Intellectualism.Zed Adams - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):37-56.
Dorr on the Language of Ontology.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3301-3315.
The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism.Nicholas Baima - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.
Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism.Colin Marshall - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):293-316.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-10-31

Total views
205 ( #56,291 of 2,506,297 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #60,050 of 2,506,297 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes